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Abstract 
What explains trust in government and how can political institutions ensure that they are trusted by 
citizens? This study explores how perceptions of the economic, political and social performance of 
government translate into citizen confidence in the institution of central government. Using a 
qualitative methodological approach involving 12 focus group discussions with ordinary citizens; and 
in depth interviews with a carefully selected set of key informants, the study explores how perceptions 
of government outputs among everyday citizens in Uganda affect how much people trust the 
government. The findings of the study reveal that confidence in government is mainly a result of 
perceptions of tangible outputs in terms of health care, education and security. At the same time, the 
study found that perceptions of corruption in government have the most trust eroding effect among 
everyday citizens. 
 Key Words: political trust, institutions, performance, Uganda. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1. Introduction 
 “The wealth of information and the statistical significance of the correlations of trust are too 
tempting to resist, and; therefore, trust has become a focus of scholarly attention and a 
presumptive cause various desirable political outcomes” Clearly and Stokes, 2009:309) 
Over the years, there has been growing perception, especially in the developed world, that 
trust in government is decreasing. There have also been many explanations for this decrease 
in trust, and varying prescriptions on how it can be restored. Some scholars have argued that 
this should not be taken as distrust in government, but rather as healthy scepticism
1
, engrained 
in the Lockean doctrine of institutionalised distrust (Levi and Stoker, 2000,). Subsequent 
studies carried out in the developing world, most notably the various Afro barometer surveys, 
have also attempted to convey growing disquiet among African citizens towards their 
governments. Opposition politicians have also used the dismal scores on trust as political 
capital to discredit incumbents. Why is trust garnering so much attention, and under what 
conditions do governments gain trust of citizens? This study explores these questions in 
general terms.  
In this section, I introduce the research problem that the thesis addresses, and advance 
arguments as to why the issue of trust is at the heart of current scholarship on democratic 
practice and governmental processes, and especially why I ask the trust question in regard to 
the current political environment in Uganda. 
 
1.2 Why the focus on trust? 
Why has trust become such a buzz word in the study of democratic processes? What does it 
mean for people to trust institutions? What makes people trust or distrust political institutions? 
What are the likely consequences of declining trust in institutions? This thesis addresses a 
study entitled 'Trust in Central government in Uganda: the importance of institutional 
outputs.' The question raised is, 'How do institutions impact on political trust among citizens? 
                                                          
1
 Nye notes that skepticism about government is a healthy tenet of democracy. Nye, Joseph(1997) In 
Government we don’t trust. Foreign Policy.99-111 
1 
 
The aim of the research is to investigate, analyze and document the meaning of political trust 
and what institutional characteristics enhance political trust among people. The research 
develops a theoretical framework that places public institutions at the centre of production and 
or destruction of trust.  
1.3 Problem Statement 
Many studies have documented the growing state of distrust in the way democratic 
institutions work in the developed world (Putnam, 2000, Dalton, 2007, Uslaner, 2001, Mishler 
and Rose, 2002). Indeed, political trust has become a core concept in recent empirical 
research on mass political attitudes and a critical indicator of good governance in the mass 
media and public debate (Dekker, 2011:1). Stokes and Clearly (2009:309) have also pointed 
out that 'the wealth of data and statistical significance of the correlations on trust are too 
tempting to resist; therefore, trust has become a focus for scholarly attention and a 
presumptive cause of various desirable political outcomes.'  
In the developing world, growing unrest and revolts may be a signal of the increasing distrust 
that ordinary citizens have for political institutions. Recent revolts such as in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Libya, and growing unrest in a number of countries on the African continent have called into 
question how much people trust governments to deliver on the promise of good and inclusive 
governance. 
 In Uganda, the National Resistance Movement
2
 that has been in power for the last 27 years is 
facing growing voices of discontent from citizens that point to credibility problems in the 
ruling class. A sense is within the country that the democratic experiment which held 
immense promise following the turbulent 1980's is faltering, and continued public protest 
echoes voices of dissatisfaction with the way democratic institutions in the country operate. 
Indeed, political commentators have pointed out issues such as rampant corruption, 
breakdown of infrastructure and aggressive government crackdown of dissenting voices as 
signs of a regime that is facing legitimacy issues (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011). This study 
therefore, seeks to understand the reasons for the growing dissent and to explore the 
institutional characteristics necessary for public trust in government. 
                                                          
2
 The National Resistance Movement is the ruling party in Uganda. It came to power in 1986 after a protracted 
five-year guerrilla war. 
2 
 
 
 
 
1.4 Purpose of the study 
This study aims to understand, using a qualitative research approach, how citizens' 
perceptions of  performance of political institutions impact on political trust. The research 
attempts to develop a theoretical framework that places public institutions at the centre of 
production and or even destruction of trust.  
1.5 Research Motivation and Outcome. 
The motivation for this study is to offer a theoretical and empirical basis that specifies the 
relationship between citizens' perceptions of the performance of government institutions and 
political trust. The central hypothesis of this thesis is that trust relates to the perceived 
trustworthiness
3
 of institutions which arises from citizens' satisfaction with institutional 
performance. What makes for trustworthy institutions? Levi and Stoker put forward three 
main features that make an institution trustworthy. First, transparency, which means that an 
institution performs its duties according to set rules and is open to public scrutiny. Second, 
fairness, reflected in the choice of policies that cater for the common well being, and third, 
absence of corrupt practices, reflected in accountable and open institutional practices (Levi 
and Stoker, 2000:485). It is through the evaluation of these features that citizens will rate 
political institutions as trustworthy or not. 
 In essence, the institutional theory of trust adopted for this thesis supports an argument that it 
is the degree of perceived fairness and impartiality in the institutions that are responsible for 
public policy implementation which serves as an important foundation for the building and 
maintenance of high political trust. Experiences of impartial, inclusive, just and fair political 
institutions are the most important factors for the development of this trust. This research 
contributes empirical evidence from Uganda to such an argument. 
                                                          
3
 Levi defines trustworthiness (of a person, institution) on two dimensions; the first, as commitment to act in 
the interests of the trustor because of moral values that emphasize promise keeping, care and incentive 
compatibility; and the second dimension, as competence. 
3 
 
1.6 The Research Question 
Maxwell (1996) notes, “any form of research is triggered by certain ideas in either the 
researchers mind, or an issue in society that one feels needs attention.”  Layder (1998:30) also 
observes that 'one need not necessarily have a clear research question, and that the 
formulation of research questions may have a rather haphazard evolution.' Indeed, Maxwell, 
(1996:51) points out that a research question is central to any study since 'it explains 
specifically what the study will attempt to learn and understand.' It is also an indication of 
what site or informants to choose, what data to collect, and how to analyze it (Ibid:51). 
Cresswell, (2009:129) also recommends that a researcher reduces the entire study to a single 
overarching question and several sub-questions.  
As stated earlier, the central question this thesis addresses is, 'How does the perceived 
performance of political institutions impact on political trust among citizens? This I break 
further into sub-questions:  
What is the nature and role of the central government in Uganda and how are these related to 
citizen's responsibilities? What are the important institutional characteristics for generating 
trust among citizens? What is the connection between perceptions of service delivery and trust 
in government? What is the significance of social demographic variables for political trust and 
how much variation do they bring
4
? 
King, Keohane, & Verba, (1994:15) point out two major features that should mainly guide the 
choice of research questions; first, their importance in the real world, and second, their likely 
'contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to 
construct verified scientific explanations of some' aspects of the world
5
.’ They argue that for a 
research question to be substantive, these two features need to be incorporated. My choice of 
the research questions had these two recommendations in mind; Let me elaborate. Firstly, 
there are various programs in Africa, Uganda inclusive, which aim at 'democracy building' 
that take the form of encouraging the growth of 'civil' society and associations. This follows 
the logic of 'making democracy work' through encouraging voluntary association (Putnam, 
1993). However, as Newton (1999) notes, there is little empirical evidence to support that 
associational membership improves trust. This research addresses the problem from the 
                                                          
4
 (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005) 
5
 The authros argue that the first criteria is mainly an issue of societal judgement, while the second, 'means 
explicitly locating a research design within the framework of existing literature' 
4 
 
supply side and shows, especially in the Ugandan context, how institutions can be the basis of 
the building or destroying political trust.  
Secondly, there is a paucity of literature on trust in institutions, in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Notable exceptions include Askvik and Bak's (2005) 'Trust in Institutions in South Africa,' 
Hutchison et al's (2011) 'Capacity to Trust? Institutional Capacity, Conflict and Political 
Trust in Africa', Lavallee et al's (2008) 'Corruption and Trust in Political Institutions in Sub-
Saharan Africa' and the Afro Barometer surveys which tap into the trust variable. 
More so, some of this literature addresses the issues from mainly macro level variables 
combining aggregated survey data from a number of African countries, with only few country 
specific studies. While this has the advantage of providing a general picture on the nature and 
extent of the political environment in many African states, it has fostered essentialist 
arguments, where findings in one country from the African continent are generalised to hold 
for others, as well.  
With such an approach, studies on democracy in, for example, Kenya or South Africa are 
usually generalised as studies on 'African' democracy, and such an approach continues to 
proliferate in the way concepts are used, without much effort to carry out context-specific 
research. This research attempts to contribute to discerning the concept of trust in the context 
of Uganda. Choosing a specific country enables us to understand specific nuances that are 
likely to be lost in aggregated multi-country studies. 
 In addition, given that trust in institutions is a product not only of institutional design but also 
of institutional performance
6
' a research agenda along these lines enriches the 
interdisciplinary dialogue between political science and public administration while 
improving our understanding of and the impact of public administration on democratic 
practice (Guillermo, 2006). This research and the questions raised contribute to this dialogue. 
1.7 Background to the Study 
1.7.1 Uganda-country Profile 
Uganda, ideally termed the 'pearl of Africa', sits astride the equator in East Africa. The 
country as it stands today is a colonial creation of the British, with boundaries that grouped  a 
                                                          
6
 Guillermo(2006) makes a strong case for a dialogue between political science and public administration in his 
review of Stokes and Clearly's study of political trust in Argentina and Mexico. 
5 
 
wide range of ethnic groups
7
 with different political systems and cultures (Anouk, 2013). It is 
in the Great Lakes Region, neighbouring Kenya to the East, Democratic Republic of Congo to 
the West, Tanzania and Rwanda to the South, and Southern Sudan to the North. It covers a 
total area of 241.038sq kilometres, with an estimated population of 35 million people (July 
2012 estimates, CIA world fact book). The capital city Kampala has an estimated population 
of 1.5 million people. 
1.7.2 Brief political History of Uganda 
Pre-colonial Uganda can be categorized into two broad political systems; centralized states 
and sedimentary societies. In the centralized states, the political system was premised on well-
defined hierarchy with an ultimate authority at the top compared to sedimentary societies, 
which thrived on egalitarianism and absence of hierarchy. By use of military conquest and in 
some cases cunning negotiations, pre-existing centralized states like Ankole, Bunyoro and 
Buganda, together with a host of sedimentary societies, which had prior to colonialism co-
existed but did not identify politically, nor  socio-economically were forced into a marriage of 
convenience to become a British protectorate.
8
 
Uganda remained under colonial occupation until 1962 when it became a juridical state 
(Mutengesa and Hendrickson 2008). British colonial rule in Uganda left a typically complex 
legacy regarding longer term prospects for economic and political development. Lwanga 
(1989) notes that the manner in which “protection” was effected, the nature of administration 
established and the colonial economy imposed were basic elements of the recipe for the chaos 
created in the post-colonial period.  
At independence in 1962, the political elites in Uganda, (headed by Prime Minister Milton 
Obote), inherited a divided state. It was an amorphous state of different political systems; 
some areas were fully federal (Buganda was a state within a state), some semi federal 
(Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro), some confederation (Busoga) and others especially the previously 
sedimentary societies, districts. This created multiple centers of power, which became  
breeding ground for further chaos, the most prominent being military takeovers which created 
a political power base for the central government (Ibid).  
                                                          
7
  Uganda facts and Information. Accessed from http://goafrica.about.com/od/uganda/a/ugandafacts.htm.  
8
 In British colonial empire, a protectorate was, ideally a territory which is not formally annexed but in which, 
by treaty , grant or other 'lawful' means, the crown has power and jurisdiction. The protectorates were usualy 
administered under a system of indirect rule. Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894. 
6 
 
This turbulent political history includes the most catastrophic rule of Idi Amin (1971-1979) in 
which state violence, intimidation and coercion became the only instrument of sustaining 
power and keeping citizens in suppression. In addition to this, parliament was dissolved and 
power vested in the military defense council as a supreme state decision-making body (Okoth 
1995). Despite Amini’s fall in 1979, there was no much change as political violence 
orchestrated during successive governments continued to rip Uganda apart.  
The year 1986 is considered a political epoch in the political history of Uganda as a relatively 
disciplined regime replaced malevolent military regimes after a protracted guerrilla warfare. 
Following the takeover of power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
instituted a form of broad-based government, banned political parties and initiated a 
grassroots-based system of administration based on local councils (then known as resistance 
councils). 
 In its 10-point programme, the NRM declared that the people of Uganda had the right to 
defend themselves against those who threaten the democratic order and human rights and that 
the state would no longer be used to violate the rights of the people (Sejjaaka, 2005). In his 
inaugural speech to crowds outside parliament in 1986, Museveni, leader of the NRM 
famously said, 
'The people of Africa, the people of Uganda, are entitled to a democratic government. It is not a favor to 
them from any regime. The sovereign must be the public, not the government.  No one should think that 
what is happening today is a mere change of guard; it is a fundamental change in the politics of our 
country
9
.' 
Museveni was constantly praised in the following years for introducing key institutional 
reforms. Among these reforms, Tripp (2010) notes, were his single minded pursuit of 
economic growth, fiscal discipline and the free market. From the onset, therefore, the NRM 
won a large number of admirers, both within and outside Uganda for its pursuit of rebuilding 
a nation whose institutions had collapsed under previous administrations (Ibid). A new 
constitution was promulgated in 1995, with many observers thinking that Uganda was indeed 
on a path to both political and economic transformation. 
However, many Ugandan political observers held a skeptical view; Ssenkumba (1998, cited in 
Tripp, 2010) notes, 
                                                          
9
 Yoweeri K. Museveni (1997), Sowing the Mustard Seed, London: Macmillan 
7 
 
'To many Ugandans, the widespread conception, mainly by outsiders, that their country is an oasis of 
stability, economic progress and democracy is a frustrating mirage
10
. For those without the privileged 
protection from the unilateral exercise of government authority, however benign or enlightened this 
authority may appear to be, this image of Uganda as an arena of boundless political openings and 
relentless economic growth is grossly deceptive
11
 '(172) 
In 1996, the first presidential and parliamentary elections held after his 10-year reign, 
President Yoweeri Museveni, the leader of the NRM, won with a big margin, gathering 75.5% 
of total votes cast. In a closely contested election in 2001, Museveni won 69% of the vote. 
Notably, his main challenger was a his former personal doctor and retired soldier of the NRA, 
who had earlier released a dossier in which he accused the ruling government of abandoning 
democratic ideals that were agreed on during the bush war and betraying the trust of the 
people.  
Following growing demands to open political space, the NRM, through and amendment of the 
constitution, freed political parties to operate in 2005. In the same year, parliament passed a 
bill to remove presidential term limits, amidst accusations of coercion and bribery, a move 
that many observers interpreted as a way of keeping the incumbent in power. An editorial of 
the government owned 'The New Vision' was indicative on this matter, 
'….a new element was introduced into our parliamentary methods of work, whereby the legislators of a 
particular persuasion, namely the NRM, were given large sums of money
12
 outside of their 
remuneration in order to 'facilitate' their voting for some proposals, particularly the removal of term 
limits!' (The New Vision, 23, 08, 2005).  
In the following election in 2006, Museveni's lead declined to 59%, amidst reports of 
widespread harassment of the opposition and voter intimidation
13
. The following years saw 
increased tensions, with widespread riots in 2009 almost threatening to plunge the country 
into chaos. In the 2011 general election, Museveni won with 68% of the vote, but voter apathy 
meant that less than 60% of voters turned up for these elections. There were also widespread 
complaints about voter registers, intimidation by the army, and widespread vote buying by the 
incumbent government (ICG, 2012). Following the election, the country was plunged into 
acute inflation, which sparked off widespread protests in the city. Movements such as 'Walk 
                                                          
10
 Tripp(2010:3) uses this argument to illustrate the 'paradox of the hybrid regime' in Uganda 
11
 Tripp (2010:3) Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime 
12
 Tripp (2010) actualy mentions that 70% of the MPs were each bribed with 5million shillings(about 2500US 
dollars) in exchange for the vote to remove term-limits. 
13
 Poll Violence Team lines up Museveni,' The East African, 28, February, 2006. 
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to Work', 'Free Uganda now' and pressure groups such as ‘Activists for Change’, ‘For God 
and my Country’, put increasing pressure on the ruling regime. A sense was within the 
country that the government had stopped 'listening' to people and is using the police and 
military to subdue them, with many describing Kampala as 'teargas city.' Indeed, Tripp (2010) 
characterizes the type of governance in Uganda today as a clear manifestation of a 'hybrid' 
regime whose dynamics present a conflicting picture for political analysts. 
How does this historical narrative inform my study of political trust in Uganda? How weighty 
are current events to my argument that trust results from perceptions of positive institutional 
performance? Scholarship on trust advances an argument that 'if major political institutions 
are deemed trustworthy, citizens are more likely to cooperate with unpopular decisions 
necessary for the long-term benefit of a society. On the other hand, if institutions are 
distrusted, citizens may refuse to cooperate or ignore laws and regulations, and the 
effectiveness of government is thereby reduced
14
' In other terms, while public trust is a key 
factor of successful government processes, its existence depends on factors that go beyond 
formal democratic procedures and include the government’s proven or, at least, perceived 
capacity to deliver on citizens’ expectations.  
In the proceeding discussion, I try to navigate the broad literature on trust, and illuminate the 
varius strands that have informed the framing of trust studies. Focussing on the sociological, 
economic and political view points, I endaver to sieve through the implications of these view 
points for the study of political institutions. I conclude the chapter by elaborating on political 
trust, placing it in an African institutional environment, and the movement system in Uganda.  
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Chapter 2: Mapping the Trust Debate 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
This chapter continues as follows; first I present a discussion of the concept of trust as 
understood in various disciplinary strands in the literature. I then address the concept of 
political trust as used in this thesis and the theoretical debate over the origins of political trust, 
locating this squarely within an African institutional environment. I then continue to examine 
the unique legacy of the 'movement' system in Uganda and how it has shaped the country's 
institutional apparatus, and what this implies for the study of trust in the country. 
2.2 Geographies of trust in 'The Trust Debate' 
The question of whom to trust and how far is as central a question of political life as it is of 
personal life...(John Dunn, 1993:641) 
As earlier noted, there is widespread agreement that citizens today view most of their 
governments with distrust (Norris, 1999). These perceptions are notably widespread, 
especially in the developed world, and specifically in the United States, although various 
studies have also found similar trends in other trilateral
15
 countries.  But what is this 'trust' that 
features so prominently in countries' political health? When we are told that citizens trust 
some institutions and 'distrust' others, what is meant by those descriptions? On what bases are 
these judgements of 'trust' or 'distrust' made
16
? And what are the implications of 'trust' or 
'distrust' for institutions? In other words, should we be concerned that the public apparently 
sees many institutions through jaundiced eyes?  
Political science literature provides answers to only a few of these important questions. The 
consequence, Seyd (2010) argues, is that 'we are poorly positioned to understand what people 
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mean when they say they trust or distrust political institutions, the criteria that underpin such 
judgements, and the implications of judging a political institution as trustworthy or not'
17
  
In this section, I attempt to map out, using both empirical and theoretical illustrations, the 
nature of trust in institutional settings. Drawing on a mass of multi-disciplinary authored 
theoretical and empirical works of scholars from fields such as economics, sociology, political 
science and psychology, I elaborate on both the various understandings of trust, and what it 
means for the study of government institutions. In particular, I borrow heavily from 
Rothstein's (2011) institutional theory of trust, Mollering's (2006) neo institutional theory of 
trust, and Putnam's (1993) empirical study of Italian regional governments, 'Making 
Democracy work.' These studies provide two particular relevant features for developing a 
more substantive research agenda on trust in institutions in the African context. 
First, they devote considerable attention to the analysis of the conceptual nature of trust, and 
elaborate, albeit in more abstract terms, what trust means and what it consists. Second, they 
address issues of conceptual measurement, devoting attention to how trust can be empirically 
studied and understood. Indeed, Putnam's study is important as a foil for the development of 
my study of trust in public institutions in Uganda.  It is against the cultural
18
 perspective of 
trust that informs his study that I adopt an institutional performance perspective (heavily 
informed by Rothstein 2011) of understanding institutional trust in the Ugandan context. 
2.3 The Conceptual Nature of Trust 
'The social science literature on trust has grown enormously in recent years, partly in response 
to the perception that political and social trust, deemed essential to a good society, are in 
decline' (Levi and Stoker, 2000:495). This interest is also coupled with competing views and 
diversity in conceptualisation of trust, given the multi-disciplinary nature of the concept. 
Nannestad (2008:415), has noted 'the wide gap between much of the theoretical and 
conceptual work on trust in the bulk of empirical studies.' Much of the recent empirical work 
on trust, he notes, be it based on surveys or experiments, does not seem to proceed from what 
is meant by trust in the first place. Rather, he argues, trust is taken to be what is measured by 
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one or more of the survey questions (Cited in Dekker, 2011:5). Indeed, social scientists have 
used widely diverging meanings of the term trust
19
, ranging from faith to confidence. 
Trust definitions have ranged from beliefs about predictable bad behaviour to faith in the 
good intentions that lie behind unpredictable behaviour. Seligman, (1997:16-30) describes 
trust as the belief in the good will of another. Hardin, (in Cook, 2001), talks about trust as an 
expression of encapsulated interest. In his view, A trusts B to do X if A believes that B has a 
reason to act in A's interest or at least to take strong account of A's interest. To Hardin, the 
trust dilemma is a principle-agent dilemma, 'in which the trustee has to do something on 
behalf of the trustor' (Castillo, 2005:3) 
Coleman (1990) proposes an understanding of trust as a problem of utility maximisation, 
while for Williamson (1993), trust implies giving someone the possibility to harm one's 
interests. To him, trust is calculative on a higher self interest level. In other words, people 
decide to make a calculative limitation on their calculativeness -by trusting.  
Ostrom and Walker (2003 Cited in Castillo, 2005:4) offer a somewhat more encompassing 
view of trust, when they point out that trust arises when ''boundedly rational individuals are 
assumed to enter situations with an initial possibility of using reciprocity based on their own 
prior training and experience.'' In this way then, 'trust is a product of reputation as well as 
other contextual variables such as institutions and the physical environment' (Castillo, 
2005:4). 
Echoing this institutional view, Mollering (2006:356) notes 'trust is a matter of embedded 
agency, where trustors and trustees, as actors, interpret the social context in which they are 
embedded.' The key element in his argument is that trust is a leap of faith; it is more than just 
a social process, but an idiosyncratic accomplishment, actively constituted in more or less 
institutionalised contexts. Research on trust, he insists, must consider the leap of faith, 
because it is what gives trust its original meaning, and ignoring the leap of faith in trust 
research could make findings superfluous. 
Echoing the 'leap of faith' characteristic, Kim (2005:621) defines trust as the willingness of 
the trustor to be vulnerable based on the belief that the trustee will meet the expectations of 
the trustor, even in situations where the trustor cannot monitor the trustee. In this way, trust in 
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government institutions is treated as normative, and concerned mainly with "the extent to 
which citizens are willing to follow government decisions even without sufficient 
information, but under the assumption that those decisions are legitimate and protect their 
interests.' Walker, et al (2008) defines trust in terms of its constitutive characteristics such as 
benevolence, credibility, consistency, honesty, integrity, openness and reliability (1). 
Macknight and Chervany (1996) note, 'the definitions of trust in the literature tend to reflect 
the paradigms of the particular academic discipline of the researcher.'
20
 While sociologists 
tend to see trust as structural in nature
21
, found in structurally embedded relationships among 
people (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Shapiro, 1987, Granovetter, 1985), some psychologists have 
viewed trust as a personal attribute (e.g., Rotter, 1967). 
On the other hand, social psychologists are likely to treat trust as an interpersonal 
phenomenon (e.g., Deutsch, 1958; Holmes, 1991, cited in Mcknight and Chervany, 1996). 
They frame their assessments of trust in terms of attributes of the trustors and trustees, and a 
host of internal cognitions that personal attributes yield. Economists are more inclined to view 
trust as institutional or as a rational choice mechanism (see Hardin, 1999, Williamson, 1993). 
These divergent viewpoints suggest inherent conceptual conflict and divergent assumptions at 
work (Rousseau, et al, 1998:393). 
Scholarly attention has also been focused on trust as a meso-level concept (ibid: 393), 
integrating micro-level psychological processes and group dynamics with macro level 
institutional arrangements. In essence, 'to study trust in institutions is to ride the institutional 
'elevator' up and down on a variety of conceptual levels' (Ibid: 394). At this point, it is 
important to examine in broader terms the various disciplinary strands that inform these 
definitions and understanding of trust. What are their commonalities, if any, and divergences? 
How can these approaches help us understand the way trust studies are framed?  
2.4 Understanding Trust- Multi-disciplinary Approaches. 
How has trust been conceptualised in various disciplines? I must say at the onset that I do not 
intend to offer a comprehensive discussion on all strands of scholarship on trust, and as a way 
of making this task manageable; I concentrate on three approaches that are particularly more 
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valuable for this thesis. I will discuss the economic, sociological and political science 
approaches to the study of trust, keeping in mind institutions as my focal point of reference. 
2.4.1 The Economic/Rational Choice Approaches 
Economists view trust as based on the expectations about choices made by another agent that 
may have an impact on one's own choices. In the economists' approaches, the need for trust 
arises out of scarcity of resources and the impossibility of monitoring other people's 
behaviour. The fact that such people are aware of this and may use this knowledge to cheat, 
and the temptation for those who have access to the resources to commit aggression and 
cheating makes trust indispensable for the allocation of these scarce resources (Casson and 
Guista, 2006). For economists, institutions emerge as a mechanism for coordinating the 
actions of less reputable people. Given that people will have an interest in promoting their 
selfish ends, institutions can promote a value system conducive to trust and encourage people 
to commit to it, supported by legally binding sanctions and norms.  
Adopting a game theoretic approach, Putnam (1993) argues that the decision to invest in trust 
(by creating a reputation of trustworthiness) facilitates transactions by reducing transaction 
costs. Suppliers of goods may refrain from opportunistic behaviour and nurture a reputation 
because it is in their interest to do so.  Ortmann (1996) notes, 'it may make sense to trust 
someone not because he or she is more trustworthy per se, but because the incentive structure 
is such that living up to his or her promise to deliver is in the person's own interest." Such a 
person may thus deliver on quality since short run opportunism could lose them customers 
and hence revenue when the 'game' comes to be repeated. In this way, trust becomes 
enlightened self interest, or what Hardin (2001) calls encapsulated interest, sustained by laws 
and morals which induce selfish people to behave in a socially responsible way. 
In respect to political institutions then, we can infer that institutions as 'agents' act as a guard 
against defaulting behaviour in the allocation of resources. Using economic theory logic, we 
can then argue that political institutions such as central government, will strive to hold up to 
their promises to the public and deliver on services out of fear of losing the people's mandate 
during the next 'game' (read election).  
The criticism with such a view is that it assumes there are legally sanctioned contracts, 
perceived as meaningful and enforced by the state. In cases where the state is the biggest 
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defaulter then, what happens? What happens, for example, when the 'game' is manipulated to 
appear in such a way as benefiting the general public when it's actually not (such as through 
manipulating public information by state agencies, or cheating in elections)?  
In addition, Rothstein and Stolle have argued that in public institutions, trust as encapsulated 
interest is more unproductive for it erodes the principal of impartiality. They note, "imagine a 
soccer match in which the referee acts as an agent of the teams. The teams could not trust 
her. In fact, it would ruin the whole game. The teams trust the referee because she is supposed 
to be impartial and competent. They may accept a loss only on the condition that the referee 
has been impartial (2001:10)." These are issues that the economic approach fails to address 
adequately, and therefore make it inadequate on its own in explaining trust in both personal 
and institutional settings. 
2.4.2 The Sociological Approach 
In the sociological approaches to trust advanced by scholars such as Granvotter (1985), 
Zucker (1986), Sztompka (1999), Giddens (1994, cited in Mollering, 2006) trust is defined as 
the taken for granted assumption of reliability that underlies social relations and transactions. 
Departing from the purely rational economic accounts of trust, sociologists do not deny 
rationality, but treat it as just one of the variables rather than the axiom. From Durkheim's 
(1984, cited in Mollering, 2006) observation that behind every contract is a host of tacit 
agents, Giddens (1994) suggests that the concept of trust be understood as presumed 
reliability and emphasises the taken for granted-ness of the behaviour of others. He uses the 
term 'blind trust' to depart from the rational choice approaches that misleadingly reduce trust 
to a matter of risk assessment.  
In the sociological view, trust is seen not simply as developing through mutually 
advantageous interactions mediated through the market, but as socially embedded, supported 
by a normative structure whose distinctiveness from calculativeness is the very aspect that 
facilitates trust. Sztompka (1999) ably notes that the condition of human nature is the very 
foundation that necessitates trust. He notices a 'perennial epistemological gap' (19), the 
condition of lacking knowledge, certainty and control regarding the bases and future 
consequences of our own and others' actions. 'Trust,' he argues  'is a bet about the future 
contingent actions of others'  (25) and  active agency, that is, believing and committing, is the 
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human response to an uncertain future. In this way, he stresses that trust is 'intimately related 
to risk' (29).  
From the sociological perspective then, institutions as systems of rules and meanings provide 
common expectations which define actors as social beings. These institutions come to 
reproduce roles and rules, and trust is based on the expectation of the reliability of the routine 
to continuously reproduce itself, and for actors not to deviate from it, for whatever reason 
(Mollering, 2006). We can then conclude from these postulations that in the case of political 
institutions, expectations of technically competent role performance are the basis upon which 
trust is built. In other words, citizens will trust institutions because they believe that the role 
bearers not only share their values and belief systems, but also because they are competent to 
do so. 
One of the most important contributions of sociological theorising on trust is the development 
of distinctions among varieties of trust. Zucker, (1986 cited in Mollering, 2006:360) identifies 
three modes of trust production; that is, process based trust, tied to past exchanges between 
actors, which may be first hand or through reputation, characteristics based trust, produced 
through social similarity between actors, (such as age, sex, ethnicity), and institutional based 
trust, derived from formal social structures such as professions or associations. In this 
perspective, unlike in rationalist accounts, institutions are more than just third party 
guarantors, but systems of rules and meanings that provide common expectations for social 
beings. 
However, one of the criticisms that have been raised against this approach is that it is built on 
the premise that trusts rests on shared values and experiences, but tends to explain agency 
away in explaining how values come to be shared. Indeed, institutions cannot be assumed to 
be infallible and immutable, and as Mollering (2006) notes, role negotiability is one of the 
features that necessitates trust. Indeed, in the rapidly complex world of modern institutions, 
taken for granted-ness and predictability seem to imply more institutional inertia. As 
Seligman (1997) argues, it is the complex nature of institutional environments and the 
absence of familiarity that necessitates trust in the first place. 
Mollering (2006:355) also faults sociological accounts of trust for concentrating solely on 
institutions, and attributing a marginal role to trusting and trusted actors. He notes "actors 
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interpret and question institutions and do not merely reproduce them passively. Therefore if a 
theoretically sound case can be made for why institutions become the source of trust between 
actors, it also needs to be recognised again that institutions become the object of trust for 
trustors who exercise their agency by relying on them,"  
From his argument, Mollering (2006) is adamant that "analytical distinction needs to be 
drawn between the influence that institutions have on the trustor-trustee relationship on one 
hand, and the trust that actors have in institutions on the other." The latter, trust that actors 
have in institutions, is what this thesis here is mainly about, and has also been the main 
subject of political science oriented research.  
2.4.3 Political Science Approaches- The centrality of Social Capital 
Political theorising on trust can be traced through Alexis De Toqueville's postulations on 
civicness, Almond and Verba's(1989) 'The civic culture' and a number of other scholars, such 
as Coleman, (1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) who have given a prominent role to the 
role of voluntarism in building social capital, whose most important ingredient is trust. 
Almond and Verba (1989) tie voluntary association to feelings of political efficacy. They 
note, 'attitudes favorable to participation within the political system play a major role in the 
civic culture, but so do non-political attitudes such as trust in other people and social 
participation in general,'(31). To them, trust enters the equation implicitly because those with 
civic virtue have the willingness and ability to act in a civic fashion.  
Coleman, (1990) also argues for voluntary associations as assuming an instrumental role; that 
of facilitating social connections and cooperation, and by virtue of repeated interactions, 
engendering trust. Building on Coleman's work on voluntary associations, Putnam (1993) 
zeros on social cultural factors, in pursuing the question of explaining differences in 
performance of regional governments in north and south Italy. 
His major finding is that the differences in institutional performance are related to the 
presence of social capital (Putnam, 1993:102). The underdevelopment of the southern region, 
he argues, was directly linked to the low levels of civic community that manifested through 
patronage and hierarchical organization (105) whereas in the north where people actively 
engaged in social clubs and reading newspapers and debate, the level of development was 
much higher. According to Tarrow,(1996) Putnam "actualizes on what he has dubbed 
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civicness or a sense of civic community, and argues that its creation and sustenance is 
provided by a "dense network of secondary associations," (see also Putnam, 1993: 176). 
Arising out of these findings, Putnam identifies trust and the lack of social capital as the major 
dilemmas of collective action. He states, "it is necessary not only to trust others before acting 
cooperatively, but also to believe that one is trusted by others…"(:164). In the absence of this 
trust, he argues, defection becomes the best equilibrium strategy for all involved. He therefore 
concludes that "the success of a democratic government depends on the degree to which its 
surroundings approximate the ideal of civic community"(Tarrow, 1996). Reflecting on 
institutions then, the social capital logic prescribes societal-centered interventions to build 
trust, such as formation of more voluntary associations and social clubs. This, it is assumed, 
will create horizontal networks of trust that in turn will spur on institutional functioning. 
One of the fundamental arguments against the logic adopted especially in 'Making Democracy 
Work' is that Putnam neglects the way political institutions shape political culture (Stolle, 
2003). Levi and Stoker (2000) also criticize Putnam's bottom up model for concentrating on 
societal factors, and ignoring policy performance which can be just as well a source of trust.  
Indeed, Tarrow (1996) also points out that the state plays an important role in shaping civic 
attitudes, while Rothstein (2011) has demonstrated the important role that state welfare 
institutions play in fostering trust among citizens in Scandinavian countries. 
 Rousseau et al argue that regardless of the differences in disciplinary approaches to trust, 
there are salient features along which trust has come to be understood. These include the 
willingness to be vulnerable (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1996) and confident, positive 
expectations by the trustor (Lewicki, et al). Arising out of this understanding, Rousseau, et al 
(1998) proposes a definition of trust as "a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon the positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of 
another"(395). They however point out that despite identification of similar meanings, the 
operationalization of trust must depend on the focal object (Ibid). This brings me to the 
subject of this thesis, political trust, the trust that people put in political institutions. 
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Table 1. Summary of trust approaches and assumptions 
Trust 
Approach 
What trust is and its 
roles 
Assumption on role of 
Institutions 
         Critique  
Economic          Trust as an individual 
disposition
         Institutions emerge to 
coordinate actions of less 
reputable people. Reliability 
in transactions
         Assumes that there are always 
legally sanctioned contracts enforced by 
the state, which may not always be the 
case.
         Economic lubricant 
that enables 
cooperation(the difference 
between Nash Equilibrium 
and Pareto optimum
         Games can be manipulates by more 
powerful individuals to the disadvantage 
of others.
         Trust arises out of 
scarce resources
         Trust as encapsulated interest erodes 
the principle of impartiality in 
institutions.
         It is enlightened self 
interest
  
Sociological           Trust is a social 
construct. It is embedded 
in social relationships, that 
produce common norms 
and values
         Institutions provide 
common expectation about 
future contingent actions of 
others.
         Explains away agency
         It is a bet on the 
future contingent actions 
of others
         Institutions are systems 
of rules and meanings that 
provide common 
expectations for social 
beings.
         No clear explanation on how norms 
come to be shared.
o    Taken for granted 
assumption that sustains 
relationships 
           Taken for granted-ness seems to 
imply institutional inertia, yet change 
happens.
         Reduces social 
complexity 
         In other words, citizens 
will trust institutions because 
they believe that the role 
bearers not only share their 
values and believe systems, 
but also because they are 
competent to do so.
  
Political 
science/social 
capital 
approaches  
         Form of civic virtue 
that arises out of 
voluntarism
         Trust facilitates 
cooperation and enables 
proper functioning of 
institutions
         No clear causal direction between 
social capital and positive outcomes
         Role of individual level interactions 
on collective action problems 
exaggerated.
         Ignores critical role of state 
institutions by focusing on civil society.
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2.5 Elaborating Political Trust.  
Political trust, a global affective orientation towards government (Rudolph and Evans, 2005) 
is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour 
by citizens from political institutions. In most common formulations, political trust is seen as 
some function of perceived conditions with the assumption being made that political trust is a 
consequence of these (Ibid). Scholars have also profitably defined political trust as a basic 
evaluative orientation towards government founded on how well the government is operating 
according to people's normative expectations (Hetherington, 1998:791). This understanding 
was largely developed from David Easton's (1965) work on political support, where he 
distinguished between diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support refers to the public 
attitudes towards regime level political objects regardless of performance, while specific 
support refers to the satisfaction with government outputs and the performance of political 
authorities ( Hetherington, 792).  
As a result, political trust has been widely studied as subjective support given to a regime and 
it is widely accepted that support is associated with evaluation of institutions. Such 
evaluations are made of government and its affiliated institutions in respect to its policies, 
promises, efficiency, fairness and justice (Miller and Listhaug, 1990). The core meaning of 
trust here is that institutions will act in the interest of the trusting and low levels of trust are 
seen as symptomatic of alienation between the government and citizens, signalling a crisis of 
legitimacy.  Because of this definition of trust, it may not be possible to trust political 
authorities who have previously violated probity (Mishler and Rose, 2002).  
Arising from this understanding are two debates that dominate the extensive literature on the 
origins of political trust. The institutional performance approach and the social trust approach. 
Both approaches attempt to theoretically grasp the sources of trust in political institutions and 
provide empirical evidence of the impact of performance or social trust respectively. I will 
elaborate. 
2.5.1 Institutional Vs Social-Cultural approach 
Many scholars have argued that politics is structured by institutions (Thelen & Steimo, 1992). 
Scholars working in different disciplines have all focused on the significance of institutional 
variables for explaining outcomes in their respective fields "Institutions affect the ways in which 
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individuals and groups become activated within and outside established institutions, the level of trust among 
citizens and leader, the common aspirations of political community, the shared language, understanding, and 
norms of the community, and the meaning of concepts like democracy, justice, liberty and equality,"(March 
and Olsen, cited in Putnam, 1993, page17).  
It can be argued from Putnam's accounts of the roots of civic culture in Italy that institutional 
variables have a lasting influence on trust in society. Explaining regional differences in 
performance of governments in 20th century Italy, Putnam invokes 11th century institutional 
legacies, 
 "throughout the peninsula during the 11th century, the time honoured imperial system of government-
byzantine in the south, German in the north, passed through a time of strain and weakness, ending in 
virtual collapse, which handed the initiative to local forces. in the south, the breakdown of the central 
government was relatively short-lived, and a powerful Norman kingdom built upon Byzantine and Arab 
foundations emerged. In the north on the other hand, the attempts to revive imperial power all ended in 
failure and local particularism triumphed all but completely. It was in this region, stretching from Rome 
to the Alps, that characteristic Italian society of the middle ages was free to evolve most fully; here, the 
communes became in effect city states, so that the area maybe conveniently described as communal 
Italy, (Putnam, 1993:121-122)."  
In the same vein, Rothstein (2011) makes a convincing case for political trust as a dependent 
variable that arises out of citizens' experiences of fair, just and uncorrupted government 
policies. 
Arising from these arguments, are questions that are relevant to today's institutional legacy; if 
the Norman kingdom had such lasting impacts on southern Italy, just as the self organizing 
communes had on the north, what parallels do we find in today's political institutions? What 
role do institutions play in fostering, maintaining and destroying trust? The institutional 
perspective in this sense would suggest that the way institutions function will determine if 
citizens will trust them or not. 
In the Cultural theorists' perspective on the other hand, trust is the main independent variable, 
affecting the level at which institutions will perform. This perspective has been furthered 
especially through studies that emphasise the centrality of social capital. One of the major 
points of departure in the social capital theory is that trust is created through dense networks 
of voluntary cooperation (see Putnam, 1993). It is in these associations, Putnam argues, that 
norms of reciprocity and moral resources that result in the creation of institutional capital is 
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developed (1993:169). He writes, "trust lubricates cooperation; the greater the level of trust in 
the community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation."  
In his study of regional governments in Italy, Putnam asserts “the power of historical 
continuities to affect the odds of institutional success” (161). These historical continuities 
included a culture of distrust, especially in the South, that negatively affected the success of 
newly created institutions. 
In sum, while culturalists (such as Putnam, Mancur Olsen) believe that trust exists prior to 
functioning of democratic institutions, institutional performance theorists (such as Rothstein, 
2011, Rothstein and Stolle, 2001, Newton, 1999) suggest that trust is a consequence of 
institutional performance and thus does not constitute a prerequisite for democratic 
institutions.  
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that questions of trust in general, and political trust in 
particular, have received much scholarly attention. It is also clear that much of this attention 
has focussed on the western world and industrialised democracies, with insufficient focus on 
the African institutional context. Given that my research setting is a sub-Saharan African 
country, Uganda, it is prudent to place this theorising on trust in the African institutional 
context. The discussion that follows attempts to do this, and to foreshadow the arguments that 
I raise later in the theoretical framework adopted for this study. 
2.6 Understanding political trust in the African institutional context  
In order understand the trust dilemma in Africa, it is important to proceed by offering a brief 
synthesis of the theorization that has defined the problematic of the African state and its 
institutions to date, and to locate political trust within an understanding that Hyden (2006) 
characterizes as institutional embeddedness. This is important for two reasons; first, it 
provides a framework through which African institutional arrangements can be understood, 
and at the same time enables us to understand the trust dilemma in Africa on its own terms.  
A number of scholars have attempted to study and understand the character and nature of the 
'African state' and its institutional characteristics. Theorists such as Weber, (1947 cited in 
Wolf, 1966) Hyden, (2006) Bayart, (1993) mainly characterise the African state as 'extractive' 
and linked through patronage systems that directly connect to the political actors that are 
involved in the political process. Max Weber uses the concept of 'prebendalism', to 
characterize the intensive and persistent struggle to control and exploit the offices of the state 
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(Wolf, 1966). Prebendalism encompasses malignant ethnicity as a mask of class privilege and 
as the most viable means of mass mobilization. According to Weber (cited in Wolf, 1966), 
"state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who use 
them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kinships". In this 
way, politics is fundamentally about the struggle for control over decision rights to the 
allocation of scarce resources. 
Hyden, (2006:232-34) notes that African political institutional arrangements can be 
understood only through an appreciation of the underlying social logic that determines 
political behavior and choice. This logic has facilitated the growth of the 'movement legacy, a 
lack of separation between the public and the private, with state institutions firmly embedded 
in society, and zero-sum political games with face to face trust that does not allow the growth 
of secondary institutions. Such an environment has been breeding ground for wide spread 
political instability and predatory regimes, resulting into a difficult and often dysfunctional 
relationship between the state and society (Hutchinson, 2011). Alluding to state-society 
relations, Ekeh (cited in Hyden, 2006:53) argues that Africans have no loyalty to the civil 
institutions of the state, but instead nurture their relationships in the local community based on 
primary social organization such as the clan or tribe. It is this primordial realm, he argues, that 
commands loyalty in African societies. Formal institutions created by colonialism are only 
milked of material resources to feed communities.  
Other scholars of Marxist orientation such as Ogude, (2009) Mamdani,(1996), Fanon (1963) 
have characterised the post colonial state in Africa as a 'vampire state'. They stress that the 
modern state in Africa has alien roots, having been introduced from abroad as the coercive 
and legal instrument of European colonial rule. This peripheral state within the capitalist 
economy thus performs principally as an instrument of ‘adjustment’ to the changing demands 
of global capital. As such, the relationship between the state and society in Africa is 
incorrigibly rough and exploitative and citizens continue to have an ambivalent attitude 
towards the state (Mamdani, 1987).  
Badie and Birnbaum (1979, cited in Bayart, 1993) more critically argued that 'societies in the 
third world tackle the construction of the state by mimicry, by a more or less forced 
acceptance of exterior models originating in the industrial societies of east or west, artificially 
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grafted onto economic, social and political structures which probably required a different type 
of organization (8).  
Although their assertion that the state in Africa is 'a purely imported product, a pale imitation 
of the diametrically opposite European social and political systems, which is moreover 
overweight, inefficient and a source of violence' has been criticized as overly stretched and 
Eurocentric
22
, they nevertheless tackle an important facet of social political exclusion of 
majorities in many governance systems in Africa. Williams (1987:4) captures this situation 
aptly in describing the situation of the post independent African state, 
 'the colonial period made the state in Africa a focus of aspiration without engendering any widespread 
sense of loyalty or legitimacy... pressure from expectations led to the fortifying of the castle gate, and 
access increasingly allowed those who could pay admission charges. This led to the emergence of a 
class of intermediaries and fixers who knew which doors to open and which guards to bribe.' 
Writing about the role of the state in Africa, a number of other post colonial writers created an 
analogy of a dead buffalo; with different hunters scrambling with sharp knives to carve out a 
piece for themselves
23
. Bayart (1993) went ahead to describe the “politics of the belly” that 
characterise political processes in Africa. These analogies are important for they locate 
patronage systems as directly connected to the political actors that are involved in the political 
process. 
 Indeed, one of the most defining features of the state in Africa continues to be its use as a tool 
for the accumulation of resources, and, unlike Marxist formulations that “those who govern 
do so because they are rich,” in most of Africa, those who are rich are so because they govern. 
In the imagination of Africans, the state, and state power becomes a resource in itself (Ogude: 
2009:7). The distribution of state resources is done through ‘big’ men (and women) connected 
to state power, and patronage is dispensed through them rather than directly to the people. 
Such a situation convinces ordinary people that they can access wealth and resources through 
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these men and women. In Uganda for example, President Yoweri Museveni, when faced with 
strong calls from the opposition to step down, retorted to his tormentors thus,  
'It is me who hunted, and after killing the animal, they want me to go. Where should I go
24
?'. Commenting on 
this statement, Obbo (2008) notes, 
'Museveni is right. In reality, a country like Uganda is a vast abattoir. Its wealth and opportunities are 
like a giant carcass laid out on the chopping table. Becoming president and being a member of the 
ruling party entitles you to getting a knife for carving out your portion. The president usually gets the 
biggest knife, and the opportunity for the first and largest cut. The Opposition and most of the ordinary 
folks usually don’t get any knives at all, or a chance to slice their bit.'  
Moreover, the phenomenon of 'big man' rule in many African countries, to which Uganda is 
not exempt, also tends to create an environment where institutions and role bearers become 
fused, in such a way that the citizens will expect reciprocities for their allegiance to a role 
bearer within that institution.  As Hyden (2006:102) notes, clients and followers expect 
something in return for their royalties. Such a situation means that the failure of the role 
bearer to reciprocate these royalties will eventually lead to a loss of trust by the followers. It is 
therefore possible to understand why citizens are more likely to trust institutions only if they 
see tangible outputs from them, and for them to view the institutions using the same political 
grammar which reduces the state (and its institutions) to the zero-sum game of 'eating.' 
 Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, (2005), Hutchinson, (2011), build on Marxist theorising 
about the origins and nature of the African state, and argue that, because the state is a 
colonially imposed system that has not necessarily evolved from the social fabric, for it to 
have any legitimacy, it needs to demonstrate its ability to deliver on services in order to be 
trusted by citizens. Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, (2005) succinctly note that political 
attitudes in Africa are formed pragmatically, and trust levels reflect society's overall 
assessment of legitimacy derived from perceptions of how well institutional performance 
matches functional expectations. 
How important are these accounts to a research agenda that aims to understand political trust 
in Uganda? One of the major contributions of such theorising is its explicit treatment of the 
origins and nature of the African state. It must be noted that studies of trust in the western 
                                                          
24
Uganda: It is not always the best hunter who takes home the choice cuts. The East African, Tuesday, 19, 
February, 2008. 
25 
 
world interface mainly with a state that has evolved from indigenous society structures. In the 
African context however, we need to understand the problematic nature of the state, and the 
fact that its evolution is less path dependent than its western counterparts. This understanding 
then illuminates the kind of conflictual state-societal relations, and perhaps it helps us 
understand why citizens would have a more pragmatic attitude in evaluating state institutions. 
In other words, such an understanding would make sense of why African citizens would only 
appreciate institutions in functional terms, basing on their usefulness in delivering services. In 
this context, Rothstein and Stolle's argument that political institutional performance matters 
for generating trust among citizens is very relevant to the African context and to this thesis. 
Here it is important to relate these African realities in the specific context of Uganda, and for 
the purposes of this study, I will briefly reflect on the 'movement legacy' and how it has 
shaped the current political discourse. 
2.6.1 Political trust and the legacy of the 'movement' in Uganda 
It would be insufficient to discuss issues of politics and institutional performance in Uganda 
without illuminating on the legacy of the 'movement system'. As earlier noted, the 
criminalisation of the state that followed decades of one-party rule had left the country 
divided not only along ethnic but party lines too.  Upon capturing power, Uganda under the 
NRM chose a broad-based, individual merit and inclusive road to no party democracy, known 
locally as omugendo
25
 (Mugaju and Onyango, 2000:1). This was rationalised as giving 
breathing space to heal the wounds of war, rehabilitate and reconstruct the economy and 
return the country to constitutionalism. It was also argued that this would give the country 
time for developing "constitutional and institutional mechanisms in the hope of building 
viable and durable democratic values and practices that would guarantee political stability,"
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economic development, peaceful and orderly change of government, rule of law and respect 
for human rights (Tripp, 2010). In his justification of the no-party movement system, 
Museveni argued that political parties are necessary in societies with social economic 
cleavages, but, since African countries have only one class, the peasant class, they do not need 
parties (Museveni, 1997:195). Movement democracy was defined as 'popular councils, 
parliament and adequate standards of living (Kasfir, 2000:68) 
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Though the movement began as a radical and unprecedented attempt to empower Ugandans in 
both town and countryside, the NRM government subsequently used it to enhance its 
legitimating and position of power. Political commentators were especially critical of the way 
that the regime had manipulated the constitutional making process to keep its grip on power. 
Oloka, (2000), notes  
'The movement is neither unique nor is it an exemporary expression of the democratic ideal. It is guided 
democracy of old in which political expression is both dictated and suppressed by the ruling political 
organisation of the day. For those who believed that the dawn of an African renaissance was neigh, represented 
in part by the effusive praise for Africa's new breed of leadership, the disappointment has been swift and bitter 
(43). Mujaju (2000) adds, 'there are inconsistencies in arguments proposed by its proponents, 
their aim reduced to self perpetuation and entrenchment.' 
Indeed, during the constitutional making process, the Constituent Assembly was accused of 
constitutionalising the continuation of the no party system and accusations of helping NRM to 
hold its grip on power. Over time, the NRM which began as a mass
27
 political party was 
turned to patron
28
 client cleavages, and the opening of political space in 2005 did not make 
things any better.  As Kasfir (2000:61) notes, over time, the main issue in the general 
elections was reduced to a candidate's proximity to the president rather than his or her ability 
to deliver in the political sense (Kasfir, 2000:61). 
On the economic side, although the country continued to experience economic growth, the 
income inequalities between the rich and poor continued to rise, and reports of constant graft 
and corruption in public institutions continued to appear regularly in the public media. 
Subsequent elections saw increasing tensions with reports of massive rigging, and matters 
were not helped by acute inflation, poor infrastructural developments and increasing 
unemployment rates especially among the youth. Many are now questioning the 'fundamental 
change' and recent research by Afro barometer (2012) indicates that 72% of Ugandans believe 
that the country is heading in the 'wrong' direction. Against such a background, it important to 
assess the reasons behind these perceptions, and to what extent they can be explained by 
perceptions of institutional performance. 
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This research therefore conceptualizes political trust as a function of institutional performance 
in the study of citizens' trust in political institutions in an African country, Uganda. The 
assumption is that people perceive these institutions as a combination of people, positions, 
procedures and processes. People trust these entities depending on how they perceive and 
assess their actions. People develop these perceptions according to their expectations of how 
these institutions should function, and if their actions will benefit certain social groups and 
how. These institutional images that they create (either through the media, personal 
experiences or through campaigns) then become the basis upon which their evaluation and 
trust depends (Askvik and Jamil, 2011:4). 
 In other words, if this hypothesis is true, then bad images or poor performance perceptions 
lead to limited trust and low participation in institutional activities and thus reliance on non-
sanctioned actions and processes. On the other hand, good images will lead to positive 
perceptions, reflected in participation in institutional activities, avoidance of actions and 
processes that are not approved by institutions such as reporting cases to police instead of 
using mob justice, reflecting institutional provisions as legitimate. 
The above dialogue with the literature on trust in general and political trust in particular aimed 
at helping me develop a theoretical framework for the study of political trust in Uganda. This 
framework should be consistent with prior evidence about the research question posed (King, 
et al: 19). The next section therefore is an elaboration of the theoretical framework that was 
used to guide this study and to address the study questions. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction  
Arising from the discussion of the various debates that inform trust studies, this chapter is an 
attempt at explicating a clear analytical framework for the study of trust in government in 
Uganda. Arising out of this literature, a theoretical framework for the understanding of 
political trust in Uganda, and a strategy to measure trust in the central government of Uganda 
is presented. The chapter also offers a brief discussion of the institutional and cultural 
approaches, and delineates specific variables that are adopted for this specific study as 
illustrated in figure 1. 
3.2 Choosing a theoretical framework  
While choosing a theoretical framework to adopt in one's research, it is pertinent to choose a 
theory that is falsifiable, (King, Keohane, Verba: 1994: 19) that is, a theory that has as many 
observable implications as possible. This, they argue, "makes it possible to collect data so as 
to build strong evidence for the theory." Neuman, (2007:25) also notes that an explicit and 
clear discussion of the theory helps to produce better designed, better conducted and an easier 
to understand study. 
The theoretical framework adopted for this study derives from Easton's (1965) concept of 
specific support, which encompasses two main elements; process and output. The process part 
concerns how decision making processes are organized, in terms of rules followed, 
competence of government personnel and participation of affected parties (Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2006:492). Process based specific trust may be high even when the output is 
unfavorable for the actors affected, as long as the process is perceived as appropriate.  
Output based specific support concerns the question of who gets what, and means that 
people's trust in government depends on the perceived gains, regardless of the process. This 
thinking informs the performance model of trust in government, which treats institutions as 
devices for achieving certain purposes. Institutionalists treat trust as a dependent variable, 
mainly arising out of citizens perceptions of fair, just and impartial public institutions. 
Rothstein and Stolle note, "it is the degree of perceived fairness and impartiality in the 
institutions responsible for the implementation of policies which serves as an important 
foundation for trust," (2001:3). Following this line of argumentation, Newton (1999) notes 
that the nature of institutional trust today differs from that of Tocqueville's America, because, 
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whereas then trust was mainly based on social identities and ideological loyalties reinforced 
by personal ties and similarities, trust now seems more pragmatic, instrumental and dependent 
upon second hand political information and performance. He notes, "politicians are less likely 
to be trusted because they are 'one of us', but because of their policy record and personal 
performance and appearance."  
Indeed, whereas in society -centred models of trust in government, such as that advanced by 
Putnam in 'making Democracy Work' , dense networks of associations build trust that fosters 
the proper functioning of democratic institutions (Huchinson, et al, 2011:742), I  argue, in the 
context of this research project, that it is institutional performance that fosters political trust 
for institutions among citizens. I put forward two reasons for adopting the institutional 
performance model as my major frame of reference. 
First, Putnam’s model, which gives precedence to the existence of trusting societies before 
institutions that perform well, is modelled on Euro-America-centric thinking about the path of 
state building. This model works well in societies that have evolved on a path dependent 
mechanism (Ibid). In the African context such as Uganda however, the state is a colonially 
imposed system that has not necessarily evolved from the indigenous social fabric. For it to 
have any legitimacy therefore, it needs to demonstrate its ability to deliver on services in 
order to be trusted by citizens. As Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, (2005)  note, political 
attitudes in Africa are formed pragmatically, and trust levels reflect society's overall 
assessment of legitimacy derived from perceptions of how well institutional performance 
matches functional expectations.  
The second reason is empirical, and it is reflected in the developments that have characterized 
African states since independence. In Uganda's case for example, the overwhelming optimism 
that came at independence quickly crumbled following successive coups. Consequently, 
following the coming to power of the National Resistance Movement, there were renewed 
hopes of a new order and democratic dispensation that would be ushered in. However, after 
almost 30 years in power, and with growing disillusionment among the population, the trust 
that people had in this liberating force seems to be on a downward spiral, as a reflection of the 
governance that people have experienced under the regime, and as expectations of political 
and economic performance fall below citizens' expectations. These two arguments lend 
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credence that this study correctly models the relationship between institutional performance 
and political trust, at least with respect to the direction of causality in the Ugandan context. 
3.3 Developing an analytical model for the study of political trust and 
institutional performance in Uganda  
The debate on institutional performance has a long tradition in international academic 
literature; but Putnam's (1993) study of Italian local governments provides perhaps the best 
example of a comprehensive analysis conducted in the past two decades. It must be noted that 
measuring institutional performance is a big task since one has to deal with multiple variables 
and indicators at different levels (Castillo, 2006:1). Shepsle (1988) argues that in order to 
evaluate a representative institution, one needs to consider both its responsiveness to its 
constituents and its efficiency in conducting the public's business. Castillo further adds that 
one of the most important dimensions of institutional performance is accountability, that is, 
the extent to which a political system is responsible to popular demands.  
In addition, while it is important that any measure of institutional performance relate to the 
two fundamental criteria for democratic government, that is, effectiveness and responsiveness,  
Putnam (1993) has also argued that any measure of institutional performance must correspond 
to the evaluations of institutional protagonists and constituents: the argument here is that 
before making any conclusions about success or failure of institutions, one needs to check the 
judgments against the views of the people whom the institution serves. This is meant to avoid 
imposing standards that are alien to the constituents. 
3.3.1 Measuring Institutional Performance 
In my analysis of institutional performance in Uganda, I adopt a subjective evaluation, 
focusing on the perceptions of the common citizens regarding the performance of central 
government.  In this way, evaluating trust in the Central government of Uganda focuses more 
on the perceived institutional outputs, than on empirical evaluations of actual performance. In 
broad terms, three propositions aid this analysis. I argue that the more institutions are 
perceived as fair, accountable and responsive by citizens, the more citizens will trust them. 
These three are further narrowed down to more vivid and measurable indicators below: 
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3.3.1 Perceptions of corruption 
Corruption and trust seem to be polar opposites (Uslaner, 2004:2). While trust is built on 
cooperative moral sentiment, corruption thrives on expropriating what rightfully belongs to 
others (Ibid). Using this variable, the study aimed to investigate perceptions of corruption in 
the central government that citizens feel in distribution of resources and treatment from 
central government. The aim then is to understand people's perceptions of corruption and 
political clientlism, which have important consequences for the development process. 
Corruption is an important issue for discussion and is always cited by the World Bank reports 
as increasing a specific 'tax' on economic activities. More so, as Rothstein, (2011:156) notes, 
corruption transfers resources from the mass public to the elites, leaving less money for public 
expenditures and therefore negatively affecting institutional performance. Putnam (1993) also 
argues that corruption reduces trust, an important precondition for development. In trying to 
understand performance in terms of perceptions of corruption for this study, the assumption is 
that citizens' perceptions of uncorrupt institutions (central government) generates and 
increases trust in these institutions. Thus,  
Hyp.1. The more citizens perceive that central government is corrupt, the more they may see 
it as poorly performing and may trust it less.  
3.3.1 Perception of government delivery of basic services-(Responsiveness to citizen priorities) 
Politics and public policy takes on a critical redistributive dimension when politicians and 
bureaucrats are charged with not only implementing prepackaged policies but also collecting 
money and deciding how it should be spent. They are faced with fundamental trade-offs, and 
the question becomes as to wether government invests in policies demanded by the general 
public, or those that feed the interest of elites to keep them in power. A government's ability 
to successfuly resolve this dilenma is an important part of what good performance is. In this 
study, policy considerations are discussed in terms of respondents’ perceptions of to what 
extent citizens' priorities resonate with where they perceive those of government to be, in 
terms of government delivery of basic services.  A variation to this discussion is whether 
some services are more significant than others in creating satisfaction and trust. Different 
groups of people may be concerned with different services, in leiu of their needs and 
expectations. In assesing this indicator, the aim is to try and understand citizens' perceptions 
about how government is performing in the deliverly of basic social services such as 
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education, health and roads. (Miller and Borreli cited in Hetherington, 1998) argue that the 
farther citizens' priorities are from where they perceive those of government to be, the less 
they will trust government. The assumption here then is that the more citizens percieve 
government as performing well in delivering basic services, the more they will trust it. 
Hyp.2. Positive perceptions of government performance in basic services may lead to positive 
evaluations of overall government performance and trust. 
3.3.1 Perceptions of tax payment 
Tax effort represents the transfer of individual resources from the population to the 
government. Taxation is theorised as one of the ways that legitimacy and trust in government 
can be manifested. Tax effort also reflects the perceptions that citizens have towards their 
government's ability to perform its functions (Fjeldstad, 2004). People's willingness to pay tax 
is likely to be based on their perceptions of whether government is doing its functions and 
reflects their trust in government capabilities. Consequently, individuals have to believe that 
these resources will be utilised effectively in order to pay tax, or that non-compliance will 
result in substantial consequence. Individuals willing to part with resources make this choice 
based on both experiences and expectations of institutional performance (Hutchinson and 
Johnson, 2011). This measure represents a rational and non-normative base for reflecting on 
individual evaluations regarding government performance. This indicator is used as a 
hypothetical question, and respondents are asked if they would be willing to pay more tax if it 
would help improve services. The thinking behind this question is that positive expectations 
on the uses of tax monies will lead people to be willing to pay tax, and reflect peoples trust in 
the system. As Fjeldstad (2003) found in his study of non-payment of service charges in 
South Africa, one is most likely to obey the law if they feel that they are sure that they will be 
treated fairly. In this case, reported tax compliance would reflect trust in the system. 
Hyp.3. Perceptions that tax payments are properly used may inspire people to be willing to 
pay more, and reflect trust in the government. On the other hand, if tax money is perceived as 
being misused, people would be hypothetically unwilling to pay more tax. 
3.3.1.4 Perceptions of tribalism/Ethnic cleavages. 
Ethnicity has been one of the most widely regarded factors in African politics. Indeed, many 
studies of politics have intimately tied ethnic cleavages to national politics in ways that 
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suggest a relationship that is both supplemental as well as conflictual to national political 
landscapes. I use the term ethnic identity here from Erickson’s, (1962) definition, as a process 
located on the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a 
process which establishes, in fact, the identity of these two identities and ethnic 
consciousness; what it takes to recognise this identity and use it for one’s ends; what propels 
behaviour.” While it is mainly looked at it as parochial, ethnic determination of people’s 
political choices continues to have a large influence in many post colonial states, attached 
mainly to an ethnic group's power of brokerage. 
Brokerage, as used by Young (1976)) refers to the power of ethnic elites to negotiate a share 
of resources not only for themselves but for their constituents as well. Ethnicity is important 
in the study of trust in Uganda, given the diversity of ethnic composition, and the power of 
ethnic elites in allocation of resources. My main proposition here is that one's perception of 
ethnic group favouritism will have a big impact on how much they trust the central 
government. That is, the more central government is perceived as favouring a particular ethnic 
group, the less it will be trusted by citizens. However, it is also possible that these perceptions 
maybe affected by in-group out-group location. That is, if one belongs to the ethnic group that 
is favored, they are more likely to trust the government while those outside are likely to show 
distrust. Favor to one's ethnic group compromises the principles of impartiality, uniformity 
and standardization. The less these principles exist in government, the more the state will be 
considered biased towards a particular group and the less it will be trusted. 
Hyp.4. perceptions of tribalism may lead to distrust of government by those who feel left out 
and do not belong to the favored ethnic group. Tribal favoritism is also likely to result in poor 
overall evaluations of government performance. 
3.3.1.5 Perceptions of political Stability 
In Uganda, evaluations of government performance cannot be complete without addressing 
the issue of national security. The country has been scourged by war for decades, and, 
although there is relative peace now, there are still pockets of instability. Observers of 
Ugandan politics have always argued that one of the reasons the current regime has been able 
to keep in power is because it has managed to maintain a semblance of security within a once 
chaotic nation (Krutz and Logan, 2011). The security factor therefore becomes a key indicator 
of performance. Perceptions of political stability by citizens, in this case I assumed would 
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override other factors in evaluating government performance, and  positive perceptions would 
thus lead to more trust among citizens. Focus group participants were asked to evaluate the 
government in its delivery of peace and security, and how important this is to them. In 
pursuing this question, I was interested in finding out the disparities in perception among the 
different age groups, especially I assumed that young people who lived in relative peace 
would not have reservoirs of the past to draw from, and therefore this would mainly be a 
significant factor among older people. 
Hyp.5 perceptions of political stability may more human security and societal peace and may 
lead to more trust in the government by citizens. 
3.3.1.6 Accountability (understanding government roles and citizen responsibilities) 
Accountability is the degree to which governments have to explain or justify what they have 
done or failed to do (Swianiewicz, 2000) One of the theoretical advantages in a democratic 
system is improved information about citizens' needs and preferences, but there is no 
guarantee that leaders will actually act on these preferences unless they feel some sort of 
accountability to citizens (WorldBank, 2001). Elections are the most common and powerful 
form of accountability, but even these must be free and fair for them to hold any meaning for 
citizens. In trying to discuss governmental performance in terms of acountability to citizens, 
first i tried to understand how citizens view the roles of central government as an institution, 
what it does, and whether they perceive it to be working in line with these roles. In addition, I 
also tried to discuss and understand whether citizens feel they have any power to hold 
government accountable for its actions. The assumption here was that the more citizens feel 
they can hold the central government accountable for its actions, the more they will have trust 
in it and the more powerless they feel regarding what government does or does not do, the 
less they will trust it. 
The question then that arises in trying to understand these perceptions and trust evaluations is, 
how are they formed? And what do people mean when they say they trust an institution or 
not? The following section tries to address political trust, the dependent variable, and how it 
was measured in this study.  
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3.3.2 Measuring Political Trust 
Scholars have argued that trust evaluations are influenced by a number of factors, including 
but not limited to, the extent and nature of media exposure (ibid), the level of political 
engagement, political leaning, ethnic alliances and a number of other social demographic 
characteristics. Media exposure is important because the distribution of negative or positive 
information about government institutions affects the way in which individuals make 
performance evaluations about government. This information, becomes the basis for forming 
judgments regarding the expected role of government against the perceived outputs. The 
discrepancy between the two may result into reduced trust.  
With this in mind, In the framing of this study, my aim was to try and understand trust from 
the discussants point of view, therefore the first question that was addressed was what it 
means to trust, and what characteristics are necessary for an institution to be held as 
trustworthy. The discussion aimed to delineating the concept of political trust through 
understanding local metaphors and images, and then further discussion to address how these 
trust evaluations are made. It was also important to get a normative evaluation frame that 
disregarded issues such as one's party belonging, ethnic alliances and other issues by allowing 
respondents to draw their own frame of reference on what a trustworthy government looks 
like. 
In order to understand how trust evaluations were made, two variables were considered. These 
were,  
a) Confidence in the electoral commission and the electoral process,  
b) Confidence in government.  
3.3.2. Political engagement-Confidence in the electoral commission and electoral Process 
Political engagement has been widely acclaimed as one of the markers of civicness. Putnam 
(1993) asserts that  one of the indicators of civic community is the level of citizen interest in 
community affairs. The critically disengaged, he argues, are also more suspicious and 
distrustful of government. Indeed, Schildkraut (2005) also notes that when people are 
politically engaged, their issues are likely to be addressed by the political system. At the same 
time, she argues that politically active citizens are more likely to make favorable evaluations 
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of the political process. In trying to shed light on this issue, I chose the variable of perceptions 
on the electoral process and the electoral commission because it represents the main avenue 
through which citizens interact with the electoral system, not only by electing their leadership, 
but also by rejecting those that they feel have not fulfilled expectations. Trust in the electoral 
process would also mean that the regime is more likely to be seen as legitimate even by those 
that do not support it. The hypothesis therefore is that trust in the electoral process and the 
electoral commission would reflect regime legitimacy and political trust in central 
government as a whole.  
Hyp.6. The more the citizens perceive the electoral commission as competent and the 
electoral process as free and fair, the more they will have trust in government. 
3.3.2.2 Confidence in Government 
This indicator was used subjectively as a direct question of whether citizens have confidence 
in central government or not and why. This variable was used as a check against the other 
indicators being used, for it captured a direct, non obtrusive gauge on whether or not people 
trust the central government, and what characteristics they think a trustworthy institution 
should have. Confidence in government is also directly related to people's belief in the 
competence of government institutions. 
3.3.3 Demographic variables  
I also add a set of demographic variables such as age, gender and education that have been 
found to have an influence on trust(Kuenzi, 2008). 
3.3.3 Age  
Seligson (2002) views age as an important factor in explaining political trust. In his thinking, 
young people might be expected to exhibit greater trust because, unlike their elders, they have 
not accumulated the years of disappointment with institutions and may have an idyllic view of 
democracy. The counter argument in Uganda’s case, may be that younger people may be less 
likely to trust the government than the older people. This may be explained by the fact that 
they have grown up with higher expectations from government, and their access to 
information through social media may make them more demanding of government. In 
addition, youth unemployment in Uganda is at an all time high, at 36 % compared to the 
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national average of 3.2. Some have even described this as a 'ticking time bomb
29
.' The older 
people on the other hand are more likely to value government outputs in areas such as 
security, and therefore may trust the government more.  
Hyp7. Young people may be less trusting of government than older people. 
3.3.3.  Education  
It has been argued  that citizens grant or withhold trust based on their evaluation of the 
performance of the actors or institutions of government (Alvarez and Hall, 2008).  As such, it 
can be assumed that educated people, given their greater capacity to accurately assess the 
level of issues like corruption, coupled with a stronger commitment to democratic values, are 
likely to be more critical of government. Secondly, citizens with more education are not only 
more likely to be better able to identify practices that undermine the smooth functioning of 
government, they are also more likely to be normatively troubled by practices such as 
corruption. Seligson (2002) also argues that more educated people are likely to be more 
informed about government and therefore more critical. This is likely because educated 
people are exposed to more information about government and are therefore in a better 
position to compare how government is doing in relation to its responsibilities. They are also 
likely to be more demanding of government due to this exposure and access to information. 
Counter arguments are that because of the cognitive factor, educated people have greater 
knowledge about the political administrative system, can distinguish between its various 
components and understand how public services are organised and function, something that 
supposedly furthers trust (Christensen and Lægreid, 2003:494). The less educated, it can be 
argued, are more likely less engaged in political debate, are less likely to put political elites to 
task and have limited information about government to be able to critically evaluate it. 
The study  therefore hypothesised that those who were highly educated were more likely to be 
critical about government performance and less trustful of government, while those with 
lesser education were assumed to be likely to evaluate the government in a more positive 
light. 
Hyp8. The more educated one is, the more critical and less trustful of government one may be. 
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 Rising Youth unemployment in Uganda, a ticking time bomb. The Daily Monitor, Saturday, April 7, 2012. 
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3.3.3 Gender  
Gender is also a key determinant of political trust, with scholars like Chang and Chu, (2006) 
arguing that women are less likely to trust political institutions. This argument is based on 
various studies, especially from Europe and north America, that have documented the 
different levels of both information access and resources to engage in political activity 
between men and women. In these studies, women's roles as house mothers and their limited 
access to the public sphere, it is argued, limits their access to information about government 
and their disaffinity for politics. Women may also find public organisations such as 
bureaucracies to be more masculine and hence less sensitive to their issues ( See for example 
studies such as Norris,2002, Burns, 2007 and Dalton, 2008). In my study, I also adopt an 
alternative hypothesis, with an assumption that women would be more likely to trust 
government than their male counterparts. This thinking is informed both by various studies 
that have documented the progressive role that the current movement regime in Uganda has 
played towards women empowerment (Ahikire, 2003, Tripp, 2000) which has also been 
reflected in women as a big voting block for the current regime. It is also likely that the 
relative security enjoyed during the current NRM government is more appreciated by women, 
given the past indicators that showed women and children as the biggest causalities of war. 
Consideration of a positive security environment may therefore lead to more trust in 
government by women. 
Hyp.9. Women are more likely to trust government than men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical model guiding research and presentation of findings. 
Independent Variable                                                                          Dependent variable 
Institutional performance                                                                     Trust in Government 
                                                                 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
Demographic  Variables 
 
                                                             
 
 
 
Source: Author’s synthesis derived from literature 
The model presented is a synthesis of ideas borrowed from Lavalee, et al (2008), Hutchison 
and Johnson (2011), Putnam (1993) and Hetherington (1998). The main Independent 
Variable, institutional performance, is operationalized in terms of perceptions of corruption, 
perception of tax payment, perception of fairness reflected in low tribal favouritism in 
allocation of resources, and perceptions of government delivery of services, while the 
Dependent Variable, trust in government, is operationalized in terms of confidence in national 
government and confidence in the electoral process. To address the above theoretical 
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propositions a research strategy was adopted as a way to identify the respondents, scope and 
methodology for the conduct of the research. This is what I discuss in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 : Methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I discus the various methodological considerations that have been adopted for 
the study. The chapter gives detailed information about the thought processes that informed 
the study, the research strategy adopted, methods used and types of respondents that were 
targeted for the study. A strategy to ensure quality of the study is discussed, also keeping in 
mind ethical issues since the study targets human subjects. The chapter also highlights some 
of the methodological challenges that were encountered during the course of the research and 
how they were addressed, and outlines the data analysis techniques  that were adopted for the 
thesis. The chapter concludes with a critical reflection on the whole process and usefulness of 
research that targets human subjects as social and reflective beings. 
4.2 The Research Design 
When designing a research project, one needs to ask; given this research question, what type 
of evidence is needed to answer it convincingly? A research design is therefore the logic that 
links the data to be collected and the initial questions of the study (Yin, 2009:26). The main 
purpose of the research design is to reduce ambiguity of research evidence. Indeed, a good 
research design eliminates rival explanations of the evidence and seeks evidence that could 
falsify the theory. Yin describes five components of a research design: the study’s questions, 
its propositions, its unit of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions, and the 
criteria for interpreting the findings (2009:27). In the same vein, King et al (1994:13) divide 
research designs into four components: the research question, the theory, the data and the use 
of the data. They however stress that these do not necessarily follow a predestined order, and 
their structuring depends on the research environment. I have already discussed the research 
questions and the theoretical framework used in this study, the discussion that follows below 
elaborates the research strategy adopted for the study. 
4.3 Research Strategy 
This research adopts a qualitative methodological tradition, specifically using FGDs and in 
depth interviews as the primary data gathering techniques and an interpretive approach in data 
analysis. Qualitative research, Creswell (1998) notes, is an inquiry process of understanding 
based on a distinct methodological tradition of inquiry that explores a social phenomenon or 
human problem. The research takes place in a naturalistic setting where the researcher is an 
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instrument of data collection who gathers words or pictures, focuses on the meanings of 
participants and describes a process that is expressive and persuasive in language. The reason 
for adopting this approach in the study of trust is that trust is a complex concept (Newton, 
1999) and using this approach is a useful way of building a holistic, complex picture, where 
the researcher becomes an active learner who can tell the story from the participants' view 
other than as an expert who passes judgment (Creswell, 1998:18). Moreover, this approach to 
the study of trust recognizes the intentionality of consciousness, and the refusal of the subject 
object-dichotomy so often found in research works, by being cognizant of the fact that the 
reality of a concept can only be perceived within the meaning of the experiences of an 
individual. 
4.4 Research Location 
To address the above propositions, I carried out the study in three Divisions of Kampala city. 
These are Kawempe Division, Central Division and Rubaga Division. The choice of Kampala 
city was based on its diverse demographic characteristics, which gives a more nuanced picture 
of citizens' views from different economic, ethnic and political backgrounds. It is also the 
political and administrative capital, and therefore it is assumed that citizens here are more at 
grasp with what government does. In addition, and unlike other districts of Uganda whose 
management is under local government, Kampala is placed solely in the hands and authority 
of central government through the Kampala City Council Authority Act 2010 (Karyeija and 
Kyohairwe, 2012:684). It  was therefore an appropriate site to study political trust. 
The choice of the three divisions also followed a closely related logic. Central Division is in 
the heart of the city and most commercial, political and social activities take place here. It is 
multi ethnic, has people from various economic and educational backgrounds, and is the 
centre of power. It was therefore interesting to 'feel the beat' at the centre. Rubaga Division, 
just adjacent to central division, is important as the seat of one of the main centres of power, 
the kingdom of Buganda. It is important to note that the kingdom politics has significant 
impact on central government, as evidenced in the 2009 September
30
 riots. Here the ethnic 
factor was important as it was aimed at determining how ethnic tensions affects the views of 
citizens on government institutions. Kawempe  Division is chosen because of its diversity in 
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 The september 2009 riots took place after confrontation between the central government and the kingdom 
of Buganda. The riots erupted after the central government blocked the king of Buganda from travelling to 
Kayunga, a part of the kingdom of buganda that is highly contested. The riots broght the city to a standstill, and 
left more scores dead. 
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population demographics. More so, Kawempe's demographics consist of a population of 
youth, both educated, as evidenced from the presence of various higher institutions of learning 
(State of Uganda population Report, 2007), and those with low education, mainly doing semi 
skilled jobs such as boda boda
31
 riding. I also discovered in the course of the research that this 
is one of the most politically charged divisions in the city, where the opposition holds key 
positions, and where people are actively involved in following the political events that are 
shaping the Ugandan state today. It was therefore fruitful for an investigation of political trust 
as it provided fertile ground for discussions on issues of political trust. 
4.5 Methods of Inquiry  
'Truth lies at the confluence of independent streams of evidence' Karl Deustch, cited in 
Putnam, 1993:12) 
The range of methods and techniques of data-gathering include the use of qualitative or 
quantitative data, or some combination of the two (Layder, 1998:42). In fact, Yin (2009:115-
122) proposes three principles to be followed in data collection; the use of multiple sources of 
evidence (this allows the researcher to address broader range of historical and behavioral 
issues), creation of a database and maintaining a chain of evidence during the inquiry. He 
further points out that the use of various methods in data collection can permit investigators to 
address more complicated research questions and collect a richer and stronger array of 
evidence than can be accomplished by a single method (63). In order to underline the value of 
this consistency in my inquiry, I employed focus group discussions as my major data 
collection technique, supplemented by in-depth interviews and media content analysis. These 
I elaborate below. 
4.5.1 Focus group discussions 
A focus group is a carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a 
defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening, non judgmental way. The purpose of 
conducting a focus group is to listen and gather information. Participants are selected because 
they have certain characteristics in common and relate to the topic of the focus group. The 
researcher does not do one focus group; the discussion is conducted several times with 
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 Boda bodas are essentially motor cycles used to transport people. It is one of the most unique features of 
kampala city, used mainly as a way of beating the constant traffic jam. Many youths that have emigrated to the 
city are involved in this activity. 
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different participants so that the researcher can identify trends and perceptions (Krueger and 
Cassey, 2009:2). 
 Focus groups work well to determine perceptions, feelings and the thinking of people 
towards particular issues, services or opportunities (Ibid:8). However, a researcher has to be 
cognizant of the disadvantages associated with focus groups, such as the tendency for 
dominant members to hijack the discussions and influence results, and a tendency for 
members to offer dishonest opinions just for the sake of appearing informed (ibid:14). 
Patton(2002, cited in Krueger and Cassey, 2009:21) also advises about choice of participants 
for the focus groups, to choose from "those from whom one can learn a great deal about the 
issues of central importance to the purpose of the research." Three or more focus groups are 
recommended because focus group data is analyzed across groups to find patterns and themes 
across groups (21). 
For the purpose of this study, a double layer
32
 focus group design was employed, and twelve 
(12) focus groups were conducted. This included the multiple category design, with 
participants of various characteristics in different geographical locations(Ibid, 27). 
 Focus group participants were mainly purposively selected,  for example, the educated youth 
groups mainly consisted of participants who are students at higher institutions of learning. I 
was able to recruit them because I lived in an area with a high student population, and so I 
talked to different individuals  about joining a discussion on issues affecting everyday citizens 
in Uganda. Those who agreed mainly formed these youth focused groups. I worked with 
Local Council leaders to access participants for the older people and uneducated youth focus 
groups. I talked to the LCs and they informed me when they normally hold village meetings, 
and I would then talk to various people after the meetings to recruit them for a focus group 
that would take place a few days later. It also happened that some of the participants that I 
invited to the focus group would invite along a friend, and if in my discussion with them that 
person fitted the characteristics of the group, I let them join, or asked them to come to another 
group which they would fit in. This selection of course has implications for the findings of my 
study. First, given that the people I mostly selected were those that usually come to village 
meetings, it is possible that I selected the most active citizens of the population, or also that 
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  A double layer design involves selecting participants from diferent geographical areas as one layer and 
different participant types as another. In essence the analyst can compare and contrast  based on geographical 
regions or between participant types(Krueger and Casey, 2009:26). 
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my having talked to the chairman first would influence the way the discussion was framed. I 
however tried to organise the groups in the most open manner, and at all times assured my 
respondents that they were free to air their views as they would only be used for academic 
purposes. Moreover, recruiting people from village meetings was advantageous because most 
of them were already acquainted with each other and therefore had some level of rapport, an 
issue that I felt was important given that the topics to be discussed could be perceived as 
sensitive. We also held discussions mainly in neutral places such as a school room on the 
weekend, or in a relatively quiet open space especially when the group was small. These steps 
ensured that at most an environment of free expression was facilitated. The discussions for the 
educated focus groups were held in English, while the ones for the uneducated were held in 
Luganda, a widely spoken language in Kampala. It was also advantageous that all the focus 
group participants could understand at least one of these two languages. 
 In the focus groups, there were animated discussions about government, including its roles, 
performance and issues such as corruption, infrastructure, voting, protest and tax payment. 
Other issues raised included how citizens understand trust, and their views on how a 
government can make people trust it. There was also discussion of what characteristics 
citizens think are important for institutions if they are to generate trust (that is, what does it 
mean when citizens say they trust an institution? What sort of evaluation are they using? What 
has the institution done that makes it trustworthy? What are their perceptions on corruption in 
central government? In what areas do they think government is performing well? What is it 
failing to do? The discussions in the various focus groups were useful in providing insights on 
the various ways in which people perceive institutional trust, and what institutional 
characteristics are important for citizens to trust institutions. 
For the focus group discussions, a discussion guide was  used, and the researcher moderated 
the discussion and also took notes, with the help of a research assistant who also took notes. 
The use of an assistant in note taking was as a result of concerns raised by various group 
discussion members about recording their voices. Since I take seriously the concerns of the 
discussants about their anonymity, the recorder as a tool was therefore discarded and careful 
and elaborate note taking was used instead. Here I must mention that the use of a research 
assistant has its own shortcomings. The assistant may not understand the questions, or may 
make the moderator lose control of the conversation during the focus group (RiDNet, 2012). 
These potential challenges were however overcome because I recruited someone that I knew 
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and had earlier worked with, whose competence I had firsthand experience of. We also went 
through the guide together after I had clearly explained the purpose of the study. Indeed, she 
also read through the thinking process (Proposal) so as to familiarise herself with the 
concepts. An attempt was also made to use clear, short, open ended, one-dimensional 
discussion questions. This helped to evoke open conversation among discussants. 
4.5.2 In-depth Interviews 
In-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive 
individual interviews with a small number of people to explore their perspectives on a 
particular idea, program or situation (Boyce and Neale, 2006). This method was employed to 
gather data from purposively selected public opinion leaders including intellectuals and 
politicians. The main purpose of the interview was to gather insight on the political process in 
the country, and also raise questions about the relationship between institutions and citizens. 
The aim of interviewing these respondents was to gain a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between government institutions and the people. The instrument used had a set of 
predetermined open ended questions that guided the interview sessions. A defect of the 
interview method is that the researcher takes the lead and the interviewee takes a more passive 
role, information of high value may not be disclosed and the data obtained is as likely to 
embody the preconceived ideas of the interviewer as much as the attitudes of the subject 
interviewed (Kruger and Casey,2009:2). I interviewed individuals who in my thinking have 
experience on Uganda's political situation, and effort was made to allow for an open 
expression of ideas and interaction. The results from these interviews will be used to 
supplement those of the average citizen. 
I must mention here that including politicians in this sample appears problematic, because it is 
likely that they will have partisan views, this was mainly intended as a way of gauging how 
much partisanship affects evaluations of government performance and trust, especially 
focussing on where government is performing well or not.  
4.5.3 Media Content Analysis 
To supplement data generated from primary sources secondary sources of data were also 
used. These include mainly issues from mainstream media, the Government owned The New 
Vision, and The Monitor which is more opposition sympathetic, and also content from radio 
and Television talk shows  to supplement the main data collected. I noted down the major 
news stories that related to government activities during the time of data collection, and also 
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devotedly watched the 10 o'clock news popularly known as 'agataliiko nfuufu'(loosely 
translated as unedited or uncensored news). The purpose of using this source is because it has 
become a major avenue for ordinary citizens to vent their frustrations with the regime, and 
one can easily pick a trend in the political and social economic situation of the country 
through closely following the bulletins. The use of these multiple sources was also intended to 
try and gauge my findings against the general issues that were being raised everyday by the 
wider Ugandan public  and collect as many observable implications of perceptions of 
government performance as possible to be able to present substantive line of argument. 
4.6 Sampling Method and Target Respondents  
I used both random and purposive sampling techniques. Selection of respondents was put into 
two main categories. The first category consisted of 44 ordinary citizens above 18 years and 
they were selected for the focus groups. I employed both purposive and stratified random 
sampling
33
 technique to select this group. It is important to note that the intent of focus groups 
is not to infer but to understand, not to generalise but to provide insights about how people in 
these groups feel about a topic under discussion. The use of randomisation therefore was 
mainly intended to prevent selection bias and to obtain respondents with varying social, 
political, ethnic and educational background.  As I already mentioned, I built rapport with 
most of my respondents who lived in my vicinity while others were  identified after attending 
some Local council meetings and requesting the leaders if I could talk to some of their people.  
The second category of respondents  consisted of five key opinion leaders and academics. 
These were purposively sampled in order to obtain deeper insight and information about the 
subject matter of trust and governance as well as insights regarding Uganda's political 
landscape. Krueger and Casey (2009) recommend in the selection of individuals for in-depth 
interviews and focus groups that one should select what one considers 'information-rich cases' 
or 'those from whom one can learn a great deal about the issues of central importance to the 
purpose of the research'(21). In essence these two groups of respondents  were selected 
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 This is  method of sampling that involves the division of a population into smaller groups known as strata. In 
stratified random sampling, the strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics. A 
random sample from each stratum is taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size when compared to 
the population. These subsets of the strata are then pooled to form a random sample. Here it is important to 
note that due to time and financial constraints, I could not attain a proportional sample size, but the aim is to 
capture the varied characteristics. 
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because they  appeared to posses relevant information that were key  in answering the 
research questions of posed in the study. 
4.6.1 Sample Size 
Creswell indicates that it is very important for a researcher to identify the population in the 
study (Creswell, 2009). The total sample for my research was 49 respondents. 44 respondents 
were for focus groups and five respondents for in depth interviews. I conducted 12 focus 
groups each comprising an average of four people, and  five in-depth interviews. Of the 12, 
five focus groups were for men, four for women and three for youths. These categories were 
further subdivided into educated and non educated. The reason for dividing the groups 
according to age, education and gender was because, as I earlier discussed, these 
characteristics may have important effects on both political trust and evaluations of 
performance (Marien and Hooghe, 2008)  and I therefore wanted to find out if these were 
significant in the case of Uganda. In addition, grouping people with similar characteristics 
was meant to facilitate more open discussion, and to make people more comfortable in 
relating to each other in the focus group. 
 Each focus group lasted on average two and half hours, while the in-depth interviews were 
conducted within one hour each. Although I had originally planned to conduct only 4 focus 
groups, I realised that for my analysis to be more informed and broad, and in order to be able 
to capture views from diverse categories of people, I had to conduct more focus group 
discussions. Another reason for conducting more focus groups is because focus group data is 
analysed across groups, and the analyst looks for patterns and themes across groups (Krueger 
and Casey, 2009:21). Conducting more focus groups also helps to determine whether the 
discussion reaches a point of saturation
34
. In addition, each group comprised  an average of 
four people in order to facilitate a more interactive discussion. As Krueger and Casey 
(2009:6) note, the focus group must be small enough for everyone to have an opportunity to 
share insights and big enough to provide diversity of opinions. Conducting smaller groups 
was important for  participants to feel more comfortable to share ideas (67) while too big 
focus groups would have limited participants' opportunity to share insights and observations.  
 In addition, the five in-depth interviews were conducted. Of these  two are political scientists 
from the highest institution of learning, Makerere University, two are leading figures in 
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 Saturation is a term used to describe the point where one has heard a range of ideas many times and there is 
no new information arising(Krueger and Casey, 2009:21) 
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political parties, and one is a director in a political advocacy group. These respondents were 
selected purposively to gather more varied and deeper understanding of the broader issues 
related to trust in government institutions in Uganda. Indeed, conducting in-depth interviews 
in addition to focus groups facilitated the opening up of multiple lines of inquiry that help to 
compare findings and improve the quality of findings and conclusions.  
 
 
Table 2. Profiles of Focus Groups 
Area No. of Groups Gender Education profile Number of 
participants 
per group 
Rubaga Division 2 Female  Uneducated  5 2 
Kawempe  2 Female  Educated 3 2 
Central Division 2 Youth(mixed 
male and female) 
Un educated 7 4 
Rubaga  1 Youth (mixed 
male and female) 
Educated  5 
Central Division 3 Male  Uneducated  3 5 3 
Kawempe  2 Male  Educated  3 2 
Total number    12                                                                                               44 
 
Source: Field Data July-August 2012 
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Table 3. Profiles of key informant Respondents  
No. Respondent gender  Profile  
1  Male  Political Scientist from 
Makerere University 
(Government sympathetic) 
1 Male Lecturer ethics Makerere 
University 
1 Male Opposition Politician from 
Forum for Democratic Change 
(FDC) 
1 Male Opposition Politician From 
Conservative Party 
1 Female  One of leading advocates in 
Activists for Change (A4C) 
 
Source: Field Data July-August 2012. 
 
4.7 Data Analysis 
A data analyst has an obligation to do the very best with full intellect to fairly represent the 
data and communicate what the data reveal given the purpose of the study (Patton, 2002:434, 
cited in Krueger and Cassey, 2009:113). Krueger and Casey (2009:114) emphasize that the 
analysis of Focus group data should be strongly guided by the purpose of the study which 
helps the researcher avoid getting lost in the amount of information received from the 
discussions. They point out that for analysis to be credible, it must be systematic, verifiable, 
sequential and continuous (116). A constant comparative analytic framework has been 
adopted for the analysis of focus group data for this study. It involves grouping data together 
on a similar dimension, categorizing these dimensions and arranging patterns in a relationship 
to each other. This technique is used because it helps to identify patterns in the data and to 
discover relationships between ideas and concepts. In addition, elementary data analyses also 
happened during the focus group discussions, as arguments and counter arguments were 
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raised by the participants in different groups. This has been very useful for me as it has helped 
sort out inconsistencies and ambiguities within the data. 
In addition, “hermeneutics as ‘interpretation’ will further be used as a method for interpreting 
and analyzing the data. This approach can promote understanding of the nature of  contexts, 
and our own self-understanding. According to Gadamer
35
, interpretation should take place 
within distinct historical, cultural and intellectual contexts. He argues that the various 
frameworks that have been invented or created by human beings over the course of their 
history should be the fundamental objects of interpretation
36
. Gadamer encourages us to be 
self-conscious to and appreciate the fact that we all find ourselves in the world as products of 
specific historical, cultural and intellectual contexts (Kwasi, 2004). Although hermeneutics 
has not been commonly used in the analysis of trust, it is important in this context especially 
since my study addresses issues relating to application of concepts and adopts a qualitative 
methodological stance and seeks meaning behind the concepts being studied. This is 
important for my research because the aim is to understand political trust in the specific 
context of Uganda. Presentation of the data has been done through narration. 
The question then arises, what procedures were followed to ensure that the study  meets the 
standards of scientific research? How was the quality of the study ensured and how am I 
handling data analysis in order to present substantive arguments? I address these concerns in 
the following discussion. 
4.8 Quality of the study 
King et al.(1994) offer four criteria for judging the quality of a study, that is, the goal should 
be inference, the procedures should be public, the conclusions should be uncertain, and the 
content is the method(7-9). Yin (2009) proposes evaluation based on validity (construct, 
internal, external) and reliability. 
4.8.1 Validity 
 This refers to the extent to which we measure what we think we are measuring (King, et al: 
25). It reflects both the internal and external logic that links concepts to observable indicators.  
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 Gadamer's approach is one of dialogical openness, trying to learn the truth, even if it contradicts ones own 
expectations. Indeed, he considers the study of 'other' cultures as a hermeneutical problem and that 
hermeneutical reflection sheds light on this task (Palmer,E. 2006;16). 
36
 (Kwasi, 2004) A companion to African Philosophy. 
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4.8.1 Construct validity  
in this case deals with deeper issues of adequacy of indicators that are employed to represent 
the concepts being measured, (Layder, 1998:79), that is, identifying correct operational 
measures for concepts being studied. The logic of the choice of indicators I use for 
institutional performance is linked to theoretical assumptions of what an effective institution 
looks like. It also relates to the two fundamental criteria for democratic government, 
effectiveness and responsiveness. In addition,  the indicators are linked to citizens own 
perceptions of what an effective institution must look like. As Putnam (1993:80) notes, people 
everywhere recognize the distinction between good and  bad government, using essentially 
the same basic standards of efficiency, responsiveness, and practical achievement. It is 
therefore not enough for governments to say that they are doing their job, the people must 
perceive them as doing so too. 
The indicators that I used for political trust are also related to democratic theoretical 
postulations on civic life. Measures like confidence in government, confidence in electoral 
process and engagement and interest in political affairs reflect whether citizens will trust or 
not trust political institutions depending on the context in which these interactions take place. 
In addition, these measures have been tested and internationally used, in varying ways, in the 
study of trust (see, Hetherington,2004; Hutchison,2011; Dekker,2011; Uslaner, 2005; 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2001). They have also been found to correlate with political trust. 
4.8.1  Internal Validity  
Internal validity mainly deals with issues of inference and development of causal relations, 
that is, that certain conditions lead to certain results and no other spurious relationships exist , 
that is (A causes B)and not C.  I have to note at this point that given that my research is 
located within the reformist school of social science research (also known as narrative 
research)
37
, I treat issues of validity as a prototype rather than a definitional concept. In other 
words, in narrative research, such as this one, validation is not a mechanical but an 
argumentative process, and a knowledge claim is not treated as intrinsically valid, rather, its 
validity is a function of inter-subjective judgment, and rests on the consensus within a 
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 The major argument of this school is that there are important aspects of the social and personal realms that 
cannot be investigated within the realm of the limitations of what has been conventionally accepted as 
evidence and arguments used to justify knowledge claims. It therefore adopts naturalistic research paradigms 
in which the researchers 'observe, analyse and intergrate into the research process unexpected, constantly 
changing and other potentially influential aspects of what is being studied' (Polkinghorne,2007:3) 
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community of speakers (Pilkinghorne, 2007:4). Also, in narrative research, the concern is 
with clarification of what the storied text is intended to represent, in other words, the 'truths' 
sought by narrative researchers are narrative truths, rather than historical truths. Stories are 
gathered not to determine if events actually happened, but about the meaning experienced by 
people whether or not the events are accurately described (Ibid). In addressing issues of 
validity at the data collection stage, I adopted mechanisms in data collection that reduce 
threats to internal validity. King et al.(1994:19) advise researchers to collect as many 
observable implications of a theory as possible to allow for falsification and build strong 
evidence. This was done by conducting a series of FGDs so as to gather as many ideas as 
possible, and to be able to build a strong case for the arguments I raise. Indeed, multiple 
sources of data were used in order to enhance the depth and accuracy of the findings. For 
example on the question of perception of government delivery of basic services, besides the 
data collected from FGDs, I was able to review multiple documents, policies and reports, and 
also to observe for myself how government was performing in service delivery. In addition, 
having focus groups of different categories of people ensured that data on a particular issue 
was obtained from various sources.  
It is also important to note that the research instruments had been refined and data analysis 
were done together with the guidance of my supervisors and discussions in class seminars. 
Also as earlier mentioned, the indicators used in the study of trust and performance and how it 
is influenced have been tested and commonly used in the understanding of the two concepts. 
Yin (2009:43) proposes that a researcher adopts analytic tools such as pattern matching, 
explanation building and addressing rival explanations as a way of reducing threats to internal 
validity. During the analysis, progression of evidence is used through means such as citing 
quotations from the text and providing explanations of why other interpretations which were 
tried during the research process are not as adequate as the presented interpretative claims. 
4.8.1 External validity 
 External validity refers to the generalisability of results (Yin, 2009). Put in more pedestrian 
terms, external validity is the degree to which the conclusions in a study would hold for other 
persons in other places and at other times (Trochim, 2006). I have to note here that my study 
is aimed more at analytical rather than statistical generalization. Adopting analytic 
generalization, a study of some phenomenon in a particular set of circumstances is used as 
evidence to support, contest, refine, or elaborate a theory or a model. In this instance, the 
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study  aims to contribute to the theoretical argument that links political trust to institutional 
performance, and to provide empirical evidence from the context of a developing country. In 
a more general sense, the findings from this study are likely to be useful in understanding the 
concept of trust in other African countries, and one would also argue that these findings can 
be a step towards contributing to statistical generalization by providing specific society 
studies. 
4.8.2 Reliability 
Reliability in research means that applying the same procedure in the same way will produce 
similar measure (King et al, pg, 25). This is also related to replicability, meaning that if a 
study is replicated at a later time using the same methodology and research questions as well 
as the same theories and reasoning process, other researchers will get the same general results 
(King, 1994, pg, 26). To aid reliability, a researcher needs to document every step of the 
research process clearly. As a way of ensuring reliability, I drew up a proposal as the first step 
towards this goal, where I provided a detailed discussion of the reasoning process behind the 
research and also the methodological tools adopted for the study. During the research,  I kept 
a research journal in which I documented the fieldwork process and research instruments were 
drawn up and made available and data analysis processes have been clearly documented. This 
thesis is the culmination of this whole journey.  
4.8.3 Ethical Considerations 
Given that social research, and focus groups in particular are targeted at human subjects, it is 
important to inform them of the study's rewards and risks, that the study is voluntary and 
confidential and that they can opt out at any time(Cassey and Krueger, 2009:29). This is 
important to uphold the integrity of the results and also of the human persons involved. In 
conducting this study, I sought permission from the local leaders in the divisions where I 
went, after presenting letters of introduction form both the University of Bergen and my home 
institution, Makerere University. I also explained to the participants that the study was for 
academic purposes only and that their anonymity would be ensured. I sought permission to 
use a recorder, which was rejected so I used note taking as the main way of recording data. 
Respondents were also assured of the voluntary nature of their participation, and that they 
were free to opt out at any stage of the discussion. These assurances of strict confidentiality 
enabled respondents to freely discuss issues, and I was able to gather data useful to addressing 
my research questions. 
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4.9 Challenges 
In carrying out this study, a few methodological and technical challenges were encountered. I 
had originally planned to do only four focus groups, but realised that I needed more groups in 
order to aid data analysis. This also meant that time and resource constraints had to be 
factored in. On the logistical side, recruiting focus group members was also a challenging 
process. This was partly as a result of the NGO culture that has deeply penetrated people's 
psyche, where they expect some kind of financial reward for attending any form of 
'workshop'. It was a long process just getting people to show up to the venue for the 
discussion without expecting any financial reward for it. Also given the nature of my topic 
and the political environment in Kampala city where my research was conducted, some 
respondents were concerned about how safe it was to air out their views regarding political 
issues. Some of these challenges actually enriched my research because I could get the feel of 
how the political environment in the country is actually perceived by the ordinary citizens. I 
was able to overcome some of the challenges and also work within the constraints and 
managed to collect data as I kept on assuring my respondents about confidentiality and the 
purpose for which their views would be used.  
Data analysis  also proved to be an ominous task, given the bulk and diversity of opinions. 
Interpreting the findings also offers difficulties, as I am conscious of my role as a researcher 
immersed within an environment, for which my own opinions can greatly affect how I 
interpret the respondents' narratives. I am constantly trying to overcome these challenges by 
following the logic of the purpose of the study, my research questions and constantly cross 
checking various focus group data to establish a clear line of argument.  
4.9. 1 A critique of the research proposal as a social form38 
The research proposal is not a natural, self evident  step in the process of intellectual labour. It 
is a specific technology, with a history and social political content. Its  intricacies demand that 
the researcher discipline their intellectual project within particular categories; background, 
statement of the problem, methodology, findings, conclusions and sometimes policy or 
theoretical relevance. Through the research proposal, scholarship adopts a specific social 
form, it is a mode of professionalization and expertisation, in which the intellectual(in this 
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 I must admit that I was driven to critically think about what I was doing during the process of research while 
attending a seminar at Makerere Institute of Social Research on 'seeking Political Futures from Uganda's 
Northern War.' The ideas raised by Dr Adam Branch led me to think about my own intellectual project during 
this period of fieldwork. 
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case master student) is to manage and appropriate to his or her own genius what is in fact a 
social product that is extracted from others through unrecognised structures of inequality. The 
'others' in this case are particularly the 'subjects' who are interviewed, others who have written 
on the topic, all the way to what has been called the general intellect. 
In the specific case of Uganda, there is no shortage of studies seeking to determine 'local 
perceptions'. It is also true that there is widespread resentment towards such research, and 
even inducements, such as transport refund, lunch, that are given to participants do not 
compensate for the time and energy that respondents are required to give. The question then 
one has to ask, does one give up doing field research? Given that the answer is likely no, I feel 
that a deeper thinking of what research is needs to be done, and perhaps the figure of the 
researcher be replaced with a social being whose relations with others is not primarily 
mediated through the rigidity of the 'methods' of research, and whose productive act is 
writing. 
On that same note, I am perhaps more gratified that this study does not primarily seek policy 
relevance, something that has been revived as a demand made of intellectual production in 
Africa. Is an academic a courtier of those in power? The demand for policy relevance would 
assume so. What I hope through this research is that its form not only unsettles its readership, 
but also seek its relevance to the autonomous logic of scholarship in itself. 
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Chapter 5: Study Findings and Discussions. 
5.1 Introduction  
The following two chapters  present findings from the study of institutional performance and 
political trust in Uganda. The findings are from 12 focus groups; five of men, four of women 
and three of youths  and five in-depth interviews. The groups were further divided into highly 
educated and lowly educated, and highly educated were defined as those respondents who had 
attained an Ordinary level certificate
39
 of education or higher, while low-educated as those 
below the Ordinary level certificate of education or none. The findings are divided into two 
sections, with section 1 mainly on the dependent variable and section two on the independent 
variable. 
In the study, I present the views as they appear to emerge from the various discussions. I 
recognised early on in the research that the study participants might merely repeat catch 
phrases or expressions commonly used in the media or political rhetoric, and present them as 
their own ideas. ‘Tukooye’ (we are tired), ‘twebaka otulo’ (we can now sleep) and ‘abali 
mukintu’ (those in the thing), ‘modernisation’ are some such phrases. The discussions were 
therefore designed to be expansive enough to allow for clarification of meanings wherever 
such phrases were used, and I also kept in mind that certain political messages were only 
likely to acquire meaning if they resonated with people’s experiences, 
I start the findings on a discussion of what government is and who owns it as perceived by 
citizens so as to establish a background upon which to evaluate perceptions of its 
performance.  
In this chapter, I use a lot of text in the local language, which I translate in brackets in order to 
capture the real meaning as it emerged from the discussions. I also need to mention that my 
discussion of these findings is affected by the fact that I am a Ugandan, and have own 
political views and experiences, which may influence how I understand the various 
discussions. I therefore try as much as possible to present the findings as they are, while 
hoping that if my respondents were to read this piece, they would be able to recognise their 
ideas. 
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 The Ordinary Level Certicicate of education is achieved after eleven years of schooling, seven of which in 
primary school, and four in lower secondary school. 
58 
 
Section 1 
5.1 What is central government? 
Discussions with focus group respondents yielded detailed ideas of what central government 
is. The findings strongly suggest a politically active citizenry, although at times especially 
among the low educated groups, government is looked at with apathy
40
.  
Definitions of what central government is often stressed its 'big man
41
' attributes. Central 
government is seen as ‘that which rules us’ by majority of the groups. It was also evident 
especially among the low educated groups that government seemed like a personal entity of 
the regime in power. Low educated men in Central division defined the central government as 
‘the government of Museveni, Mbabazi and all the Banyankoles. They own the country, rule 
it, and take all the taxes plus the land that belonged to our ancestors.’ At the same time, 
educated men in Kawempe division defined central government normatively as the regime in 
power that is composed of the executive, judiciary and the legislature. However one member 
argued that even though that is the ideal, central government is composed of the NRM party. 
He opined ‘ekintu kyabwe, ate who owns it? Not even fellow Banyankoles anymore but the 
NRM party as a group. Kyebasalawo kyekikola munsi eno…’ (The thing is theirs, now who 
owns it? it is not even those from the Ankole tribe anymore but just the NRM clique. 
Whatever they decide is what works in this country). It was also evident that the person of 
the president is widely identified with what central government is. In majority of the groups, 
there were echoes of central government as ‘Museveni’s government, or Mzee’s government’, 
participants widely attributed the figure of the current ruler as an embodiment of central 
government, with powers to ‘run the whole country and control everything’.  
                                                          
40
 During discussions, there was marked indifference towards central government especially among the low 
educated groups, with discussants claiming that wether government is functioning or not, there wouldnt be 
any much effect on their lives. Such political apathy has been discussed in many studies as a reflection of 
political stagnation. 
41
 Big man rule is a term that has been used widely to describe governance processes in sub-Saharan Africa. It 
can be defined as a form of highly autocratic rule that is highly personalised and restrained little by modern 
institutions, making the supremacy of politics risky. It also involves a great degree of uncertainty for the general 
public (Hyden, 2006:949) 
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5.2 Who owns central government? 
Central government is owned by the citizens…noooo…it is owned by those with long 
noses
42…(discussants in low educated group of women, Rubaga Division) 
The discussions yielded various contestations to whom the ownership of central government 
belongs. While it emerged from all groups that ideally Central government is owned by 
citizens who vote the leaders into power, discussants were quick to add that the reality is 
different. Among the low educated women group in Rubaga division the general feeling is 
that even though the government is supposed to be owned by all citizens, the current 
leadership has personalised it. Majority of the discussants regard the central government as an 
all-powerful entity, whose power is even rising more.  It is widely viewed that this power 
comes from the backing of the army, even though routine voting takes place, ‘…it is for the 
president and his army. It is for Museveni
43
, his family, Amama Mbabazi
44
 and the so-called 
Kayihuras
45…you know, those people with long noses..’ while the educated youth in Rubaga 
Division argued that the regime in power owns the central government… ‘it is owned by the 
president and his ministers..’ In most cases, there was evidence that central government was 
seen as clearly identifiable with the personality of the president, and a few of his more 
powerful ministers strongly attached to his  tribe
46
. 
5.3 Roles of central government 
In respect to the roles of central government, the majority of groups viewed government role 
as chief service provider. The political discourse among the discussants is that government is 
responsible for providing tangible social, economic welfare and development outcomes. As 
the discussants made clear, government role is mainly to…look after its citizens so they don’t 
lack anything.. In all groups, provision of education, roads, health and security were 
mentioned as the chief roles of government. It is also interesting that discussants usually 
referred to collecting taxes as one of the major roles of government. Low educated women in 
Rubaga perceived of the government as existing on collecting taxes.. ‘This government only 
                                                          
42
 The term long noses is used in a somewhat derogatory form to refer to people from Ankole region and 
Rwanda. It is used mainly as a differenciation because of their pysical features especialy relative to the 
baganda, whose noses are relatively flat and short. 
43
 Current Ugandan President 
44
 Prime minister and long-term confidant of the president 
45
 Inspector General of Police who is also from the Western region 
46 I use tribe here instead of ethnic group to clearly demarcate the differences, although for example the 
Banyankoles and Baganda belong to the same ethnic group, the Bantu, tribal lines are clearly demarcated. In 
this case I will use tribal identity instead of ethnic identity to spell out the differences. 
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collects taxes; I think it has even improved the ARV
47
s for aids patients so that it can have a 
bigger population to tax. That is all it does…’one discussant opined.  Government is also seen 
having the role of providing employment for the people. Among the educated youth in 
Rubaga division mention was made of  the role of government as ‘to create new districts so as 
to bring services closer to the poor’ and to ‘take youths to Iraq48 and Somalia49..’ so that they 
can have employment. There was also emphasis on ‘fighting rebels’ as one of the most 
important roles of central government.  
The perception among most groups was that government is expanding in size and reach, but 
there were mixed feelings over whether this was a good thing or not. Government was cast as 
a big patron, with the head of government usually referred to as Mzee
50
, with the implied 
acceptance of duty and care. What can be inferred from the various discussions is that 
government is mainly looked at distinctly as ensuring the delivery of practical needs for the 
citizens. This is in contrast with many views especially of western citizenship, where 
governments are mainly evaluated in terms of their ability to ensure the protection of civil 
liberties. It is clearly in line with Chatterjee (2004), who detects a contrast between the civic 
and political rights stressed in western citizenship norms, and the emphasis for government as 
a welfare provider among postcolonial populations. Mattes and Gymah Boardi (2008) 
advance the same argument for sub-Saharan Africa citizens, and argue, like Chatterjee, that 
citizenship for many is a matter of governmentality, and citizen's evaluation of government 
performance is rather pragmatic, based on how much it can deliver tangible economic goods. 
Indeed, results from Afro barometer survey (2008) in Uganda indicate that 54% of 
respondents perceived citizens as children, and that government should take care of them, 
while 53 percent responded that government's most important role is to improve the economic 
conditions of the poor. It is no coincidence then, that in a survey carried out by in 2012, 
amidst biting inflation and economic hardship, the government approval rating fell from 64% 
in 2008 to only 24% in 2012, with over 80% respondents believing the government is doing 
very poorly in the management of the economy. 
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 Anti-retroviral drugs that help HIV from progressing into AIDS. 
48
 Uganda youths were drafted to work as guards alongside US soldiers from 2005. Youth minister Mwesigwa 
Rukutana estimated that Iraq earnings bring in over USD 90million a year, more that the country's main export, 
coffee. Iraq was seen by many as a profitable prospect, given earnings of between 600-1000USD a month, 
compared to the average income of 250 USD  a month in Uganda. 
49
 Somalia is now known widely among Ugandans because of the Uganda People's Defence Force leadership 
role in the African Union backed mission, AMISOM. 
50
  Mzee is a Kiswahili word used to show defference and respect to elders 
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5.4 Citizen’s perceptions of their roles and responsibilities 
What the state needs from the citizenry cannot be secured by coercion, but only 
cooperation and self restraint in the exercise of private power….Cairns and Williams, 
1985:43.  
What then do Ugandans think of the roles and responsibilities of citizens? The study aimed to 
address the question of whether ordinary citizens were aware of roles and responsibilities that 
they play to contribute to government performance and how important they thought these 
roles were. Much of the current debate in citizenship theory has been focused on virtues that 
are distinctive to modern pluralistic liberal democracies, relating to the basic principles of a 
liberal regime, and to the political role of citizens within it (Kymlicka, 2002:289).These 
virtues, which include the  willingness to question authority and to engage in public discourse 
are precisely what distinguish citizens within a democracy from the subjects of an 
authoritarian regime (Ibid). It is hypothesized that citizens’ role perceptions are related to the 
relationship they have with the state, and this relationship has implications for how they will 
evaluate government performance. The aim of including this discussion in the study was to try 
and establish the kind of relationship that exists between the citizens and the government, 
because this has implications for both perceptions of government performance and trust in 
government. These discussions therefore created a baseline upon which understanding of 
citizens' perceptions of performance and trust is based. 
5.4.1 Paying taxes 
It was widely echoed in the various groups that payment of taxes is one of the most important 
roles that citizens have, since government activities cannot run without funding. Highly 
educated women in Kawempe echoed this and added that besides payment of tax, taking 
children to school is also one of the most important responsibilities of a citizen. There was 
also mention of reporting terrorism and being a spy for each other from one discussant among 
the low educated men in Central division. Such perhaps is indicative of the situation that arose 
after the July 11, 2010  bombings in Kampala that claimed the lives of over 80 people. 
Ordinary citizens now feel they have responsibility to be vigilant even to spy on each other. 
Arising out of this same idea, there was mention of ‘joining the army to go to Somalia’ 
especially among the youth groups, as one of the roles that citizens have.  
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5.4.2 Voting  
It is interesting to note that even though among the groups there was constant mention of 
voting as one of the roles a citizen has, some respondents objected, claiming that the 
government has deprived them of any meaningful roles, since voting had become a mere 
formality. It was however recognized that fulfilling these various roles, especially paying 
taxes, helps to build the nation, ‘without paying tax, how will government build hospitals? We 
as citizens are the ones that can make government function,’ one respondent among the highly 
educated males in Kawempe pointed out. Indeed, this reflected that citizens are quite aware of 
the symbiotic relationship between government performance and active citizen participation. 
‘Obeying rules and regulations’ was constantly mentioned as an important way of helping 
government maintain security,  
‘these days people are vigilant on taking their sons and daughters to the army, so we may end 
up like America where at least every child is trained, which improves our security..’ one 
discussant observed. 
These various observations perhaps point to what Uslaner (2003:4) conceives of as the ‘thin 
view of citizenship’ where citizenship is viewed as a contract with the state. In this way, the 
state provides basic services and people have ‘thin’ responsibilities which include obeying the 
law and paying taxes. Citizens thus have a ‘condiment contract’ with the state; they agree to 
obey the law and pay taxes if government provides basic services. This contrasts sharply with 
the western notion of citizenship based on citizen participation and communitarian values.  
Uslaner (2004:8) also argues that this more formalistic criteria of good citizenship, obeying 
the law and paying taxes, and also the obligation to vote, is more strongly linked to 
evaluations of government, while more communitarian criteria such as being self-critical and 
thinking about others, should be more strongly linked to values such as trust, and tolerance. 
We can thus argue from the findings above that Ugandans’ conception of citizens’ obligations 
stem from their perceptions of performance of the government, contingent upon its 
deliverables other than the bonds people share. 
Having established the baseline about what government is, what its roles are and how they 
relate to those of citizens, it is then possible to go ahead and examine citizen's perceptions 
about government and how it is doing its job. In the next section, I present findings and 
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discussions on the trust in government and its performance evaluation according to the 
perceptions of ordinary citizens. 
Trust in government was investigated using two simple yet important variables. Trust as 
confidence in the electoral commission and electoral process and confidence in the current 
government as an institution. Confidence in the electoral process combined people's 
perception towards the electoral commission and how it performs its duties and their 
perceptions regarding voting as a way of expressing citizen preferences. The questions that 
were posed sought to find out citizens' perceptions on how the electoral commission is doing 
its job and whether  voting is important for ordinary citizens. 
5.5 Confidence in the electoral commission and process and trust in 
government 
In democratic settings, the electoral process, and voting in particular,  is a major way holding 
government accountable as well as expressing citizens’ priorities51. It has been argued that 
one of the ways that citizens keep their leaders in check and demand for accountability is 
through regular and periodic elections. Voting becomes a mechanism to reward good 
performance, and also to air out important preferences of citizens. As a channel of both 
expressing preference and discontent, voting  becomes a major avenue through which citizens 
communicate to their governments. This implies that for voting to have meaningful impact, 
the electoral process has to be fair, transparent and trustworthy
52
. 
It was therefore important to find out whether the citizens of Uganda feel they have power to 
influence the government through the electoral process. This has implications, as I will later 
show, for political trust. In using this indicator, I pursued two aims. One was to find out if the 
electoral process is perceived as free and fair and if voting is perceived as a viable option for 
those who feel left out by the system, and if it can be used as an instrument of change. 
Secondly, the study  investigated the perceptions that Ugandans have towards the electoral 
commission. Discussants were asked whether they perceive the electoral commission as free 
from influence peddling, and also if voting is a viable way of getting performing individuals 
in office. The assumption was that if the electoral process is seen as free and the electoral 
                                                          
51
 Chabal (1998:296) notes that as an instrument of democratisation, elections are key to establishing a 
democratic political order. For this to occur, he argues, there must be the establishment of an independent 
electoral commission, the elections must be seen as free and fair and the results of the elections must be 
accepted by all and immediately executed.  
52
 See Chabal, Patrick,(1998) A few Considerations on Democracy in Africa. International Affairs, 74, 289-303. 
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commission as competent, and if voting is seen as legitimate and a viable option for citizen 
participation, it would reflect trust for the regime and its institutions.  
5.5.1 Constitutional mandate of the EC 
In relation to the electoral process and electoral commission, the 1995 constitution of  the 
republic of Uganda stipulates thus, “Every citizen of Uganda of eighteen years of age or 
above has a right to vote Article 59(1),....there shall be an Electoral Commission which shall 
consist of a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and five other members appointed by the 
president with the approval of parliament, Article 60(1) ......subject to the provisions of this 
Constitution, the commission shall be independent and shall, in the performance of its 
functions, not be subject to direction or control of any person or authority (Article 62). 
Discussions revealed quite varied perceptions among people regarding both the electoral 
commission as an institution and voting to influence government policy. Whereas it was 
acknowledged by the majority of the groups that voting is an important arena for airing their 
views, many were skeptical about its effectiveness, and they mainly cited the electoral process 
as a fraud. There were those who held the skeptic view  
‘no no no no…voting cannot change anything in Uganda, maybe in other countries. How can a 
president of the whole country stand on his two legs and say that a vote is a mere piece of paper, it 
cannot get him out of power! My daughter, don’t you live in Uganda?’(Discussant from low 
educated women group, Rubaga) 
The electoral process is widely perceived as unfair and it was claimed certain leaders use 
money to influence the outcome of results, contrary to people’s preferences. An example was 
cited in Rubaga, where there were battles between the police and the people when the 
government-supported contestant, Katongole Singh, was declared winner against Kasibante, 
his opponent from the opposition. Constant riots in the area only subsided when Kasibante 
was declared as the rightful winner by the courts of law. A discussant in Rubaga commented 
 ‘We had to protest. It was clear Kasibante had won, and then the electoral commission said Singh had 
won. They even had to go to court, but for what? That chairman of the electoral commission is an old 
man but he has no morals. He should be ashamed…okay…if they think that people had elected Singh, 
why doesn’t he come back to his constituency and see!...’ 
One also mentioned the constant strikes after the 2011 elections, as an indicator of a flawed 
electoral system thus, 
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 ‘people have been disenfranchised, elections were rigged and people were very angry. People also lost 
confidence in courts of law because before, Besigye had taken the EC to court and the court had 
recognized that Museveni had rigged, but they said it doesn’t change the results. People now know the 
only way to get what you want from this government is to strike. People are very angry (Key 
informant, Political Advocacy Group) 
Others observed that voting at the presidential level would never change anything, but bring 
more chaos. They opined that it would be better if the presidential elections were cancelled, so 
that money would go to services such as health and education. It was also apparent from the 
discussions that perceptions of vote rigging and voter intimidation are looked as reasons as to 
why voting will never change anything…  
'Museveni just rigs that vote..and the military police is always on the street, when you 
see them, just tick Museveni or go back to the bad old days of war' 
Among the educated youth in Rubaga however, the dominant feeling was that if the ground 
was leveled (meaning free and fair), voting would influence a lot of policies. In fact, many 
opined, even now at the local levels and at parliamentary level, voters were channeling their 
grievances to government by voting MPs who oppose government 
 ‘it was the power of the vote that brought Nambooze and Lukwago and Kasibante53 to parliament!. It is 
possible to vote the people we want especially if Museveni is doing his own presidential campaign, 
because then he can’t intimidate us…’  
These findings echo arguments from elsewhere,  (Hooghe,Marien and Pauwels, 2011) where 
empirical research has provided convincing evidence that a lack of political trust affects 
electoral behavior. Low trust levels will affect the way citizens will behave when they have an 
opportunity to voice their preferences. There are three likely options; the first is exit, where 
voters abstain from participation, the second is to vote for populist parties, and the third, is to 
opt for loyalty by supporting a mainstream party, especially if there is no viable exit option.  
Evidence here clearly shows that voters’ attitudes and preferences in voting reflect the three 
trends, where at presidential level, voters either exit or support the mainstream NRM due to 
lack of viable options, and yet vote for populist MPs and councilors at local levels. This may 
be an indication of low levels of political trust among the population for the government. 
Evidence of exit, or voting with their feet has also been reflected in the decreasing numbers of 
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registered voters that are actually casting their vote in presidential elections over time. Voter 
turnout has decreased from 72% in 1996 presidential election to 70% in 2001, 69% in 2006 
and to only 59% of registered voters in 2011 presidential election(IIDEA, 2013). 
Yet, others have opted to vote opposition MPs as a way of protest. A discussant pointed out 
that the presence of the president at any rally where an MP was campaigning was a signal to 
the voters to vote out that MP. A discussant in the same group observed, 
 ‘Those MPs who are wise distance themselves from Museveni, they tell him not to come to their rallies, 
he is bad luck because the people are tired…’ 
Others noted that voting can only influence government if the voters are informed. Youth in 
Central Division were in agreement that the reason government isn’t responding to citizen’s 
demands is because it relies on an uninformed rural population who keep voting the current 
regime. An interesting case was pointed out in the poor eastern region of Busoga, where 
voters are said to have been manipulated into voting the incumbent president in the 2011 
elections 
‘the NRM cadres went to Busoga, the Basoga were very angry and vowed not to vote Museveni, so the 
NRM people got one of their people to go to rallies telling people that, when you get the ballot box, the 
person you don’t want, tick them so they can be kicked out of power..gwotayenda muteeko tick 
agolole..They went and ticked Museveni, he won by a very large margin and they couldn’t believe 
it..isn’t that ignorance? Such people shouldn’t be allowed to vote!’ 
The above observations point to various perceptions that citizens have in regard to how much 
they can hold government accountable through voting, and how they view the electoral 
commission. It is also reflective of low trust levels especially at the presidential level, as 
evidenced in apathy and skepticism towards elections as a means of influencing government. 
It has also been documented by various analysts of Uganda's electoral process that the 
institutional design of the electoral commission itself is flawed, while others have pointed out 
the various electoral mal practices that characterize the elections in Uganda.  
Tripp, (2010) notes that the requirement in the constitution that the chairman be appointed by 
the president, even with approval of parliament, creates a conflict of interest, which has 
mainly led to the president appointing his own people. And, she adds, given that the NRM has 
the majority in parliament, it is less likely that the parliamentarians will oppose the president's 
choice. In similar fashion, Muhumuza, (2009:34) laments of Uganda's electoral situation,  
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'elections held under the NRM government in 1996, 2001 and 2006 have been afflicted by rampant acts 
of bribery. Money and material things were reported to have been extensively used to woo voters. The 
EC has become a subject of serious contention, especially because the commissioners are appointed by 
the president. This explains why it has been organizing disputed elections that are characterized by 
inflated voter numbers, faulty registers and rigging… 
Indeed, the European Union observation Mission also noted of the 2011 elections in Uganda, 
'…the power of incumbency was exercised to such an extent as to compromise severely the 
level playing field between the competing candidates and political parties,'(cited in Helle, 
Makara and Aagedel Skage, 2011). 
5.5.2 Influencing the government….voting with their feet 
As already mentioned, one of the measures that can be used as an approximation of the 
public's distrust in government is the increasing decline in voting behavior in elections 
(Boxill, et al, 2007), and the increase in unconventional participation over time. Within the 
context of the aforementioned issues, we will be examining the factors that account for this 
reality. 
The study went on to investigate to what extent this assumption held, and the likely reasons 
for such unsanctioned participation, and whether it has close ties to perceptions of 
government performance. What other ways outside the electoral process do citizens influence 
government? Theories of representative democracy tell us that dissatisfied citizens should 
regularly be given a chance to express their discontent towards those in power. This, it is 
argued, makes representatives aware of citizens’ demands, and makes democracy ‘work’ 
(Kumlin, 2008). I sought to find out whether average citizens in Uganda have avenues for 
expressing their views and discontent with government other than through the electoral 
process, and how effective they think these avenues are. It was interesting to note that 
‘rioting’ was mentioned repeatedly by different groups as the most effective way of 
expressing discontent. A male discussant in the low educated group in Central division 
observed critically, 
‘this government is stubborn; it only understands the language of riots. Nogamba nogamba, oyatikire 
omutwe…tebakuhuura...konkashi abantu kubakwekarakasa, gavument yatiina nekikoraa..! don’t you 
remember last year the riots of traders, they closed the shops for three days, and government 
responded…’ (You talk you talk, until your head bursts, they don’t listen. But when 
people riot, the government fears and responds) 
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 Some discussants however observed that there were avenues for expressing discontent, but 
most of them are not being listened to by the government. They singled out programs like 
‘ekimeeza’ (round table) a local talk show program on radio that was banned by government 
because of the way people were debating government issues.  
‘They said that if they find any gathering talking about the government, that is treason, and anyone 
involved will be imprisoned, don’t you see how they put Besigye on house arrest?’ ‘sometimes the MPs 
lie to the president that the people want this, when it is not true, that is why ordinary people want to talk 
to Mzee face to face, they don’t trust MPs..Museveni himself would be good, but his people betray him..’ 
 However in the educated women group in Kawempe, some discussants believed that 
government listens to people unlike that of Amin, citing the example of new districts as 
evidence. 
 ‘People even ask for new districts and get them, that is why we have many new districts, it’s because 
government listens to the people…’ one discussant pointed out. 
In general, the discussions revealed an affinity amongst the population for non-institutional 
means of engaging with the government. But what could explain the leaning towards rioting 
as an acceptable arena of discussion? In the literature, two forms of competing claims about 
political trust and participation accrue. While some argue that trust is a perquisite for any 
form of political participation to occur, others claim that distrust can be a motivating factor 
for participation in non-institutional forms of participation (Hooghe and Marien, 2012).  
The study  hypothesized that if citizens trust government, they would be more willing to abide 
by institutional decisions and policies especially in relation to electoral processes. If they did 
not however, they would be more likely to adopt unconventional means as a way of 
expressing dissent.  
A significant finding here is that non-institutionalized means of participation reflect people’s 
skepticism towards the ability of institutional processes to deliver viable outcomes. A major 
question posed in the literature on political trust and political participation continues to be, 
‘will low levels of political trust be associated with low participation or rather with different 
patterns of participation? (Hooghe and Marien, 2012). Findings in this study seem to confirm 
the latter hypothesis, that is, low levels of trust are positively associated with active 
participation in non-institutionalized activities such as strikes and riots. It is also a reflection 
of perceptions of poor performance on the part of institutions responsible for electoral 
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processes, the electoral commission, such that citizens feel they can neither rely on it as a 
means of holding government accountable nor view its conduct of elections as an expression 
of citizens' aspirations. 
5.6 Confidence in Government and trust/competence 
It is important to remember that in framing this study, I drew upon two research traditions, the 
cultural and the institutional. The central notion of the cultural argument is that a set of 
internalised norms structure political behaviour and that widespread presence or absence of 
those norms dictates the chances of any society having a successful or unsuccessful 
governmental regime. One of those norms was identified as trust. The institutional perspective 
however looks at trust as a consequence of proper functioning governmental institutions.  
As a way of making the task manageable and clear the study included a normative question on 
what citizens understood by trust and what citizens would consider being an institution that is 
trustworthy. The aim of asking the meaning of trust in general was not meant to set the 
Ugandan experience apart as exceptional or exotic, nor did I intend to absorb it in a broad 
corpus of trust theory as routine and banal. The endeavour is meant to establish the historical 
legitimacy of the Ugandan political experience as a valid analytical location. The responses 
regarding what to trust is were quite revealing. Let’s start with trust definitions. 
Trust was variously  defined as 'believing in someone or something without doubt’; being sure 
that one says the truth, 'putting confidence in something or someone'. In the group of low 
educated women in Rubaga, there were responses such as 'trust means knowing that someone 
will not let you down' doing what one is entrusted to do, and 'to appear honest and reliable. 
The men in Kawempe however recognise that trust can be 'with strings attached.’ while the 
educated youth in Rubaga defined trust as 'having no doubt about someone that when they say 
they are going to do something they do it'  
What is most interesting in most of these definitions is that trust was defined in relation to the 
likelihood that someone or something would do what they promised to do. This was important 
for I was trying to relate political trust to the performance of government. I then endeavoured 
to find out what people think are the qualities of a government that citizens are likely to trust.  
Discussants were quick to mention a corruption free government, absence of tribalism and 
nepotism, transparency, fulfilling promises, as the qualities that a government that citizens 
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trust would look like. It was also echoed in the groups that there is no trust in anymore, not 
just in government but society as a whole. On whether they trust government, most 
respondents said that they had lost trust in the government especially due to the rampant 
corruption and unfair treatment in the allocation of resources. Some discussants however 
identified security as a reason they still trust government even if other areas were not doing 
well... 
'this is the only government where you can at least go home and sleep in your house without worrying 
about soldiers coming to your house, they have given us a chance at life, other things may be bad, but 
we are secure, that’s what matters '(respondent from low educated men, central Division) 
Others differed, arguing that although security was generally good, they are being threatened 
by poverty which is another disease that could kill them. A number of discussants in the 
various groups wondered how one could trust a government that is so corrupt, and even 
accused their counterparts of 'mwe mutusibyeeko obukenuzi'(you are the ones who are making 
corruption continue).  
It was interesting that whereas some groups of respondents evaluated government 
performance as not being good, when it came to the question of whether they trust 
government or not, their responses reflected that they trust the government. Most such 
respondents identified the poor record of past governments as the reason they trust the current 
government. 
 Others were of the thinking that they can only trust this government because they are not sure 
what change in government would lead to; many voiced concerns over likely instability as the 
reason they still trust this current government, 'what is the reason of expecting more when you 
aren’t sure it is going to be better, at least these ones we know!'(female respondent, 
Kawempe). However, some argued that they would be able to trust government if it reduced 
on corruption, stopped giving jobs to only 'westerners
54
' and improved on social services. 
Such an outlook is a clear indication of the importance of improved performance of 
government institutions as a way of building political trust. 
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hails from. 
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Section 2 
Chapter 6:  Findings and discussions on perceptions of central 
government Performance 
6.1 Introduction  
How then do citizens evaluate government performance, given those trust ratings? This 
chapter presents findings and discussions on the independent variable, institutional 
performance. The study tested institutional performance perceptions using five basic 
indicators. These are; perception of government delivery of basic services, perceptions of 
corruption, perceptions of tax payment, perception of political stability and perceptions of 
fairness. The findings largely indicate that government is perceived as performing well in 
providing security and free education, but failing in infrastructure, fighting corruption and 
health care. 
6.2 Perception of government delivery of basic services 
This indicator is used to gauge on the whole how citizens feel the government is doing in the 
delivery of basic services. I used this indicator with the realization that government 
performance in the context of a young democracy like Uganda may be less evaluated on 
normative ideals such as democracy, civil and political rights, and more on basic social 
services. It is also was in line with various scholarly attempts that have found that African 
citizens use a more pragmatic evaluation of their governments than their western counterparts, 
due to the differing relationship and dynamics between the state and society, (Mattes and 
Gyimah Boardi, 2005). Discussants were asked how they perceive government to be 
performing in delivery of social services, and whether this has changed over time. The 
assumption was that if citizens perceived government to be doing well in the delivery of basic 
services, then they will see it as a performing government and trust it, and perception of poor 
delivery would lead to poor performance evaluations and low levels of trust.  
6.2.1 Improved HIV/AIDS care 
The discussants credited the government with improving the welfare and health of people 
living with HIV/AIDS. Even though in their assessment general health services were 
discredited, the area of AIDs treatment seemed to be prioritised by government according to 
the participants’ assessments. It emerged from the uneducated men in Central Division for 
example that AIDS medication is free and available… ‘People now live longer, those on 
72 
 
ARVs just wake up and die
55
 but after living for long. They don’t have to go through the pain 
of diarrhoea, skin rushes like it used to be in the 80’s.’ While the highly educated youth in 
Rubaga division also hailed the government policy on HIV/AIDS, arguing that ‘health is 
wealth.’ It is notable that efforts to combat HIV/AIDS led to prevalence rates dropping from 
18% to 6.5% between 1990 and 2000, but a recent report (2012) from the ministry of health 
shows that the infections are on the rise again, with a prevalence rate of 7.5 percent (MOH, 
2012). 
6.2.2 Education-UPE and USE 
Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Universal Secondary Education (USE) were also 
recognised as major areas of achievement for the government. Even as they pointed out the 
various weaknesses of the UPE programme such as overcrowding in classrooms and poor 
quality of education, the general feeling among the educated youth in Rubaga division was 
that UPE has given an opportunity even for the very poor to get education and increase their 
life choices…now children go to school for free …olaba twalaba ku TV nga nobuzeeyi 
obulina abazzukulu nga buzzeeyo busome..(we even saw on TV very old people with 
grandkids going back to school)…even Saleh (the president’s brother) went back to get his 
certificate.’  
6.2.3 Peace and security 
In all the groups, security seemed the most important area where government was credited.  
Low educated women in Rubaga held the view that now unlike in other regimes, there is 
enforcement of the law and if one is attacked, one just has to make an alarm and will be 
helped. The highly educated women in Kawempe also argued that security is the most 
important achievement of the government…  
‘With peace and security, you are safe with your money…even though most people shout that this 
government has done nothing, but it has worked on security, that is the most important thing!’ 
The low educated men in central division seemed to agree with this assessment, with one 
participant pointing out, 
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‘I remember there was a thief called Black. That guy was a pro. He had a gang who could move from 
one division to another, taking people’s property and killing them. But when the government introduced 
‘Operation Wembly’ that was the end of him. Even the Iron bar criminals56 will be finished! 
Echoes of ‘twebaka kutulo’ (we can at least sleep) were also common among the groups of 
men and women when talking about the security issue, perhaps in reference to the previous 
war time regimes where most people were always on the run due to war and insecurity. It is 
quite interesting to note that these assessments reflect findings from numerous surveys 
conducted in Uganda, where respondents were asked to evaluate how secure they feel in their 
day to day activities. A 2008 survey by Afro barometer revealed that 80% or respondents 
have not been physically threatened or attacked in the whole year. This is a big improvement 
compared to Uganda's tumultuous past. 
Some of the groups also mentioned freedom of speech and movement as important areas that 
the government had scored in. It was interesting to hear a long running discourse of… ‘Now 
you can even slap a soldier and he doesn’t do anything to you. You can even walk at 4.am in 
the morning without anyone bothering you! (Discussant, low educated women, Rubaga 
Division) Now people talk badly about the president on radio and they stay alive, but let them 
try that in Rwanda...’ (highly educated women, Kawempe Division). Among the group of 
educated men from Kawempe however, it was acknowledged that this freedom of speech was 
limited when it comes to opposition leaders.  
6.2.4 Getting women from the kitchen 
There were also occasional mentions of the government ‘getting women from the kitchen57’ in 
response to the women emancipation policies.  Indeed, the statistics for women emancipation 
in Uganda are encouraging. According to the 1995 constitution, Article 78(1), it is stipulated 
that there shall be one woman representative for every district. This means that at the current 
count of 112 districts, Uganda has 112 directly elected women member of parliament. The 
current speaker of parliament, Rebecca Kadaga is also a woman. Through UPE, the 
proportion of girls to boys enrolled in primary school improved from 44.2% in 1990 to 49.8% 
in 2006 (JARD, 2009).  
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and killings. This kind of crime was quite rampant during the times of Idi Amin. 
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 This expression is used to refer to the traditional roles of women as being caretakers of the home, with the 
main job as cooking, and in this sense, the government is credited for changing that, getting women from the 
private domestic sphere to the public sphere. 
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However, among the highly educated women in Kawempe, the feeling was that the 
government has only used women as a large voting bloc and later discarded them. A comment 
from one of the discussants in this group is instructive, 
...yatujja mukiyungu netumuywereza mubuyinza, natuzzaayo...kati yatusibila eyo..tolaba bweyatuleka kufiira 
muzzaliro?...nebisumuluzo yasuula dda munyanja! ha ha ha (he got us from the kitchen, we kept him 
in power and he locked us back in the kitchen and even threw the keys in the lake. Don’t 
you see how he leaves us to die in labour?). 
The assessment regarding women dying in labour is not surprising. Uganda is among the eight 
countries with the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. Uganda’s Maternal Mortality 
Ratio is 505 per 100,000 live births and the MDG target is 131 per 100,000 live births (WHO 
2008). In addition, only 47% of expectant mothers in Uganda go for the recommended four 
antenatal checkups and many of these go for the first check up after their fifth month of 
pregnancy (JARD, 2009). It is highly probable that the country will not be able to meet the 
Millennium Development Goal of reducing maternal mortality rate by three quarters. In the 
same way, Golooba-Mutebi, (cited in Mbatudde, 2011:8) also argues that politicians in 
Uganda co-opted women in the era of inclusive politics, but abandoned them as voting 
demographics change, with issues affecting women's lives such as maternal health given lip 
service. 
The government was however credited for bringing peace and stability to the neighbouring 
countries and maintaining a good international image so that the donors could continue 
bringing in aid. Youth respondents in Rubaga noted that the government, by fighting wars in 
Somalia and Congo, was not only creating employment, but also bringing ‘peace for our 
neighbours’. Some groups argued however that this ‘good’ international image is what has 
kept the government in power because ‘the donors think that Museveni is blameless, while we 
suffer, that’s why they can’t take him like they did to Ghadafi.’ 
From the above responses, it is evident that government is credited as doing well in delivering 
services such as free education, stability, HIV/AIDS care and women emancipation policies. 
Indeed, the study observed significant appreciation especially of the free primary and 
secondary education, even though there was acknowledgement that the system still had 
significant hurdles to overcome. 
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6.3 Areas of poor performance 
6.3.1 Maternal health 
‘Batuyambye naye kale kati katulye security!kale katufe obwavu! Ha ha ha banange, buli ddagala kati 
lyona tulina ddigula buguzi?naye lwaki edda tebyali bwebityo? Olaba ne Amin eyali omubi naye 
yalwarilako e mulago, naye bano museveni abaana be bazaalira Germani, kati anaafaayo atya?’ 
(they have helped us but well, let us now eat security! Let us die of poverty! Ha ha 
ha, my dear, now all the medicine in hospital is for buying! How come it wasn’t 
like that before? You see even Amin whom they say was bad fell sick
58
 in Mulago, 
but this Museveni, his daughters give birth in Germany, how can he know and 
care about what happens in local hospitals?)(Discussant from low educated women, 
Rubaga) 
The above quotation is reflective of ideas in various focus groups about the way government 
had prioritized what it worked on and what was neglected. Discussants in all focus groups 
were of the view that while government was spending a lot of money on defense and security, 
it has totally neglected the general health sector.  Low educated women in Rubaga division 
were very critical of the way government had neglected maternal health, arguing that women 
were dying in hospitals while the daughters of the president were giving birth abroad because 
of the better health facilities there. The educated men in Kawempe were in agreement, they 
pointed out that the health sector is so poorly facilitated that patients were sleeping on the 
floor. A member observed,  
‘recently on Bukedde TV on agataliiko nfuufu, they showed Jinja referral hospital with so many sick 
people, but most were lying on the floor. There was also no electricity for a whole month! What about 
those on oxygen, don’t they just die? I don’t understand this government!’ 
Discussants also complained that while treatment at the major referral hospital, Mulago is 
supposed to be free, the medicine is never there and doctors always have to refer patients to 
their private clinics to buy the medicine, which is expensive. There also continue to be 
frequent media reports
59
 about the breakdown of health equipment at Mulago, a situation that 
is causing wide public outcry. 
6.3.2 Potholes…potholes…poor roads 
There was also general agreement in all the groups that the government had neglected the 
road network, especially Kampala. Discussants constantly pointed out the issue of potholes in 
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 Two dead as Mulago closes Intensive care Facility, The Daily Monitor, October, 31, 2012. 
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city roads as one of the indicators of government failure to perform its roles. In all the groups, 
it was noted that most of the work done on the roads in the city is shoddy, and that the money 
was diverted by ‘big men.’ One respondent actually noted that when travelling from 
upcountry areas, ‘you know you have reached the city when you start to feel the 
potholes!’(low educated women, Rubaga). Interestingly, a group of canny Ugandans have 
even set up a Facebook
60
 group. Calling itself 'operation Kampala no pothole' the leader 
invited members in 2010 to showcase the finest pothole, with the winning pothole to be kept 
in a pothole museum 'for posterity'.  During one demonstration in Kampala in 2010, a man 
appeared to be fishing from one such  pothole, to the amusement of onlookers as showed in 
the caption below. 
Figure 2: Are Kampala's potholes big enough to fish in? 
 
Source: AOL news 
It was however pointed out that the government had tried to construct better roads in the 
countryside even though the city was neglected. 
6.3.3 Unemployment 
There were also strong sentiments, especially among the groups of educated men and women, 
that distribution of jobs by the government was unfair. All the jobs are going to those with 
‘long noses’, it was frequently echoed, 'while the Baganda get nothing!' 
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‘Museveni should remember that it is our children who died in the bush, not westerners61, it is us who 
died for this peace, look at all the names you hear in big positions on TV, and they all sound the 
same…omuntu alabye! (highly educated men, Kawempe Division) 
Discussions with youth groups also revealed that rampant unemployment was something the 
government had failed to address while the uneducated men in Central Division revealed that 
instead of helping poor people start up business by giving them small loans, government was 
perceived as only giving them to its ‘own’ people who are already well off. They pointed out 
one of the richest businessmen in the city as being a constant beneficiary of government 
funding, while the poor 'cannot even get 100.000 shillings
62
 loan as startup capital!' It was 
also mentioned by several groups that government is doing nothing to reduce corruption 
which many discussants argued was like ‘AIDS’ killing the country,  
‘they are selling this country in bits, sente zonna bazibbye, airport baagitunda, olaba museveni yali 
ayagala kutunda mabira, okwo gattako enyanja! (They have stolen all the money, the 
airport was sold, you see Museveni wanted to sell Mabira forest, even the lake!) 
(low educated women, Rubaga) 
And that even taxes were getting higher and higher, combined with spiraling inflation. Even 
the free education in primary and secondary was so underfunded, they pointed out, teachers 
are not given enough salary and the education quality is so low. 
These assessments by the respondents reflect a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the 
transport system, general health care and the employment situation in the country among the 
respondents. 
6.4 Changes in Government Performance since 1986 
'There is ‘modernization’ now…but the government no longer has ears…'(respondents from 
low educated women group, Rubaga) 
There were differing views expressed by various groups about the changes in performance of 
the central government since 1986. Discussants were asked to elaborate on how they 
perceived government performance to have evolved since 1986. While most groups especially 
of men and women agreed that there was better security provision unlike in the 1986 when 
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  100.000 Uganda shillings is roughly equivalent to 50 US dollars. 
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road blocks
63
 were everywhere, some were quick to note that the security situation is now 
changing for the worse,  
‘this government is becoming tough, unlike before, now every small thing calls for tear gas! Iron bar 
criminals are also on the loose, they spend money on teargas, why don’t they put the same security they 
put in Kololo
64
  everywhere instead of these ridiculous expenditures on fighter jets? (Highly 
educated women, Kawempe). 
Some groups even periodized government performance, arguing that from the moment 
elections started being held in 1996, government performance had become poorer. 
Government was now concentrating money on winning elections, they argued. Uneducated 
women in Kawempe noted that unlike before where Mzee would listen to people, now the 
government no longer has ‘ears’ and those who talk about it just disappear. However, the 
government was praised for allowing a ‘free’ market economy and ‘modernization’ through 
introducing many phone companies which did not exist before. 
These sentiments can be summed up by a comment from a male key informant when asked to 
evaluate government performance since 1986,  
‘From 1986-1995, there was a lot of optimism. We had the 10 Point program, women taking up 
leadership positions and a disciplined army. From 1996-2006, government started sliding, rigging of 
elections was rampant, militias like Kalangala Action Plan were created by government to harass 
people, UPDF
65
 was implicated in looting of Congo, and government lies became unsustainable. From 
2007-todate, we have a Museveni who is a complete dictator. We have extra constitutional 
organizations like ‘kiboko squad66’ backed by government, corruption is like corruption. People say if 
Museveni of today met the Museveni of the 1990s, they wouldn’t be able to recognize each 
other…’(Political scientist, Makerere University) 
 Youth groups were particularly unimpressed by the trend government was taking. It is 
important to note that most of the discussants in the youth groups grew up in the 1990s when 
the tumultuous times were almost over, so unlike in the other groups where security was a big 
issue, the youths looked mainly to issues like employment, education, and general political 
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 These were mainly check points manned by soldiers, who usualy stopped citizens to check if they were a 
security threat. They were very common during Amin and Obote's regimes, and the early years of the current 
regime. 
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 Kololo is a Kampala suburb where most diplomats and politicians and the well-off live. 
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 Uganda People's Defence Forces 
66
 A paramilitary group with government links that usualy moves with heavy sticks during demostrations, to 
cane rioters. 
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environment as their points of evaluation. Discussants in the youth groups were in agreement 
that the government record on unemployment was getting worse.  
It was also  pointed out that the tax system has become tougher and unbearable. It emerged 
among uneducated men in central Division that the taxes were perceived as chasing ordinary 
people out of the city and the government is doing nothing to stop the increasing inflation. 
Unlike before, they argued, now even 10.000 Uganda shillings cannot buy you anything! It is 
also interesting that they directly associated the inflation to government increase in taxes other 
than external economic factors and argued that if taxes were lowered, inflation would go 
down. 
From the discussion above we can note that the general feeling is that apart from the security 
situation, which was appreciated as improved in comparison to that of past regimes, 
discussants felt that the general performance of government was worsening. Despite the 
diversity of views among the discussants in regard to what government was doing or not, they 
shared a common opinion that government had particularly performed well in the early years.  
These evaluations are telling. Commentators on Ugandan politics have pointed at the 
evolution of the current leadership, personified by president Museveni, from a benevolent, 
progressive regime to more suppressive tendencies. Indeed, Museveni was once during the 
early 1990s referred to by the then US secretary of State Madeline Albright as a 'new breed' 
and 'beacon of hope' among African leaders. However, after the strong economic and social 
indicators in the 1990s, the country has registered slower progress, both politically and 
economically, and sometimes even regressed. Muhumuza (2009:29) explains this trend thus, 
'While between 1986 and 1996 Museveni had a lot to prove, like fronting himself as a democrat and 
adopting neoliberal policies so as to get aid from donors and also undercut influence of traditional 
parties, after 1996 he had spent enough time in power to consolidate his power base. It was therefore 
no longer necessary for him to implement populist policies…'.  
In an earlier assessment of Museveni's political regime, Kasfir (2000) notes, 'the twists and turns 
in Museveni's 'movement' no-party democratic doctrine and its application since 1986 more closely reflect the 
political realities of legitimizing and maintaining state power than they do to the emergence of a novel form of 
democracy.' 
It is also widely remembered during the 2001 elections that the president encouraged people 
not to vote members of parliament who would be very active, but dormant ones as long as 
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they can 'wake up and vote.' It is therefore safe to conclude that citizen's evaluation of 
government delivery of  services reflected the type of services they have experienced over the 
26 year period that the current government has been in power, and overall they perceive it as 
declining. 
6.5 Perception of political stability 
In countries such as Uganda, evaluations of government performance cannot be complete 
without addressing the issue of national security. The country has been scourged by war for 
decades, and although relative peace returned to the country, there are still pockets of 
instability. Observers of Ugandan politics have always argued that one of the reasons the 
current regime has been able to keep in power is because it has managed to maintain a 
semblance of security within a once chaotic nation (Krutz and Logan, 2011). The security 
factor therefore becomes a key indicator of performance. Perceptions of political stability by 
citizens, in this case I assumed would override other factors in evaluating government 
performance, and  positive perceptions would thus lead to more trust among citizens. Focus 
group participants were asked to evaluate the government in its delivery of peace and security, 
and how important this is to them. 
Respondents were mainly positive in their assessment of the government delivery of political 
stability. They mainly commended the government on the pacification of the army, end of the 
war in northern Uganda and its role in 'securing' neighboring countries. The thinking was 
widespread, especially among the groups of men and women that the government had 
performed well in stabilizing the country compared to all the past regimes. It was also pointed 
out by respondents that this is the most important achievement of the current government. A 
respondent among the educated group of women in Kawempe noted, 
'During the times of Obote and Amin, when your husband goes out of the house, your heart was never at 
peace before he came back, if someone knocked on your door, you couldn’t just open, everywhere you 
went, you were never sure you could go back home alive, but now, we have peace…apart from a few 
areas where you hear war, my children have grown up not knowing what war looks like…who could 
have imagined this?!' 
From the low educated men in Central division, a respondent had this to say in response to the 
security situation, 'bano abaana benakuzino bazzanya nokuzanya. Edda nga otambula ezo 
saawa zettumbi? Twabeelanga ku yoleke, nga amasasi gesooza bwesooza! Nze bano abaana 
bamuseveni simanyi nakyebagala! Ensi eno nga yali ntabufu!' (you see these people who 
81 
 
have grown up under museveni's regime have no idea what it was like before. It was 
constant war! this country was a mess, I don’t even know what these children want!) 
The feelings from the youth groups however were less optimistic. Noting that the old 
generation have been duped into accepting the 'pseudo' peace, a respondent from the educated 
youth group in Rubaga reasoned that that is the very reason the government is reluctant to 
'democratise'  
'Museveni knows very well that those people fear war, so he is always threatening them with war. Look 
at the north, is that stability? Now he stopped the war so that he can get votes. Wait when he needs 
something else, he will threaten to cause another war, or say there are ADF rebels in the opposition' 
This comment is similar to the one advanced in the low educated youth group in Central 
Division, although in a more cynical approach, 
'Peace? Which peace? With all these iron bar criminals, child sacrifices, teargas, you talk of peace? 
Where do you live? That talk of we sleep is spoiling people. You are sleeping while they are taking 
everything. Who killed people in Kannungu
67
? Is that also peace? We are causing wars everywhere, 
Somalia, Congo, Rwanda. Anyone who says that is peace must be joking!' 
Clearly the issue of stability features prominently in shaping Uganda's political discourse. In a 
recent rebuff of opposition politicians who were putting the government on pressure, the 
president warned them 'not to joke with peace or the army can take over
68
' to which one of his 
critics cynically replied.. 'you can joke with money meant for HIV patients, relocation of troubled 
northerners and other health related issues, but not peace and security. Mzee, spot on! thank you for providing 
peace and security to the patients, in the end, you will be providing security to the deceased'  
But perhaps what sums up Uganda's security discourse is the image of the personality of the 
president himself. Reflecting on Museveni's autobiography of 'sowing the mustard seed,' Ogot 
(2000) notes thus,  
'the concise oxford dictionary of current English defines narcissism as a 'tendency to self worship, 
absorption in one's own personal perfections.' it is derived from the name of a Greek youth, Narkissos, 
who fell in love with his reflection in the water. Museveni's autobiography shows him as the Ugandan 
Narkissos who has fallen in love with his reflection in Ugandan muddy political waters. He has turned 
Uganda's historical record as a narrative of self justification, and although all autobiographies are 
narcistic to some degree, the careful shaping of a public self image, monuments to self love built for 
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  Kannungu became a centre of world attention after a religious massacre that led to over 1000 deaths in 
2000. Conspiracy theories abound that government was also culpable. 
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 Don't joke with peace-Museveni. The new vision, 26, nov.2012. 
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posterity- not all are trapped in narcissism as this book is. For Museveni, it is not so much how the past 
dictates the present that is important, but rather how the present manipulates the past' 
It is therefore not surprising that there were clear differences in the way that the old and 
young groups evaluated the performance of government in the security sector. While the older 
generations evaluated the security situation in relation to the past regimes, such as that of Idi 
Amin and Obote and gave favorable ratings to the government,(a reflection of the present 
manipulating the past),  the younger people looked at the current security situation as the basis 
for evaluation.  
This finding has important theoretical implications for our study of trust. If, as is claimed by 
the institutional performance model, political trust originates from the direct experiences with 
institutions, increased trust can be generated by providing better services (Mishler and Rose, 
2001). In our case, the experience of very poor security under previous regimes, and the 
subsequent improvement in security by the current regime, leads to more trust for the current 
regime among the older generation. How then can we account for the difference in 
satisfaction by different age groups?  
One way is to argue that the current generation of young people have grown up with very high 
expectations, and therefore have no appreciation of the improvements since they have never 
experienced the turbulence of the early years. The other would be that dissatisfaction with 
various other government services, such as employment programs and basic health care 
especially among the youth is mainly used to discount the gains that have been attained in the 
security sector. In essence evaluations of security were mainly hinged on the experiences that 
different age groups had experienced over time. Overall, there were variations in perceptions 
over political stability and security. While most of the older groups had positive ratings of 
government performance, the younger ones seemed to have less enthusiasm towards the 
security credits of government, which were mainly hinged on their overall dissatisfaction with 
general government performance. One can conclude from these findings that while positive 
security evaluations were are an important factor for generating political trust among the older 
people, the young generation considered overall government performance and showed less 
trust in government.  
83 
 
6.6 Perceptions on Tax payment 
Tax effort represents the transfer of individual resources from the population to the 
government. Taxation is theorised as one of the ways that legitimacy and trust in government 
can be manifested. Tax effort also reflects the perceptions that citizens have towards their 
government's ability to perform its functions (Fjeldstad, 2004). People's willingness to pay tax 
is likely to be based on their perceptions of whether government is doing its functions and 
reflects their trust in government capabilities. Consequently, individuals have to believe that 
these resources will be utilised effectively in order to pay tax, or that non-compliance will 
result in substantial consequence. Individuals willing to part with resources make this choice 
based on both experiences and expectations of institutional performance (Hutchinson and 
Johnson, 2011). This measure represents a rational and non-normative base for reflecting on 
individual evaluations regarding government performance. In adopting this as an indicator of 
government performance, respondents in groups were asked the hypothetical question of 
whether they would be willing to pay more taxes if it could help improve services. The 
reasoning behind was that if citizens felt the taxes they were paying were being sufficiently 
used, they would be willing to pay more tax, and the reverse would be true. This indicator is 
also used at the same time to reflect political trust, and it is assumed that if citizens trust 
government to put their taxes to good use, then they would be willing to pay more, and 
unwillingness would reflect a lack of trust in government. In the study, citizens were asked to 
discuss the hypothetical question of whether they would be willing to pay more tax if it would 
enable government to better improve the delivery of services.  
The responses from various groups reflected a negative attitude towards tax payment. Most 
respondents were of the view that the current failure to deliver services is not in any way 
related to lack of enough resources, but rather misuse of those resources. One of the 
discussants among the highly educated women in Kawempe argued noted, 
'Even if we pay tax, corruption will take all of it. The money we give then, they use it to fly the first 
family abroad on useless trips, they take special hires all the time, so they want more money for that? In 
fact, they will just divert the money to buy teargas! Why would someone in their right mind give them 
more money?' 
While another among the low educated women in Rubaga was more vehement, 
'no no no no, more tax for what? Let them use the money we have given them well, then they can 
convince us that they need more. Emmere gyolina ekulemeddewo ngate osaba ndala?(you have failed to 
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eat the food you have, why would you ask for more?). Even a child can see that! If they had showed 
good will that they would provide services, I would be willing to pay. But for all these years, we have 
been paying tax and nothing has changed!' 
There were also concerns in the groups that while the taxes levied on water, toilet use and 
electricity had been increased, delivery of those services had not improved, so it was not 
logical to think of paying more tax as a way to improve services. Others also claimed that the 
government had purposely made them poor, so even if they were willing to pay the tax, they 
would not have means of paying it. 
It is instructive to note that there was recognition of the importance of paying tax to contribute 
to government functioning, and educated youth in Rubaga acknowledged that government 
needs money to be able to improve services like health and education. However, there was a 
general feeling that the taxes were already high and the money was not put to good use 
therefore it is not logical to pay more tax. 
Echoing similar sentiments, a respondent from civil society organisation noted, 
 'They already collect too much tax, they brag about it. Previously the government used to collect 5 
billion  shillings (approximately USD 2million) tax but services were provided. Now they say they 
collect 7 trillion shillings(approximately USD 2 billion) and on top of that get foreign aid, but services 
have deteriorated. It is a contradiction, but that’s mainly because they steal, what is the use of 
announcing that you collect 7 trillion when civil servants are striking everyday over low pay..?.' 
Another respondent echoed similar sentiments. He noted, 
 'Government has not proved honest in managing the revenues collected, so why would someone give 
them more money to give them another burden of accounting? They failed to account for Malaria funds, 
Gavi funds and no one is sure whether the oil money is not yet spent even before oil is extracted. In fact, 
there are names of government officials, am sure you know them, from the same region that keep 
appearing on cases of misallocation of funds, and nothing happens. So you cannot expect anyone to see 
the rationale for adding more money to the government' 
My impression from the discussions was that there was a general feeling that whereas it was a 
citizen's duty to pay tax so that government can get revenue to deliver services, respondents 
felt that the government was not using those taxes effectively. There were constant mentions 
of 'they will just use it to fill their stomachs’ or 'they will just embezzle it' and so respondents 
did not think that the promise of better service delivery would encourage them to pay tax. 
These findings are not very different from Fjeldstad's (2004:11) findings in a survey of tax 
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evasion and compliance in local governments in Tanzania, where he found out that more than 
58% of his respondents argued that the most serious problem hampering tax collection is that 
the collected taxes are not spent on public services. In the same study, 51% of the respondents 
argued that people should refuse to pay taxes until services are provided. However, unlike 
their Tanzanian counterparts who say they are willing to pay more tax if services are 
improved, the findings in Uganda reveal that people have little hope of service improvement 
even with more taxes. Indeed, these findings emphasize similar arguments made by Levi 
(1997, cited in Fjelstad, 2004:7) that the relationship between a taxpayer and government is 
mainly based on  fiscal exchange, where taxpayers pay in expectation of the government 
fulfilling its contractual obligation of provision of services. 
6.7 Perceptions of Corruption and trust in government 
As earlier discussed, literature on governance has documented the negative effects of 
corruption on delivery of services (Uslaner, 2004, Tøndel and Søreide, 2008). A Transparency 
International report described corruption as 'one of the greatest challenges of the 
contemporary world; it undermines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, 
leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and particularly hurts the 
poor' (Amundsen, 1999). In the same vein the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption also recognises the devastating effects of corruption on the social, 
political and cultural stability of African states (Lavallee, et al, 2008:1). While economists 
who advance the 'efficient grease'
69
 theory have laid claim to the beneficial effects that 
corruption can have on performance, most literature suggests a negative correlation between 
corruption, performance and trust. It has  been noted by scholars such as Uslaner (2004), 
Chang and Chu, (2006) that corruption has consequences for trust. While the causal chain is 
contested, in this study I address issues of corruption, trust and performance because they 
have a reciprocal relation.  
Corruption is an important indicator of performance of government, and high levels of 
perceived or actual corruption reduce trust in political institutions. As a symptom of ill 
functioning institutions, corruption can affect citizens’ trust either directly, via citizens’ 
experiences of or perceptions of corruption, or indirectly, via its adverse effects on economic 
growth (Lavalee et al, 2008).  
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 The main argument of efficient grease theory is that corruption can strengthen citizen's trust since bribe 
paying and clientism open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies, and that this 
increases institutional trust (Lavallee, et al, 2008). 
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Discussants were asked first to give their own understanding of what corruption is, what they 
think about corruption in the government, and how they think corruption affects government 
activities. The hypothesis is that citizens’ perception of rampant corruption in government 
would lead to low or no political trust. 
In the study, the hypothesis bears in mind the old Chinese maxim of 'the fish rots from the 
head' that is, perceptions of corruption within government will lead to low performance 
evaluations and low trust. This variable is also important because, as Banerjee (2001) argues, 
corruption transfers resources from the mass public to the elites- and generally from the poor 
to the rich. It was therefore an important indicator of both performance and trust. First, I 
wanted to find out how everyday citizens understand corruption, before looking at what they 
thought of corruption in central government. 
6.7.1 What is corruption? 
The discussions were quite interesting; corruption was defined in varying ways, from using 
public money for private good, to nepotism and immoral behaviour. Responses among the 
educated youth in Rubaga defined corruption in terms of 'misallocation of funds and 
donations, segregation, and as 'where the minority take what would have been for the 
majority.' For the highly educated men in Kawempe, corruption is also nepotism, favouring 
some regions and neglecting the rest and sexual harassment, while the low educated youth in 
Central Division defined corruption as 'something done in the dark.' The low educated men in 
central division variedly defined corruption as 'embezzling public money', 'tribalism', 'unfair 
judgement in court' and 'favouritism in resource allocation,' while another respondent defined 
corruption as 'satisfying your stomach alone..' What comes out clearly in these definitions is 
that citizens perceive corruption as an expression of selfishness. These definitions are also in 
sync with most scholarly understandings of corruption as 'expropriating what rightfully 
belongs to others (Uslaner, 2004:2). 
6.7.1 Corruption is a virus..a cancer 
The discussions revealed a wide spread perception that corruption is rampant in central 
government. Most discussants were of the view that the president and his top ministers are the 
most corrupt, while others argued that the whole society has become corrupt and everything is 
run on corruption. Various discussions also revealed that corruption is the biggest impediment 
to government performance, because money that would be used to deliver services is 
embezzled and that for one to access public services, one needs to give a bribe. It is 
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instructive to note that even respondents who appeared sympathetic to the ruling regime noted 
that  corruption is rampant. A discussant from the highly educated women group in Kawempe 
candidly described her experiences of corruption thus, 
'it is a virus in this country. It is like AIDS and it is going to kill this country, it starts from the big man 
himself up to the bottom. When you go to Mulago
70
, they ask you, where do you come from? Are you 
from Ngalo Nkalu
71
(empty hands) or Kasawo
72
(bag)? Have you come with the person to take care of 
you? You think they are asking for a person yet they are asking for money. I took my daughter to 
Mulago and the doctor asked where I come from; I said I come from Makerere then the doctor checked 
the child and prescribed panadol. When I went to Rubaga
73
, the doctor said my child had hernia and 
needed to be operated on. I paid money. Corruption is a big problem. 
Another viewed corruption as reflected in the discrepancy in the distribution of opportunities. 
Commenting on how corruption had frustrated people, a male respondent from the educated 
group in Rubaga commented thus; 
'All the money we pay for tax is consumed by a small group of people while the rest suffer. MPs earn 
more than 20 million a month, yet they represent poor people, professors earn 5 million, judges, 
5million, and junior doctors 600.000thousand, the director of KCCA 36million, the mayor of Kampala 
16million. That lady even earns more money than the mayor of New York! Where does that money come 
from? There is no formula on those discrepancies, and that is a root for corruption. A school teacher 
earns 200.000 thousand, a policeman 260.000 thousand, yet they have to educate their children too...' 
It was also claimed in one of the groups of the low educated in Rubaga that because of the 
wide spread corruption, most citizens now want to talk to the president face to face, for they 
cannot trust the parliamentarians who are only there for ‘God and my stomach’(that is, 
diverting from Uganda's motto of for God and my country).  
While other discussants also recognised corruption as a 'very, very big problem,' noting that 
one of the things that Uganda is most famous for in the world is corruption. A discussant 
among the youth group in Rubaga recalled an incident,  
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 Mulago is the national Referral hospital 
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 This is in actual sense a name of a village in Uganda, which can be literally translated at 'empty hands' so for 
those who are not familiar with corruption talk, they would assume that someone is asking for the place they 
come from. 
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 Kasawo is also a village in the district of Mukono. Kasawo can be literally translated as a small bag, so for 
someone asking a bride, the question is whether you have come from 'empty hands' or with a 'bag'. 
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 Rubaga is a catholic owned private hospital located in Kampala 
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'the corruption trend in Uganda is alarming, the top government people have even started to accuse 
each other. Remember the war between Amama Mbabazi
74
 and major Tumukunde
75
. Tumukunde was 
telling Mbabazi to step down to allow investigations concerning bribe money to do with Tullow oil, but 
Mbabazi refused. These things are difficult, and this won’t stop until Museveni and his gang are gone.' 
The observations above reflect the wide spread perceptions among respondents that 
corruption is a rampant vice in the government. It was interesting to note though that some 
respondents viewed corruption as inescapable and useful if you need to get something done. A 
man from the group of low educated men in Central Division commented thus, 
'Madam, these days jobs are given on the basis of technical know who. But what is good is that if 
someone you know gets a job, even if it is corruption, you are happy. It even rescued me from the police 
once. I was parking the taxi badly and the police officer wanted to fine me, I gave him 'kitu kidogo' and 
he let me go. Do you know how much money I would have paid if I went to court?'  
This observation is particularly important for it points to the multifaceted nature of corruption. 
In his study of corruption in Local  Administration in rural Kenya, Onyango (2012) found that 
corruption practices feed off each other, creating a web that involves both bribe seekers at the 
administrative and political level to the bribe givers who usually are everyday citizens. Bayart 
(1993) also cautions us on how we understand 'the politics of the belly' not just as instances of 
corruption but as a 'figuration' of actions of interdependent actors  mediated by particular 
forms of institutions and the situation that it engenders. 
What do these perceptions mean? Could it be, as De Sardan (1999) and Ackerman(1999) 
argue, that the practice of corruption is not to be understood outside the societal cultures of  
tipping and gift-giving, and, could this type of corruption be giving off positive benefits, such 
as Khan and Jomo
76
 (2000) have argued for the case of East Asia?  
While there is a semblance of truth in De Sardan and Ackerman's arguments, the discussions 
from the field reveal that people have a somewhat clear conception of what can be determined 
as a gift and a bribe. That is why several discussants defined corruption as 'something done in 
the dark' and 'robbery and taking what belongs to others for yourself,' none of which, have a 
close relation with the conception of gift giving and tipping. What could be close to the 
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 Amama Mbabazi is current prime minister and close confidant of the president 
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  A prominent soldier who is also nephew to president Museveni's wife, Janet 
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 Khan and Jomo have argued that in the case of Asian Democracies, rents associated with corruption do not 
necessarily undermine growth because they are allocated competitively among 'enterprenuers' on a 
performance basis. 
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society-culture arguments could be traced to some perceptions of corruption as 'satisfying 
your stomach alone...' This definition is closely implicated in the practice that characterises 
most African democracies, where politics and the implementation of public policy has 
reduced offices to the political grammar of 'eating'. What is interesting here is that politicians 
are normally not vilified if they share some of the 'meat' (njawulo) with their constituents. 
6.7.2 Intricacies of corruption....it's our turn to eat syndrome 
 Indeed, as Kisseka-Ntale (2011) noted in his study of the 2011 parliamentary election contest 
in Mawokota-North constituency in Uganda, voter rationality and choice was strongly 
attached to getting someone in office who 'would give us a chance to also eat.' Ogude (2007) 
has also argued that one of the most defining features of the state in Africa is its use as a ready 
tool for the accumulation of resources. In the imagination of Africans, the state, and state 
power becomes a resource in itself (Ogude: 2007:7). Closely related to this is the existence of 
patron client capitalism. The distribution of state resources is done through ‘big’ men (and 
women) connected to state power, and patronage is dispensed through them rather than 
directly to the people. Such a situation convinces ordinary people that they can access wealth 
and resources through these men and women. It is therefore possible to understand why 
voters, in explaining their choice of candidates, expressed themselves using the same political 
grammar which reduces the state (and electoral processes) to the zero-sum game of eating 
(ibid: 13).  
In Kisekka-Ntale's study, respondents used the language of 'eating' in various ways, “we shall 
also get a chance to be remembered by the president” our area was ‘starving’ because the 
president didn’t like the MP,” you cannot bite a hand that feeds you” to explain the political 
choices they made during the elections. Moreover, those who did not vote for the then 
incumbent Member of Parliament argued that they could not give someone a vote who had 
already “eaten’ big things. 
Given these diverging perceptions, how do citizens think corruption affects government 
services? The study investigated how citizens feel corruption is affecting government 
activities. There were various views, but mainly recognising that many government activities 
had been slowed down or even damaged due to corrupt tendencies. Many recognized that 
programmes are not implemented because funds are diverted through embezzlement, a 
discussant among the educated men in Kawempe lamented, 
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'How can one even start talking about corruption? Where do I start from? I am so bitter! Can you 
imagine they released 20 national identity cards costing 2 billion shillings? They embezzled NSSF 
money, AIDS money, government eno nsilu nyo! Nebba nesente zabagenda okufa?! Wano bamemba ba 
parliament yomukaaga ensi bagitunda million ttaano!(this government is so stupid! It even 
steals money for those who are about to die! See the MPs of the 6th parliament 
were bribed to remove presidential term limits for 5 million) 
Others were also bitter,  
'Corruption kills a person who wouldn’t have died. How many people have died in Mulago because of 
corruption? It retards the country. Take the case of Jinja where a pregnant woman died because she 
had no money to pay the doctor to be operated on. Can you imagine when the doctor was arrested, the 
nurses and doctors striked? How can you strike because a doctor wanted corruption and did not get so 
he neglected the patient?(comment from low educated women group, Rubaga) 
This observation is not unique to the Ugandan scene; Rothstein, (2011:59) cites several 
examples from India, eastern Europe and Africa (Tanzania) to demonstrate the widespread 
corruption in the health sector. In his argument, the health sector as a 'killing field' for 
corruption not only demonstrates problems with the quality of government, but also has direct 
implications for the general success of a society, given that health enhances individuals' 
abilities to pursue their goals (61). 
In the discussions, youth groups were also bitter, with many discussants reflecting 
dissatisfaction with the way employment was given out. Most of them were of the view that 
you had to know someone from the 'west' to get a job, and that even money that was meant for 
the youth fund had been embezzled. 
It was also recognised that corruption has adverse effects on income between people. 
Discussants echoed that because of widespread corruption, the rich are getting richer and the 
poor, poorer, and those without access to services are badly affected most. There were also 
mentions of misallocation of resources resulting from corrupt tendencies, one discussant 
commented, 
'money that would have been used for malaria is diverted to buying fighter jets, what is a plane worth 
trillions going to do for  a poor Ugandan...even money used in the presidential election recently, where 
did they get the money they used to measure in kilos? People used to get kilogrammes of money to go 
and organise rallies, I wonder how many malaria patients died because of this; we just left everything 
to God now! 
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The above examples show the kind of desperation and widespread perception that ordinary 
citizens have towards the state of corruption in government. On the whole, the findings on 
corruption reveal that people have a perception that there is rampant corruption in central 
government, especially among the politicians who are said to demand 'enjawulo' (kickback) 
on everything they are involved in. The persistent potholes, collapsing buildings were also 
blamed on corruption. These assessments may not be surprising, given the widespread reports 
in both the electronic and print media
77
 of the continuous scandals related to embezzlement 
involving top government politicians
78
, although, one cannot say that only media influence 
has shaped these perceptions, given various incidents where discussants said they had first-
hand experiences of bribery and corruption themselves. 
Indeed, a recent report (2011) from the Inspectorate of Government, an institution responsible 
for fighting corruption in the country, recognises that 'whereas the country has made efforts at 
establishing systems to fight corruption, the implementation of corruption prevention and 
detection and anti-corruption enforcement has been particularly weak.' In a related incidence, 
an afro barometer survey (2008) found that 1 in every 4 members of the household surveyed 
reported paying a bribe to access services from government departments. Amundsen (2006) 
has also extensively documented the various instances of political corruption in Uganda, 
citing lack of political will, patron-clientism and poor institutional framework as some of the 
reasons for the rampant corruption in Uganda. 
But does this perceived corruption affect trust? Fukuyama (1995), Covey and Uslaner (2005) 
are some of the scholars that have argued for a reciprocal relationship between trust and 
corruption. Bourne (2010), using a cross sectional survey of 1338 Jamaicans also finds that 
corruption affects trust. Closer home, Transparency International's corruption index places 
Uganda as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, while a recent (2012) afro 
barometer study of citizens in Uganda over 18 years and above ranked most public 
institutions as not trusted. In essence, whether using TI's operational scale, Uslaner's or 
perceptions, we have evidence that corruption affects trust, and perceptions of rampant 
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  As recently as 2012, the European Union, UK, Norway and Ireland have announced a stop on aid 
disbursements after the Auditor General found substantial evidence detailing how aid from these countries 
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 In early 2011, Akankwasa, the then  Director of National Forestry Authority was suspended after being 
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2billion shillings(The Independent, Friday, July 11, 2011) 
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corruption in institutions will lead to low trust since positive expectations do not derive from 
corruption. As Bourne (2010) succinctly puts it, corruption is the hallmark of a dysfunctional 
system. 
Perceptions of rampant corruption in government in Uganda's case could also explain citizens' 
apathy towards tax payment, and support the argument that corruption leads to poor 
government performance and low trust. 
6.8 Perceptions of tribal favouritism in allocation of resources and 
opportunities 
Various scholars have used ethnicity to define the character of African politics, and ethnicity 
has been one of the most widely regarded factors in African politics. Indeed, many studies of 
politics have intimately tied ethnic cleavages to national politics in ways that suggest a 
relationship that is both supplemental as well as conflictual to national political landscapes 
(Hyden, 2006, Mamdani, 1996, Englehart, Basanez & Moreno,1998). In the Ugandan context, 
the term ethnicity and ethnic group however need to be rethought especially in studying the 
character of current politics. I use a more uncomfortable term ‘tribe79’ to make explicit the 
various loyalties. Whereas the ruling government is led by a man from the Bantu
80
 ethnic 
group the Banyankole
81
, discussions with other Bantu groups such as the Baganda
82
 and 
Basoga
83
 did not identify with him as ‘their son’ because he belongs to a different tribe. Tribal 
cleavages are therefore more pronounced than ethnic cleavages.  
The question asked  in the groups was whether discussants feel that  all the people of Uganda 
have equal opportunity to contribute and share in government activities regardless of where 
they come from. The main assumption here was that citizens’ perception of tribal group 
favouritism will have negative effects on their performance evaluations and on how much 
they trust the central government. That is, the more  governments is perceived as favouring a 
particular tribal group, the more it will be seen as biased and poorly performing and thus less 
trusted.  
                                                          
79
 Tribe has its roots in colonial anthropological foundations, but it is used here to refer to societies organised 
on the basis of kinship. 
80
 The Bantu is an ethno-linguistic category comprising a number of linguistically related peoples of central and 
southern Africa. 
81
 Peoples from the Ankore region of south-western Uganda 
82
 The Baganda are the largest tribal group in Uganda, organised around 52 clans and the institution of kingship. 
83
 From the bantu speaking kingdom of Busoga in eastern Uganda 
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Discussions yielded very strong sentiments regarding feelings of tribal favoritism in central 
government. There was a general feeling among those from other tribes that most of the 'juicy' 
posts were going to westerners, specifically the Banyankore of Museveni's tribe. Respondents 
gave various examples especially of cabinet ministers, arguing that the most powerful posts 
are being given to the Banyankore. A discussant among the low educated youth from central 
Division (my observation was that he is a Muganda) commented thus, 
'Maama, njagala obeere ku radio owulirize amannya geboogerako nga bali mu bifo ebinene, Kuteesa
84
, 
Muhwezi
85
, Mbabazi
86
, Bassajjabalaba
87
, Nyakayirima, Muhoozi, namenyaki nalekaki! Gwe abo omanyi 
kyebeddira? Leeka naawe eno ensi yo yaabwe….'(madam, I want you to sit on radio and 
listen to which names occupy the biggest posts in government, how many sound 
like Baganda names? This country is theirs!) 
Another added,  
'Gwe kati njagala ogende mu offiisi yonna wano mukampala, owulire lulimiki olwogerwamu! Ela 
bwoba elinyalyo silyeyo, nga omulimu ogwelabira!'(I want you to enter any office here in 
Kampala and tell me which language is spoken there. The moment they realize 
you aren't from the west, forget about the job!) 
However, among some respondents who come from the west, where the President comes 
from, the feeling was that although a few people had benefited, not all of them were sharing 
the tribal privileges. It emerged from the discussions that the feeling of benefit was among the 
small sub-group of Bahima
88
, but not all Banyankore and westerners were benefiting.  
It was also constantly echoed in various groups that even when government listens, it listens 
to particular groups and types of people. A discussant among the low educated women in 
Rubaga claimed that government only listens to NRM cadres and the donors. Another pointed 
out 
‘Things became only for the Banyankore and Banyarwanda, if you cannot speak the language of 
‘twalire (we won)’, twateera embundu89, you cannot say anything to the government and it listens. 
                                                          
84
 Long serving foreigh affairs minister and Museveni's inlaw. 
85
 Army general, former minister and museveni's inlaw implicated in the Global fund scam. 
86
 Uganda's prime minister and Museveni's close confidant, also from the west 
87
 Bussinessman from the west, implicated in a number of government corruption cases. 
88
 A small subtribe among the banyankore where museveni comes from. They are mainly pastoralists 
89
  A common reference from Kinyankore language, meaning 'we fought with the gun, now we have ultimate 
power', used mainly by NRM cadres to counter opposition. 
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People have been dying without medication in hospitals, they asked government many times, but this 
government chose to buy fighter jets, tell me, who do you think it listens to?’ 
'Segregation' and 'nepotism' was widely echoed by groups of educated women in Kawempe. 
Indeed, some discussants commented that the reason people were rioting frequently is because 
they were not getting a share of the national cake, while others were 'eating' 
‘There are names that have been on the cabinet since 1986, and they all sound the same. Does 
Museveni want to say that other Ugandans are not intelligent enough to occupy those posts? The 
government gives all statehouse scholarships and loans to banyankore while others suffer.We just have 
to force them out…’(female discussant, highly educated group, Kawempe). 
 And yet interestingly, some of the discussants, especially those belonging to the president’s 
tribe, objected to this generalization  
‘People say it’s the Banyankore who are in the thing, but it’s not all of us, just a small click of 
bahima, even us we protest against the NRM…’(male discussant, low educated Central 
Division).  
Indeed, tribal sentiments were rife in the discussions, with constant references to ‘those with 
long noses’ as being the reason people were striking. In a related observation, disrespect for 
traditional leaders also featured prominently as a reason for continued discontent with 
government. There was constant mention of the September 2009 riots in which the central 
government clashed with the kingdom of Buganda loyalists, and, especially among the groups 
from Rubaga, this was a strong source of resentment for central government 
 ‘they came here as paupers, now they even see our king in the mouth! Nanti bagamba 
sselwajja okwota lusinga nanyinimu ensitama! Naye ekikutte obudde kijja kubuta!’ (You see 
you can give someone refuge and they take over your house and wife, but well, this 
condition won’t be permanent) 
Other respondents however advanced an argument that the other tribes were just envious of 
the work ethic of the westerners, especially accusing those from central Buganda of laziness. 
A respondent from the educated youth group in Rubaga reasoned thus,  'abavubuka abaganda 
badda kukuba bukubi matatu, bwebamala nga bagamba mbu abanyankore batutte buli 
kimu!'(the Baganda youths are always playing cards, then after they say that the 
Banyankore have taken everything!).  
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It is worth noting that tribal loyalties have a very deep rooted history in Ugandan politics. The 
current government came to power after unseating a mainly northerner-dominated 
government. Museveni then argued that ethnic politics was what was killing Africa and used 
it as a basis for keeping a hold on political parties. He instituted what he termed a broad-based 
government (Muhumuza, 2009) . However as Mamdani (1998) observed, 'Museveni's claim 
that the opposition in Africa tends to be ethnic, and by implication illegitimate, explains little, 
for, where the opposition is ethnic, it is more likely that the government is no less ethnic.' If 
we take the findings from this study as a reflection of the perception of Ugandans, Mamdani's 
assessment could not be more right.  
There also various reports in the media
90
 arguing that Museveni's family runs the government. 
His wife, Janet, is a member of parliament and a minister, his brother was a long serving 
minister  and army general and his son heads the Presidential Guard Brigade, while so many 
of cabinet ministers are known to have blood relations with him
91
. Lindeman (2010:3) uses 
similar arguments in his analysis of the reasons for recurrent civil wars in Uganda. He argues 
that the elite bargain, based on the distribution of political, military and economic power has 
been biased in favor of ethnic groups from Western and Central Uganda. 
On the whole, the study findings in general indicate that there is a strong feeling that the 
government resources are distributed in favor of Museveni's tribe. But it also came out that 
there was recognition that not all westerners have benefited equally. What is interesting is that 
though most discussants criticized the government for what they perceived as tribal 
favoritism, most of them utilized ethnic tropes themselves to express the type of change that 
they would like to see… 'at least he should give the Basoga something! We the Baganda are 
neglected! It is not fair, the Banyankore are filling their stomachs, let them wait when we  get 
our chance!' 
My interpretation of these discussions was that there were widespread perception of tribal-
favoritism in government allocation of services and opportunities, but this was mainly among 
those who come from outside his tribe. Most of these discussants also evaluated government 
performance as not so good and it seems plausible that perceptions of ethnic group favoritism 
play a role in this assessment. 
                                                          
90
 The independent, March, 6,2008. Does Museveni favour Bahima Kinsmen? 
91
 Museveni Government's family tree. 'The independent, Wednesday, march 25 2009.' 
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One cannot be led to simply accept that the idea of “tribal-eating” is a phenomenon in 
Uganda, or among the Banyankore  alone. This understanding is rooted in concrete 
experiences that many African peoples have experienced overtime. In Uganda’s history, 
ethnic groups in power have appropriated resources to their kin and kith, to the exclusion of 
others to the extent that gaining state power is looked at by people as having one’s turn to eat. 
In Kenya, ethnic tensions came to the fore in 2007 electoral debates that almost shook the 
foundations of the once peaceful nation.  
In Rwanda, the genocide that shook the nation pitted the Hutu against the Tutsi, bringing the 
nation on its knees and changing the political landscape of the country forever. In Sudan, the 
Arab North constantly found the black south, to a point where two nations have now been 
born, and ethnic tensions in the dubiously named 'Democratic' Republic of Congo have partly 
contributed to one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters. What can be said of these 
ethnic rivalries and alliances however is that far from being driven by irrational primordial 
behaviour, they are rooted in rational self interest, with serious considerations linked to past 
experiences of inclusion and exclusion. 
6.9 Conclusion 
The findings from the study showed varied attitudes towards central government. In general, 
the government received more positive evaluations for providing human security and relative 
peace, HIV/AIDs care and provision of free primary and secondary education. It was however 
highly criticised on policies of maternal health, poor road infrastructure and rampant 
unemployment. It is also notable that government was seen as highly corrupt, with many 
officials cited as incompetent. The electoral commission was criticised as being highly biased 
in favour of the ruling party, although there was relatively high belief that elections were 
effective ways of holding lower level politicians accountable. Tribalism and nepotism are also 
perceived as pervasive, with technical know 'who' replacing know 'how'. On the whole, 
respondents reflected a moderate level of trust in government, mainly arguing that compared 
to past governments, it has been better performing, and also because, as one respondent 
opined 'one cannot be sure if a different government will not take us back to the past.' 
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Chapter 7 : Summary, theoretical Implications and Conclusions from 
the Findings. 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter summarizes the entire study of political trust and institutional performance in 
Uganda. I briefly highlight the study problem and methods used, and go on to provide a recap 
of the major findings while trying to link them to the research questions. I also highlight the 
theoretical implications of the study in lieu of the existing literature on trust, and its 
contributions to this body of knowledge. I close by pointing out some limitations of the study 
and thus suggest potential areas for further research. 
7.1.1 Purpose of the study  
The study had two main purposes. The primary task was that of investigating how institutions 
impact on political trust among citizens, while the secondary aim was that of testing an 
institutional performance framework for explaining political trust developed by scholars such 
as Mishler and Rose, 2001, Uslaner, 2005 and Lavalle, et al 2011. The overall idea of the 
thesis stemmed from and was subsequently based on the institutionalists belief that trust is not 
merely an endogenous variable that societies possess or not and project out to their 
environment as  Putnam (1993) suggests, but is and can be a consequence of the actions and 
inactions of political and public institutions and actors (Newton, 2007). 
7.2 Overview of the research problem  
Uganda's political landscape can be characterized as typical of many post independence sub-
Saharan African countries. The nation was riddled with conflict for almost three decades after 
independence, and the reign of terror experienced during the Amin and Obote years only 
worked to intensify many of the existing social ethnic divisions (Mutibwa, 2008). Social and 
economic infrastructure was run down following the economic war where Amin expelled 
Asian businessmen as a move towards Africanisation. At the same time, political institutional 
structures were almost non-existent, with rampant corruption, mass murders and continuous 
civil strife engulfing the country for years. 
 It was therefore with much eagerness and hope that  civilians welcomed the guerrilla outfit of 
the NRM that took over power in 1986 (ibid). After taking over power, the NRM and its 
leadership embarked on various radical measures that were geared at restoring legitimacy, 
economic rejuvenation and social reconstruction. Through their idea of a 'fundamental 
change', the leadership embarked on a policy of economic liberalization, political 
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mobilization and an all inclusive political campaign aimed at creating broad based legitimacy. 
Indeed, many commentators of African politics characterized Uganda's leadership as the 'new 
breed' of African leaders, and Uganda enjoyed widespread international and local support in 
its recovery programme. A new constitution was promulgated in 1995, and presidential 
elections were held in 1996 after 16 years. During this period, the country experienced rapid 
reforms in the economic sector followed by high economic growth rates, decentralization was 
also introduced to bring services closer to the people, and education reforms were carried out, 
not least among others the introduction of Universal primary education in 1997. 
However, despite these important gains, critics continued to argue that the design of the 
political system which suffocated political parties, growing income inequalities and the 
increasing rate of corruption would undermine the progress of the country (Trip:2010:17). 
Indeed, as the country moved into the 2000s, the no party experiment faltered, while the 
reforms in the public sector were marred by cases of massive corruption. Subsequent elections 
were riddled with strife, and observers continue to argue that the country is on the downward 
spiral due to increased neglect of public priorities by government, lack of political will to 
fight corruption and breakdown of social and economic infrastructure (Mwenda, 2009). Mass 
demonstrations are common especially in urban areas, and there is common talk among 
ordinary citizens that the government cannot be 'trusted'.  
It is on the basis of this paradox that I was interested in designing a study that explored the 
meaning of political trust among citizens. In other words, following the claims by scholars 
such as Putnam (1993) that institutions can only thrive in societies with reservoirs of civic 
virtue, could the perceived breakdown of institutional capacity in a country like Uganda be a 
symptom of a broken society? Given the enthusiasm and trust that had been given to the NRM 
following the war years, I felt that Putnam's explanation was inadequate in explaining a case 
like Uganda. This is because a society whose social fabric had been torn by war was still able 
to put their hope (I want to say trust) in a mildly known guerrilla outfit, out of expectations of 
better living conditions. 
 I was then convinced that the current state of affairs which manifests itself as dissatisfaction 
with the regime has arisen out of the experience that citizens have endured under the current 
regime. The study therefore sought to advance an argument that when the institutions of 
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government are perceived to be performing well in terms of delivering basic services such as 
education, health, security, this will increase trust for government among citizens.  
In this line of reasoning, I adopted the institutional performance approach as an alternative 
explanation for political trust, and went ahead to test some of this thinking following the 
question; How do political institutions impact on political trust among citizens? This was then 
further broken into several sub questions that guided the study on political trust and 
institutional performance in Uganda; 
1. What is the nature and role of the central government and how are these related to 
citizen's responsibilities? 
2. How much do citizens trust the electoral process and the electoral commission? 
3. What is the connection between perceptions of service delivery and political trust? 
4. What is the relationship between corruption, tax payment, security  and political trust? 
5. What is the significance of social demographic variables for political trust and how 
much variation do they bring? 
After a review of both cultural and institutional perspectives to the understanding of political 
trust, informed by such scholars as Putnam, almond and Verba, and Rothstein, Newton, 
Norris, Lavalle, respectively, I was able to derive a theoretical framework consisting of six 
independent variables. These are: perceptions of corruption, fairness  and ethnicity, perception 
of political stability, perception of basic service delivery, and perception of tax payment.  The 
following hypotheses were then derived and guided the study. 
a) Perceptions of rampant corruption in central government may lead to low levels of 
trust among citizens, and also reflect the government as performing poorly. 
b) If the government is perceived as delivering well on basic services such as health and 
education, it will be trusted by citizens, even if other sectors such as civil rights may 
not be doing well, but if it is perceived as doing poorly in delivering basic services, it 
will not be trusted. 
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c) The more the government will be perceived as favoring a certain ethnic group, the 
more it will be viewed as unfair and therefore less trusted. However, those who feel 
that their ethnic group is favored will be more trusting of government. 
d) Perceptions of political stability will lead for trust for government regardless of 
evaluations of performance in other sectors. 
e) Perceptions regarding tax payment will reflect trust for central government if citizens 
indicate that they are willing to pay more taxes. It will show that they trust the 
government to use their money well. 
f) Trust in the electoral commission and electoral process will reflect trust for 
government, indicating that citizens do view the government as legitimate, regardless 
of whether they support it or not. 
7.3 Study context and Methodology 
As elaborated in chapter three, the unit of study is the central government of Uganda, and the 
study was carried out in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda, in three of its five 
administrative divisions of Kawempe, Rubaga and Central Divisions. I relied on a qualitative 
methodological approach to collect data for this study. I conducted 12 focus groups, including 
men, women and youth, subdivided into highly educated and lowly educated groups. The 
participants in the groups were selected using both stratified random sampling and purposeful 
sampling. The total FGD sample consisted 49 adults. This data from focus groups was used to 
explore the perceptions of Ugandans towards government performance and trust issues. In 
addition, I also conducted five in depth interviews with purposely selected key informants, 
mainly academics and political commentators. I also reviewed some documents and media 
content. This data was used to supplement the FGD data and to also get a more nuanced 
analysis of Uganda's political environment. 
7.4 Summary of the Key Findings 
I present a summary of the key findings with respect to the individual research questions 
raised in this study thus; 
1. What is the nature and role of central government and how is this related to citizens' 
responsibilities) 
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Two definitions on the nature and role of central government emerged from the discussions. 
The first was neutral, concentrating on government as that responsible for the management of 
public affairs 'the body that runs the country' (according to the lowly educated men in 
Kawempe), or as the 'body that rules us' (according to various women groups). The second 
was normative, relating to the kind of responsibilities that government had towards the 
general public. Central government was also mainly defined in terms of the elected political 
leadership, with major emphasis on the president who was constantly referred to as Mzee, by 
various discussants. The picture of government is that of a big patron who is able to give or 
withhold privileges at its will, depending on how the citizens 'behave'. 
Thus, government was seen as having the role of 'looking after its people so that they do not 
lack anything' by majority of the discussants. The general feeling was that government is 
responsible for delivering tangible social services such as health, education and security to the 
people, while the primary responsibility of the citizen is seen as paying tax and voting in 
elections.  
One recurrent idea in the discussions was the general feeling that government is now owned 
by 'few people' who do what they want regardless of people's preferences. There is a clear 
sense that the overall operation of central government is biased towards a particular tribe, and 
a few wealthy individuals. This finding should not be taken solely as a negative attitude 
towards the present government. There are indications that indeed the present government is 
unpopular with many people, but that may be in part due to the fact that the level of media 
freedom in the country allows robust discussions of critical views on a wide range of media 
outlets which urban dwellers are exposed to. 
 It is also possible that people look at government in negative light because of the type of 
expectations they have had over a long period of time. As earlier discussed, the present 
regime has been in power for 27 years, and perhaps people are using this accumulated 
knowledge about its performance to assess it. It is worth noting that long periods of 
comparative economic and political stability contribute to confidence in government, 
particularly when this can be contrasted with periods of instability which they clearly recall. 
Uganda has had such an environment, stagnation in the 1980's and relative stability in 1990s 
and 2000's, and perhaps the current ambivalence towards government is related to the now 
escalating economic and political instability. 
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7.4.1 Do people then not trust the government? 
But why is this bleak picture not followed by strong sentiments of distrust towards 
government? One productive way of thinking about this is to understand that the political 
imagination of Ugandans has been formed in a context of extreme insecurity in the post 
independence period, where ordinary people suffered most under brutal regimes. Just like in 
countries like Bangladesh, ordinary people may have lost faith in radical politics, so that 
'unless change is definitely proved to be a better alternative, the masses for the time being 
prefer to maintain the status quo (Jahan, 1980:217, cited in Ali and Hossain, 2006:21). 
Compared to the past governments of Amin and Obote then, it is not surprising that people, 
despite seeing the current government as largely unresponsive, would rather stick to it that 
face an uncertain change in regime. 
2. What are people's perceptions on government delivery of basic services? 
Discussions of the role of government largely centered on how well the government was 
doing in terms of delivering on basic social services. Governmental performance was judged 
largely on how it had delivered on peace and stability, education and economic growth. 
Universal Primary Education, and recently Universal Secondary Education, was largely used 
as an example of an area that government had registered much progress. In addition, 
government was commended for its policy on HIV/AIDS, with many discussants arguing that 
more people now have access to life saving drugs usually at no cost, 'people no longer die like 
before, and AIDS is not something that you cannot talk about' argued the highly educated 
women in Kawempe. More involvement of women in the public sphere and education were 
also noted, with constant references to the government getting 'women from the kitchen.'  
There was also constant reference to people being able to 'sleep' perhaps in contrast to the 
early 1980s where war had displaced people out of their homes. It is plausible that this is also 
the long running discourse of the regime, that always reminds people about the peace that was 
brought to the country. The youths however rarely shared this optimism about sleep, arguing 
that with the pervasive unemployment and hunger, sleeping' can no longer be something one 
aspires to. 
The worst government failure was noted as road infrastructure. Animated discussions pointed 
to the presence of potholes in most regions in the city, and the constant road accidents that 
arise from such a situation. There were those who noted however that in the countryside, the 
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main roads were being worked on, but the city had been neglected because it 'always votes 
opposition.' There are also big concerns over maternal health, especially among the groups of 
highly educated women, with many blaming the government for remembering women only 
when its election year, and discarding them after wards. The main referral hospital, it was 
argued, has no drugs, and yet the government was investing large amounts of money in 
buying fighter jets. Perhaps this argument shows the diverging priorities between those of 
everyday citizens and those in power. Some have argued that concentrating on national 
defense spending at the cost of basic social services is symptomatic of a regime trying to hold 
onto power by all means, with no respect for people's needs (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011). There 
were those in the discussions however who felt that defense spending is helping the 
government to stay safe, and also stabilize the neighboring countries. 
3. What perceptions do citizens have about corruption in government? 
Corruption was discussed as a very big problem affecting government. Many invoked the 
images of 'a cancer', like 'AIDS' to describe the state of corruption in the country. There were 
constant references to people in government offices asking for 'kitu kidogo' or something 
small in exchange for a service. Corruption was more among the 'big men' in government, 
especially the politicians, it was claimed, and there was a feeling that it had now become a 
way of life such that if someone is not corrupt, it will be so hard to progress in any field. 
There was little hesitancy about criticizing the top government leadership. Unlike in Hossain's 
(2005) study of poor people's perceptions towards government in Bangladesh, where the poor 
were reluctant to discuss corruption in high places due to visions of politicians as 'benevolent 
and charitable' the ordinary citizens in Uganda vehemently point to big men with big 
stomachs in central government, who are 'eating' all their money and 'satisfying their 
stomachs alone.' This is perhaps not surprising given wide spread media coverage of cases of 
grand corruption in offices such as that of the prime minister, the parliament, the health 
ministry and even the judiciary. 
Perceptions of corruption are one of the major factors that affect the feelings towards 
government. One interesting finding is that even for those respondents who admitted to 
benefiting from corrupt practices, they still noted its devastating effect on government 
activities. Many blamed corruption for the poor roads, a fledging school system and lack of 
medicine in health facilities. There was a general feeling that the government had no political 
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will to fight corruption, since it was one way of dispensing patronage and only selectively 
punish those opposing it (It is not surprising that a recent conviction of one of the ministers 
involved in loss of Gavi funds was met with wide spread protest from his home area, with his 
constituents claiming that government was 'persecuting their son,' while the other two culprits 
who come from the same region of as the president were set free). 
People's ambivalence makes sense in light of recent scandals involving loss of billions of 
shillings in international aid due to corruption, leading the EU to suspend aid to Uganda over 
allegations that officials in the office of the prime minister embezzled over USD 13 million 
(Rueters, Dec, 4, 2012). 
It is also indicative of the corruption trend that Transparency International's (2012) corruption 
perception Index places Uganda as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Discussants 
constantly expressed hope that if the government fought corruption, it would be able to fulfill 
most of its functions, and they would be able to trust it although they had little hope that this 
would be done. 
4. Perhaps that explains the attitudes towards tax payment….. 
Although there was generally a recognition that citizens need to pay tax in order to enable 
government fulfill its functions, on the question of whether they would be willing to pay more 
in order for this to be done, most discussants expressed negative responses. The general 
feeling was that there was no accountability for the taxes being paid, and that most of it was 
being misused by corrupt government officials. The ambivalence towards tax payment were 
directly connected to perceptions of wide spread corruption in government, and people's 
feeling that the taxes did not translate into tangible social benefits. Some discussants among 
the lowly educated women in Rubaga division blamed politicians who 'want to tarnish the 
name of the president' for misusing tax payers' money, and argued that if the president 
punished them, maybe then they could pay taxes. 
 
5. Could accountability be enforced through the electoral process? 
There was moderate faith in democratic accountability as a source of forcing government to 
respond to citizen needs. The youths talked proudly about being able to unseat strong 
government backed members of parliament through the vote and 'teaching the president a 
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lesson.' This optimism was however limited to other levels other than the presidential 
elections. It was strongly argued that it is highly impossible that the president can be removed 
through the vote, citing incidents of voter intimidation and massive rigging as means through 
which the presidential vote is manipulated. It may be for this reason that people cited voting 
for opposition candidates as a way of getting their revenge. Others argued that voting out the 
current president is risky because it may cause war, and yet they are not sure if someone new 
would perform any better. This is coupled with fledging faith in the electoral commission, 
which many accused of being biased in favor of the current regime. 
 It is possible that these evaluations of the electoral process and the electoral commission were 
affected by respondents' partisanship. It however emerged that even those who claimed to 
have voted in the president then decided to vote opposition MPs, because, 'it is possible to 
have change there' according to the uneducated men in Central division. Under conditions of 
last resort, collective action in form of riots and strikes was noted as a means of pressuring an 
unresponsive government. A number of respondents admitted to being involved in some form 
of demonstration in the past year, mainly as a result of a rigged election, and the acute 
inflation that followed the 2011 presidential elections. Strikes are always talked about as 'the 
fast way for the government to listen' and there were claims among the discussants that more 
money is spent on tear gas to quell rioters than on social services. 
6. What significance do social demographic variables have on valuations of trust and 
performance? 
The study found that age and ethnicity had a significant impact on the way people evaluated 
government performance, and their  subsequent trust in government. While older people were 
more predisposed to evaluate government positively, the young ones seemed less enthusiastic 
about the progress of government. Notable areas of disagreement were in evaluations of 
political stability, where majority of people in groups of older people had positive evaluation 
of government, with many basing on good security environment as the reason they trust the 
government. The youth groups however did not consider this as a major point of government 
performance, and even pointed out that there is constant insecurity especially in the city. 
These differences relate to the variations in the security environment under which different 
generations have grown up. While the old are more likely to value security, especially in 
comparison to past regimes, the youth groups have grown up under the current regime and 
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therefore are more concerned with problems of unemployment and infrastructure. Trust levels 
were therefore expressed as being higher among the older people than the youth. 
Ethnic differences also played a role in evaluations of government performance. Generally 
speaking, tribal favouritism was negatively evaluated by those who did not belong to the tribe 
that was 'eating'. The feeling among most respondents was that the current government had 
stayed so long in power and that only one particular tribe was eating. It would be good, they 
suggested, if another person would rule so that others can also get the chance to eat. 
What is interesting is that there were no marked gender nor educational differences in the way 
respondents evaluated government. Groups of both women and men, lowly and highly 
educated manifested a wide knowledge of government activities and political events in the 
country. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the respondents were from an urban 
population that is both politically informed and exposed to different kinds of political 
contestations among them. Groups showed marked interest in politics, with women 
surprisingly being vehemently critical of the regime, especially in how maternal health is 
being handled. This can be also perhaps explained by the vibrancy of the political 
environment within the city, and at the time of research, various types of political activism in 
form of demonstrations were taking place. 
7.5 Relating the Findings to the theoretical Framework and research 
Questions. 
The study posed the research question; how do of institutions impact on political trust? I then 
developed a theoretical framework that identified the perceptions of performance as the major 
determinants of political trust. Drawing from the theoretical perspectives of the study, 
institutional performance (the independent variable) was operationalized in terms of five 
criteria; the first is  perception of delivery of basic services. The assumption is that positive 
perceptions regarding service delivery in areas of health, education, and basic infrastructure 
would lead to positive evaluations of performance and more trust for government.  
Second, was perceptions of corruption, and the assumption was that if citizens perceive the 
central government as corrupt, they will feel that it is not performing well, and will therefore 
trust it less. This in turn will affect tax payment as citizens will feel that their money is not 
being used well . fourth is perceptions of political stability, and it was assumed that positive 
perceptions of political stability will lead to more trust for government. The fifth criteria was 
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perceptions of fairness, measured by  perceptions of tribalism. The study assumed that 
perceptions of tribalism in government allocation of resources would affect trust in 
government. For those who feel excluded, there would be less trust, while those who benefit 
will trust more. 
The study findings indicate a positive relationship between perceptions of good performance 
and political trust. It was clear from the discussions that the government enjoyed only a 
limited level of trust, mainly arising out of perceptions of poor delivery of services such as 
health, employment and roads. Miller's(1974) advice in the case of United states is important 
in the case of Uganda's situation today. Miller is convinced that only policies of social change 
can solve existing social problems and reduce political cynicism. He advocates for creative 
and constructive' action that will benefit the majority of the people and diminish feelings of 
frustration. The results of this study accept Millers conclusion that policy related discontent is 
a source of political cynicism among people. For those sectors such as security that were 
evaluated as performing well, citizens showed some level of trust for government, and often 
suggested that reduction in corruption would go a long way in restoring citizens trust in 
government.  
On perceptions of corruption, the study findings show perceptions of widespread corruption. 
Many discussants blamed pervasive corruption for failures in many government sectors, and 
often cited this as a reason they have very little trust in government. Others often suggested 
that fighting corruption would help restore the credibility of government, and ensure that 
government services reach the intended recipients.  
As Miller and Listhaug (1999) have also posited, corruption has a corrosive effect on political 
trust and regime legitimacy. This occurs because corruption undermines institutional 
effectiveness and fairness which serve as key indicators of government performance. In a 
study of Japan, Phillipines, Taiwanand Thailand, Chang and Chu (2006) also demonstrate that 
political corruption has strong trust eroding effects regardless of contextual factors. The 
findings of this study are also consistent with findings of Lavalle, et al(2011:19), who, using 
Afro-barometer data from surveys in 18 sub-Saharan African countries (including Uganda) 
found that perceptions of widespread corruption have a negative impact on citizens' trust in 
political institutions. In a similar study, Armah-Attoh, GyimahBoadi and Chikwanha 
(2007:12) in their study of corruption and institutional trust in Africa,  found that even after 
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taking into account the endogenity issue, perceived corruption still maintained its trust 
eroding effect. 
It also emerged from the findings that perceptions of tribalism are widespread, and have a 
negative effect on evaluations of government performance and political trust. While it was 
recognized that tribalism could benefit some people, the overall feeling was that it has led to 
neglect of various groups of people and undermined trust in the regime. It is no surprise then 
that those who feel left out of the system distrust the government and look at unconventional 
means of expressing their discontent. 
 Muller (1972) indicates that a low degree of trust in political authorities is strongly related to 
'readiness to engage in acts of unconventional dissent against the state' while Citrin's (1973) 
study of alienation in the San Fransisco Bay area found a strong relationship between feelings 
of disaffection from the national regime and self reported involvement in political protest. 
More generally, the findings from this study indicate that 'citizens are not fools' and contrary 
to Citrin's (1974) argument, the expression of anti political rhetoric is not just a fashionable 
way of thinking. Rather, as Mishler and Rose (2005) also found for the case of Russia, 
citizens appear to base their evaluations of a regime on its political and economic 
performance. 
In summary, the findings reveal that there is a moderate level of trust in government in 
Uganda and it is clearly related to perceptions of government performance in delivering 
services and political stability. Perception of government delivery of basic services, political 
stability and perceptions of corruption in government have the most impact on people's 
reported trust or distrust in government. Perceptions of rampant corruption seemed to have a 
highly corrosive effect on people's trust in government, coupled with the perceived neglect of 
basic social services such as health and road networks especially in the city. The moderate 
levels of trust expressed were, to quote a respondent from a lowly educated women group in 
Rubaga, 'only because, unlike past governments, people can now sleep, they don’t have to 
spend nights from bushes hiding away from soldiers.' 
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Table 4. Summary of major findings indicating the relationship between perceptions of performance and Trust in 
government 
Independent variable Trust in government(major findings) 
Corruption  Corruption was perceived to be widespread and to have a corrosive effect 
on trust in government. Respondents often cited corruption as the main 
reason they did not trust government. 
Delivery of basic 
services 
Government was perceived to be doing poorly in most sectors, especially 
roads, maternal health and employment. It was however credited for 
promoting primary education and HIV care. These perceptions had a big 
impact on trust, and perceptions of poor service delivery has a negative 
effect on trust in government. 
Tax payment Tax payment was perceived as necessary, but most respondents felt that 
the taxes paid are not properly used, citing corruption as the major reason 
for this. Most respondents did not trust the government to account for the 
taxes paid, and indicated that they would not be willing to pay more.  
Perceptions of 
tribalism/favoritism 
It was widely perceived that most opportunities in government were given 
to a particular tribe, where the president comes from. Some respondents 
however argued that it is only a small clique 'eating'. Perceptions of 
tribalism seemed to have a negative impact on trust in government, 
especially for those who felt that they did not belong to the 'eating' tribe. 
Political stability and 
security 
The government was evaluated positively especially among groups of 
older people for providing political stability. This seemed to be the biggest 
factor for the existing moderate trust in government. There were however 
those that argued that there is increasing insecurity in form of robberies 
and child sacrifices which were affecting human security. 
The electoral process The electoral process was perceived as unfair especially at the presidential 
level, although some respondents noted that at parliamentary level, it is 
possible to have meaningful elections. The electoral commission was 
mainly seen as biased towards the ruling NRM.  
Demographic variables 
(age, gender, education) 
Age appeared to have a significant impact on evaluations of performance 
and consequently expressed trust in government. Older people, perhaps 
using their experiences from past regimes, seemed to have more positive 
evaluations and more trust in government than young people. There were 
no marked gender or education differences in evaluations of government 
performance and trust.  
 
Source: Author's derivations from field data. 
7.6 Contributions of the study to Trust Research  
The study makes an important contribution to existing literature on trust in general and more 
importantly in Sub Saharan Africa. As has been mentioned, there is a paucity of literature 
focusing on trust on the African continent and this study is a move towards improving on 
these lacunae. Additionally, the study goes beyond the usual quantitative approaches and use 
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of multi-country aggregated survey data (such as Afro barometer) to adopt a qualitative and 
more nuanced study of the intricacies of trust, and the meanings that people attach to trust 
evaluations that are often not explored using survey data. 
Equally important, the study findings contribute to the institutional argument advanced by 
scholars such as Uslaner (2005), Askvik, Jamil and Dhakal (2011), Rothstein (2011) and 
Gymah-Boadi (2008) regarding the relationship between trust and the performance, of 
government institutions. Uslaner has specifically advanced an argument that cites corruption 
as the most detrimental to public trust in government, while Rothstein argues that the quality 
of government institutions determines how much trust people will have in them. In the case of 
Uganda and many other sub Saharan African countries, the implication is that it is not enough 
for government to enhance its legitimacy only through electioneering, its institutions must be 
seen to work to improve the general well being of society for it to be trusted. 
On a theoretical note, the study contributes to developing more concrete indicators of 
institutional performance and political trust in case of developing countries. Unlike in the 
majority of studies where the generic question to measure trust in government is 'how much 
can you trust the government to do the right thing? And is government run by a few people 
looking for their own interests? The indicators that I develop from the literature address more 
concrete issues such as corruption, trust in the electoral system, perceptions of tribal 
favoritism, perceptions of tax payment, which not only tap into the original generic 
questions(both of them address issues of corruption and fairness) but also make evaluations of 
perceptions of trust and performance more concrete. 
7.7 Study limitations 
The imbalance of power relations is likely to affect research that seeks the views of everyday 
citizens on the powerful institution of government, thus affecting the way in which 
individuals air their views (Hossain, 2008:9). Moreover, without measures of partisanship or 
ideology in the data set, I could not fully test the possible explanations for institutional 
confidence. Clearly, partisanship is an important explanation for trust in government, where 
those who share the ideology of the party in government express greater trust than those from 
opposition parties. There is no way to know the nature and effect of omitting the partisanship 
variable. On a positive note, research by Uslaner (2004) offers some assurance, as he found 
surprisingly weak effects for partisanship and ideology in explaining trust in the state 
government generally.  
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There are also limitations with measuring citizens' perceived performance of institutions that 
should be taken into account. Nye, Zelikow, & King, (1997) note, 'people say they are 
dissatisfied with the performance of government, and in a democracy that is one important 
measure. But performance is more complicated than it first appears. Performance compared 
with what? Expectations? The past? Other countries? And what are people willing to pay for 
government efficiency?....' Other scholars argue that citizens may not always have adequate 
knowledge about the roles and functioning of government institutions (Van de Walle, Van 
Roosbroek and Bouckaert, 2008). Future studies could address this anomaly by attempting to 
develop more objective indicators of performance of government.  
I must also note that one of the limitations of the study is that it used a generic measure of 
trust, and did not ask respondents about their level of trust in specific institutions such as 
parliament, police, or the judiciary. It is also possible that other qualitative methods such as a 
comparative case study of rural urban differences in attitudes, or maybe choosing one specific 
institution of government such as police could have helped a deeper understanding of 
government-citizen relationships. Measurement was limited to 'trust in central government' 
only and did not take into account respondents' trust in local governments which have an 
influence on the everyday delivery of various services. It would be important for future 
research, adopting a qualitative methodology, to explore trust in these different agencies to 
provide a more comprehensive analysis and understanding of citizen's trust. 
With a small sample, further work will be needed to explore the extent of the generalisability 
of these results; nevertheless, I felt that the issues of trust and institutional performance were 
interesting enough to study and it has been possible to make sense of the findings within the 
limitations of the approach I used.  
7.8 Suggestions for further research 
Future research should develop more concrete  indicators  of subjective orientations towards 
the political system and specify more precisely the cognitive process that link policy 
dissatisfaction to political distrust. It would be useful to distinguish operationally between 
attitudes towards incumbent office holders, outcomes of ongoing policies and rejection of the 
entire political system.  
This research focused solely on perceptions of an urban population which is relatively more 
informed and politically active. It would also be useful to do comparative studies between 
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rural and urban populations to see what similarities or divergences there are towards policy 
satisfaction and trust in institutions. 
7.9 Conclusion and reflections 
The study uses a foundation of rich qualitative data to shed light on the link between 
perceived government performance and trust in government in Uganda. More specifically, the 
study sets out to test the institutional performance theory that suggests that citizens' trust for 
government arises out of perceptions of positive outputs in service delivery. The findings 
from the study by and large support this theoretical argument. The perception that government 
is performing poorly in delivering basic services, is corrupt and unfair usually  lead to less 
trust  political institutions by citizens. 
 Overall, the findings from this study should come as good news for Uganda and the 
performnce of democracy in general. Since institutional performance influences trust in 
political institutions, better performance is likely to generate more trust. In contrast, if 
demographic variables had been found to greatly influence trust, then demographic change 
would have been essential to foster trust and sustain democracy. This however is not the case 
in Uganda as found in other contexts too. Demographic change is not possible by deliberate 
institutional and social change. In contrast, institutional performance can be augumented 
through political commitment and institutional design. 
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Appendix 1: Focus Group Guide for 'Institutional performance and 
political trust' Research. 
Questions: 
1. Let’s start the discussion by talking about central government. What is central government?  
a) Who owns it?  
b) What does it do?   
c) Where can you see it working?  
2. Of the things that central government is doing, what is most important to you? 
a) Which services do you think government has excelled in providing? 
b) What are some things that central government is not doing that are important to you? 
c) In your opinion, has there been any changes in the way government has been providing 
services since 1986. Explain. 
 
d) Suppose government could do more if tax was raised, would you be willing to pay more tax? 
Explain.  
e) If government failed to do what citizens ask, can they force it to do it? How? 
 
Citizen Responsibilities 
3. Do citizens have any roles and responsibilities in government? What are these? 
a. How important are these for the proper functioning of government?  
b. Do citizens have any avenues of voicing their issues to government? What are these? 
c. Does government listen? Whose views does government listen to? 
4. Participation and Protest 
a) What are your comments on the electoral commission 
b) In your opinion, to what extent is the electoral process free and fair? 
c) Are there any other avenues for expressing discontent? 
d) In your experience, what are the reasons people protest against central government? 
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Corruption 
5.  Let's talk about corruption now. What do you understand by corruption?  
a) What do you think of corruption in central government? 
b)  How does corruption affect government activities? 
6. Fairness 
a) In your opinion, does every citizen have equal access to government services? 
b) In your opinion, to what extent does tribalism/nepotism influence access to government 
services? 
c) How does tribalism affect government service provision? 
 
Security 
a) How important is security to you? 
b) In your opinion, what do you think of the security situation in Uganda for the past 20 years? 
c) Where do you see Uganda in the next 10 years? 
 
Trust 
7)What does trust mean to you? 
a) What are the qualities of a trustworthy institution? 
b) Would you say you trust the central government of Uganda? Why? Or why not? 
c) What makes citizens lose trust in the government? 
d) What can government do for it to gain the trust of citizens? 
e) In general what is your opinion on the political environment in the country? 
7) Any other comments? 
That concludes our focus group.  Thank you so much for coming and sharing your thoughts and 
opinions with us.  If you have additional information that you did not get to say in the focus group, 
please feel free to write it on a piece of paper. 
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Appendix 11: Interview Schedule for Key Informants (modified depending 
on who is being interviewed). 
1. A recent Afro-barometer survey indicated that 74% of Ugandans do not trust government, 
and that support for the government had declined from 62% before the 2011 election to 47% 
now. What is your take on this? 
2. In your opinion, what do you consider have been the most important phases in the NRM 
regime? What have been the most important roles of central government? How have these 
roles changed over time? 
3. The government recently banned the pressure group A4C(Action for Change), what do you 
think of this development? What does it mean for organised protest? 
4. What is your take on the ongoing public protest since the 2011 elections? 
5. Turning to economic issues now, how have you felt the impact of inflation in this country for 
the past year? What do you think are its political and economic implications? 
6. What is your take on corruption in central government? 
7. In your opinion, to what extent has the NRM regime lived up to its promises? 
8. Where  do you see Uganda in the next 10 years? 
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Appendix 111 Location and political map of the republic of 
Uganda(excluding new districts) 
Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/uganda-political-map.jpg 
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Appendix IV. Official Authorisation for Field work. 
 
